Minnesota Lawyers Mutual Insurance v. Antonelli, Terry, Stout & Kraus, LLP

472 F. App'x 219
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedMarch 29, 2012
Docket10-2404
StatusUnpublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 472 F. App'x 219 (Minnesota Lawyers Mutual Insurance v. Antonelli, Terry, Stout & Kraus, LLP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Minnesota Lawyers Mutual Insurance v. Antonelli, Terry, Stout & Kraus, LLP, 472 F. App'x 219 (4th Cir. 2012).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Antonelli, Terry, Stout & Kraus, LLP (“the Antonelli Firm”) and Donald E. Stout, Esq. (“Stout”) (collectively “Appellants”) seek a declaratory judgment that their insurer, Minnesota Lawyers Mutual Insurance Co. (“MLM”), has a duty to defend them in a pending Florida state court action (“the Ferguson action”). The district court, applying Virginia law, determined that MLM does not have a duty to defend Appellants because the Ferguson complaint falls within the insurance policy’s Business Enterprise Exclusion. We affirm.

I.

This case returns to us after we previously reversed and remanded the district court’s dismissal of the action. Minn. Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Antonelli, Terry, Stout & Kraus, LLP, 355 Fed.Appx. 698 (4th Cir.2009). We instructed the district court on remand to “decidef ] whether the allegations in the [Ferguson ] complaint were within the scope of the insurance policy.” Id. at 702. To do so, the district court compared the Ferguson complaint and the insurance policy. The district court thoroughly described both documents, so we need only briefly recount the most salient points.

*221 A.

According to the Ferguson complaint, in 1986, inventor and entrepreneur Andrew Andros formed Telefind Corp. in order to develop and market wireless email technology (“WET”). Telefind retained Appellants to perform patent prosecutions on its behalf. Over time, Appellants’ role evolved: from pure attorneys to equity investors to increasingly immersing themselves in counseling and managing Telefind’s strategy and operations.

Telefind received substantial financial backing from a group of outside investors (“the Richards Investors”). The Richards Investors lent Telefind $6 million via a loan convertible to equity through a Panamanian corporation, Flatt Morris, S.A. The loan agreement specified that Stout would serve as trustee for Flatt Morris and would “hold all of Telefind’s intellectual property [both current and prospective] in trust for the benefit of Flatt Morris ... in the event that Telefind defaulted.” Over time, Appellants acquired a majority equity share of Flatt Morris, including its Telefind assets.

In 1989, Telefind signed a leasing agreement with Computer Leasco, Inc. (“Leas-co”) whereby Leasco provided Telefind with computers in exchange for a monthly fee and a security interest in Telefind’s intellectual property. When Telefind fell behind on its payments, Leasco sued. Around the same time, Telefind began negotiating with AT&T and France Telecom regarding the potential sale of its WET. Concerned that Leasco might interrupt these negotiations with a judgment against Telefind, Stout negotiated a “standstill agreement” with Leasco pending the outcome of the AT&T and Telecom negotiations.

As the negotiations faltered and Leasco became impatient, “Stout devised a legal strategy that he told [the] Richards Investors and Andy Andros would legally protect ... Telefind[’s] ... interest in the [WET].” In order to avoid Telefind’s creditors, Stout recommended placing the WET patents in a separate legal entity. Stout stressed that the Ferguson plaintiffs would “lose their entire interest in the [WET] if they did not follow his advice.”

To implement Stout’s strategy, three ESA Telecommunications (“ESA”) employees — a company that Telefind worked with previously — filed the WET patents “in their own names as inventors.” Stout emphasized that Andros and the Richards Investors could “not have any documented direct ownership interest in the [WET],” but he assured them that “they would continue to participate in any benefits associated with the '[WET].” Pursuant to this understanding, the Ferguson plaintiffs disavowed their legal interest in the patents. The ESA employees then assigned the patents to Stout. Finally, in June 1992, Stout created a shell corporation, NTP, Inc., to hold the WET patents.

The strategy succeeded. Though Leas-co eventually obtained a judgment against Telefind, NTP prevented Leasco from obtaining any share of the WET patents. NTP’s success was based, in part, on representations from Andros stating that he had no interest in the WET. Andros allegedly made these representations based on Appellants’ assurances that he would continue to retain a share of any future profits.

In late 2001, ten months after Andros died, NTP filed a patent infringement action against Research In Motion (“RIM”), alleging that RIM’s Blackberry system infringed on the WET patents. In March 2006, RIM settled the suit for $612.5 million and received a perpetual license. Stout, his partners at the Antonelli firm, and others apportioned the settlement.

*222 When Andros’s surviving family and the Richards Investors contacted Stout regarding their share of the RIM settlement, Stout denied the existence of any such arrangement and refused to share the settlement. The Ferguson action ensued, asserting, on the bases of the above facts, claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. In the complaint, the Ferguson plaintiffs do not challenge NTP’s ownership of the WET patents. They argue only that their implicit understanding with Appellants was that they would receive a share of any WET profits.

B.

During the relevant period, the Antonelli Firm had a Professional Liability Insurance Policy (“the Policy”) with MLM that covered

all sums ... which the INSURED may be legally obligated to pay as DAMAGES due to any CLAIM:
(1) arising out of any act, error or omission of the INSURED or a person for whose acts the INSURED is legally responsible; and
(2) resulting from the rendering or failing to render PROFESSIONAL SERVICES while engaged in the private practice of law....

Applying this language, the district court determined that some of the “damages alleged in the Ferguson complaint resulted from [covered] legal services rendered by [Appellants].” It thus held that, “barring any applicable exclusions, MLM has a duty to defend [Appellants] in the underlying action.” MLM does not challenge this conclusion on appeal.

The district court next considered MLM’s argument that the allegations in the Ferguson complaint triggered the Policy’s Business Enterprise Exclusion (“BEE”). * The BEE excludes

any CLAIM arising out of PROFESSIONAL SERVICES rendered by any INSURED in connection with any business enterprise:
(a) owned in whole or part;
(b) controlled directly or indirectly; or
(c) managed,
by any INSURED, and where the claimed DAMAGES resulted from conflicts of interest with the interest of any client or former client or with the interest of any person claiming an interest in the same or related business enterprise.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
472 F. App'x 219, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/minnesota-lawyers-mutual-insurance-v-antonelli-terry-stout-kraus-llp-ca4-2012.