Minneapolis, St. P., R. & D. Electric Traction Co. v. Searle

208 F. 122, 127 C.C.A. 89, 1913 U.S. App. LEXIS 1678
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 23, 1913
DocketNo. 3,882
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 208 F. 122 (Minneapolis, St. P., R. & D. Electric Traction Co. v. Searle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Minneapolis, St. P., R. & D. Electric Traction Co. v. Searle, 208 F. 122, 127 C.C.A. 89, 1913 U.S. App. LEXIS 1678 (8th Cir. 1913).

Opinion

SANBORN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal assails a decree of the court below to the effect that the Traction Company pay to George W. Searle $1,000 damages for the construction and operation of its railroad diagonally across Linden street, in the city of Northfield, Minn., in front of his residence, and in large part upon that part of his lot covered by the street. The railroad which the Traction Company was building was a commercial, as distinguished from a street, railway. The city of Northfield had granted to it the right to lay and operate its railroad across Linden street at the place and in the way in which it was doing, on condition that this grant should not affect the rights of individual property holders. Searle brought suit to enjoin the construction and operation of the railroad. The company [123]*123answered and filed a cross-bill for an injunction against interference by Searle, and prayed that if that injunction should he denied the court should assess the damages for the crossing. The facts in the case were stipulated, and the court assessed the damages and held that Searle was entitled to recover them. No complaint of the amount of these damages is made, and the only question here is whether the damage resulting to the owner of a lot by the careful construction and operation of a commercial railroad across a street in front of his lot imposes an additional servitude thereon and constitutes a legal injury, or is such a public use of the street for one of the purposes for which it was dedicated that it is damnum absque injuria. Both parties concede that this is a question of local law, and that, if it has been answered by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, that answer is decisive of this case. Counsel for the Traction Company, however, persuasively argue that the Minnesota court has never directly answered it, and that it is the duty of this court to hold under general principles that the crossing of a street by a commercial railroad in front of a lot imposes no additional servitude thereon.

Conceding, but not admitting, that ihe Supreme Court of Minnesota has never expressly decided that such a crossing by a public corporation imposes an additional servitude upon the lots in front of which it is made, has it not announced and adhered to rules of law which demonstrate that such is its opinion, and that this opinion will inevitably be declared whenever the question is squarely presented to it for determination? For, as this is a question of local law, regarding which it is the duty and pleasure of this court to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, it is the part of wisdom, if the decisions of that court clearly show what its answer to this question will be when it is squarely presented, to so answer it now that the answer of this court will he in harmony with that of the Supreme Court of Minnesota.

[1, 2] It has been the settled law of Minnesota since 1868 that the construction and operation of a commercial railroad upon and along the streets of a city did not fall within the public highway or street easement, hut imposed an additional servitude upon abutting lots for which their owners could recover damages. Gray v. First Division of St. Paul & Pacific R. R. Co., 13 Minn. 315 (Gil. 289); Harrington v. St. Paul & Sioux City R. R. Co., 17 Minn. 215 (Gil. 188); Carli v. Stillwater Street Railway & Transfer Co., 28 Minn. 373, 376, 10 N. W. 205, 41 Am. Rep. 290. Judge Berry, who delivered the first opinion of the Supreme Court to this effect, while discussing and applying the principle upon which that decision rests in Newell v. Minneapolis, Lyndale & Minnetonka Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 112, 114, 27 N. W. 839, 840 (59 Am. Rep. 303), said:

"The public easement in a public street is the public and common right to use the sanie for the passage of persons and things, and for purposes incidental thereto. The exercise of this right is subject, in some degree, to regulations to be made by the proper authorities. The ownership of the soil on which the street is laid being- absolute, subject only to the street easement, the owner has the right to insist that the street shall be used and enjoyed for the legitimate purposes of its creation and existence, and Cor no others. * * * Thus, for instance, an ordinary railroad, constructed and [124]*124operated In and along a street, though it is used for the passage of persons and property, and is therefore, so far as this general nature of its business is concerned, using the street for proper street purposes, yet the mode of its construction or operation, or both, are such as to monopolize the street, and virtually and practically exclude the general public from its legitimate use. So that the use of the street for such railroad is inconsistent with the common and public use of it, in which every person is entitled to share, and hence it is held to be the imposition upon the soil of a servitude differing from, and additional to, that of the proper and lawful street easement. The case of an ordinary street railway is otherwise. * * * So that when a street is beihg used for the purpose (legitimate in its general nature) of the passage of persons and property, but objection is made to the mode of use, the question of rightfulness depends upon whether the use objected to is consistent or inconsistent with the common public use, in which every person is entitled to share.”

In Adams v. Chicago, Burlington & Northern R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, 295, 39 N. W. 629, 1 L. R. A. 493, 12 Am. St. Rep. 644, and in Lamm v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 45 Minn. 71, 78, 47 N. W. 455, 10 L. R. A. 268, the Minnesota court after twice hearing and considering elaborate arguments of the question, decided that the construction and operation of a commercial railroad on one-half of a street was the taking of the property of. an owner of a lot on the opposite side of the street, who was also the owner of the fee of the land in front of his lot to the middle line of the street, subject to the public highway easement, because it was an impairment of his individual easement in the street in front of his lot to the full width of the street for the purposes of access,' light, and air. In the Adams Case that court stated its conclusions, to which it adhered in no uncertain terms in the Ramm Case, in these words:

“The conclusions arrived at are that the owner of a lot abutting on a public street has, independent of the fee in the street, as appurtenant to his lot, an easement in the street in front of his lot to the full width of the street, for admission of light and air to his lot, which easement is subordinate only to the public right; that depriving him of, or interfering with his enjoyment of, the easement for any public use not a proper street use is a taking of his property within the meaning of the Constitution; that mpro-priating a public street to the construction and operation of an ordinary commercial railroad upon it is not a proper street use; that where, without his consent and without compensation to him, such a railroad is laid and operated along the portion of the street in front of his lot, so as upon that part of the street to cause smoke, dust, cinders, etc., which darken or pollute the air, coming from that part of the street upon his lot, he may recover whatever damages to his lot are caused by so laying and operating such railroad on that part of the street;”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
208 F. 122, 127 C.C.A. 89, 1913 U.S. App. LEXIS 1678, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/minneapolis-st-p-r-d-electric-traction-co-v-searle-ca8-1913.