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Minneman v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville

105 F.2d 363, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3331
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJune 2, 1939
DocketNos. 6851, 6859, 6866, 6865
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 105 F.2d 363 (Minneman v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Minneman v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 105 F.2d 363, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3331 (7th Cir. 1939).

Opinion

SPARKS, Circuit Judge.

These four appeals are from four similar orders entered by the District Court, November 15, 1938, in four separate actions instituted under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203. Because the questions' presented by the four cases were practically identical, we ordered that they be heard together and we have so considered them.

The question presented in each case is the validity of an order striking from the debtor’s schedule certain real estate, and dismissing the debtor proceeding. We append a chart showing the chronological sequence of events in the various proceedings.* It is clear that with a few variations indicated on the chart, the facts in each case follow the same pattern: Foreclosure of mortgages after default; petitions by mortgagors for extension or composition under section 75; stay of foreclosure proceedings pending disposition of debtor proceedings; failure of proceedings for composition, in some but not all cases followed by amendment of petitions for relief under subsection (s) of section 75; dismissal of the debtor proceedings in all cases on the ground of the unconstitutionality of subsection (s) on the authority of a case decided by the lower court, In re Mullikin; sale of the real estate; filing of a second petition under section 75 very shortly before the expiration of the period of redemption; dismissal of the second petition; issuance of the sheriff’s deed; surrender of possession to the purchaser; reinstatement of the proceedings on motion of the court following the amendment on March 4, 1938, of section 75 (s) to provide for reinstatement of all cases erroneously dismissed on the ground of the unconstitutionality of subsection (s) ; orders of November 15, 1938, sustaining motions by the various creditors and intervenors in the proceedings to strike the real estate from the schedules and dismiss the proceedings. In each case the court found as a part of its conclusions of law, that there was no reasonable hope that the debtor could rehabilitate himself or herself within the three-year period provided by the Act. In three of the cases (Nevins, Bond, Crouse) the real estate in question had been sold, after issuance of the sheriff’s deed, and prior to the reinstatement of the [365]*365causes, to third parties who had thereupon entered into possession of the land.

[364]*364

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Related

Thornton v. Carter
109 F.2d 316 (Eighth Circuit, 1940)

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Bluebook (online)
105 F.2d 363, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3331, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/minneman-v-federal-land-bank-of-louisville-ca7-1939.