24CA1307 Minks v CDHS 06-05-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1307 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CV33443 Honorable Sarah B. Wallace, Judge
Ares Minks,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
State Department of Human Services,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Freyre and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 5, 2025
Ares Minks, Pro Se
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Nicole Chaney, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, the State Department of Human Services (the
Department), appeals the district court’s order requiring the
Department to adopt the initial decision of an administrative law
judge (ALJ), which concluded that plaintiff, Ares Minks, was not
responsible for child abuse or neglect, as a final agency decision.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Background
¶2 In April 2019, the El Paso County Department of Human
Services was notified of allegations of sexual assault of A.M. The
Department investigated the report and found Minks responsible for
intrafamilial sexual abuse — minor severity of A.M. Pursuant to
section 19-3-308(11), C.R.S. 2024, and Department of Human
Services Rule 7.111, 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-2, Minks requested
a fair hearing, which was held before an ALJ in the Office of
Administrative Courts. In February 2022, the ALJ issued an initial
decision concluding that the Department failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Minks was responsible for child
abuse or neglect.
¶3 The Department filed exceptions requesting a reversal of the
ALJ’s initial decision. Minks responded, and the staff adjudicator of
1 the Office of Administrative Courts’ Office of Appeals (the Agency)
issued a final agency decision reversing the ALJ’s initial decision
and confirming the Department’s original finding that Minks was
responsible for intrafamilial sexual abuse — minor severity of A.M.
¶4 Pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act, section
24-4-106(4), C.R.S. 2024, Minks sought judicial review in the
district court of the final agency decision, arguing that the Agency’s
decision to set aside evidentiary facts found by the ALJ was
arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law. The district court
reversed the final agency decision, concluding that the Agency
exceeded its authority by making improper credibility
determinations and disregarding admitted evidence supporting the
ALJ’s ultimate conclusion of fact — that the Department failed to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Minks was
responsible for intrafamilial sexual abuse — minor severity of A.M.
¶5 According to the Department, the district court’s order to
reinstate the initial decision left the administrative record without a
final agency decision. The Department thus moved to amend the
judgment, asking the court to include a remand order for the
Agency to reissue a final agency decision in accordance with the
2 court’s order and the law. After holding a hearing, the court agreed
that its order created an absence of a final agency decision.
¶6 The court then issued an amended order remanding the
matter to the Agency with directions to enter a final agency decision
“consistent with the [amended] order and affirming the [ALJ’s]
Initial Decision[] holding that the . . . Department’s confirmation of
[Minks] as responsible for ‘intrafamilial sexual abuse — minor
severity’ of A.M. [wa]s reversed.” This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
¶7 The Department does not dispute that the district court
properly reversed and remanded the matter to the Agency. But it
contends that the court exceeded its authority by ordering the
Agency to adopt the ALJ’s initial decision as a final agency decision
rather than remanding for further proceedings.1 We agree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 When reviewing a district court’s decision in an administrative
review proceeding, we sit in the same position as the district court
1 The Department does not challenge the district court’s conclusion
that the Agency exceeded its authority by setting aside the ALJ’s credibility determinations and disregarding evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion of fact.
3 and apply the same standard of review as the district court. Ansel
v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 COA 172M, ¶ 12. In each such case
under review, the court “shall determine all questions of law and
interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved and
shall apply the interpretation to the facts duly found or
established.” § 24-4-106(7)(d). We may set aside a final agency
action if it is contrary to law. Ansel, ¶ 12.
¶9 Whether the district court exceeded its authority in directing
the Agency to enter a final agency decision affirming the ALJ’s
initial decision is a question of law that we review de novo. See id.
at ¶ 13; Whitelaw v. Denver City Council, 2017 COA 47, ¶ 8 (noting
that appellate court’s review of district court’s decision in
administrative matter).
¶ 10 Section 24-4-106(7) grants district courts the authority to
review final agency actions to determine whether, inter alia, the
agency exceeded its authority or abused its discretion. If the court
finds no error, “it shall affirm the agency action.” § 24-4-106(7)(a).
If, on the other hand, the court determines that the agency has
acted contrary to law or exceeded its authority, inter alia, under
subsection (7)(b), the court “shall hold unlawful and set aside the
4 agency action and . . . remand the case [to the agency] for further
proceedings.” § 24-4-106(7)(b) (emphasis added). On remand back
to the agency for further proceedings, the agency has the
responsibility to make its own conclusions of fact. See Nixon v. City
& Cnty. of Denver, 2014 COA 172, ¶¶ 26-27.
B. Discussion
¶ 11 Here, the district court found that the Agency exceeded its
authority. Section 24-4-106(7)(b) prescribes the remedies available
to the district court, including remanding the case. While the
district court properly remanded the case to the Agency, it did not
“remand the case for further proceedings” as required by the statute,
§ 24-4-106(7)(b) (emphasis added), and instead directed the Agency
to adopt a specific final agency decision. See City & Cnty. of Denver
v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 947 P.2d 1373, 1380 (Colo. 1997)
(recognizing that when reviewing administrative proceedings under
section 24-4-106(7), both district and appellate courts have plenary
authority to review and remand the case for further proceedings).
¶ 12 In Nixon, a division of our court noted, “[O]nce the [district]
court determined that the [agency] had abused its discretion by
misapplying the law, the court was required to remand the case to
5 the [agency] for review under the correct legal standard.” Nixon,
¶ 33. The division held that the district court “erred by making its
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24CA1307 Minks v CDHS 06-05-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1307 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CV33443 Honorable Sarah B. Wallace, Judge
Ares Minks,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
State Department of Human Services,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Freyre and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 5, 2025
Ares Minks, Pro Se
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Nicole Chaney, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, the State Department of Human Services (the
Department), appeals the district court’s order requiring the
Department to adopt the initial decision of an administrative law
judge (ALJ), which concluded that plaintiff, Ares Minks, was not
responsible for child abuse or neglect, as a final agency decision.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Background
¶2 In April 2019, the El Paso County Department of Human
Services was notified of allegations of sexual assault of A.M. The
Department investigated the report and found Minks responsible for
intrafamilial sexual abuse — minor severity of A.M. Pursuant to
section 19-3-308(11), C.R.S. 2024, and Department of Human
Services Rule 7.111, 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-2, Minks requested
a fair hearing, which was held before an ALJ in the Office of
Administrative Courts. In February 2022, the ALJ issued an initial
decision concluding that the Department failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Minks was responsible for child
abuse or neglect.
¶3 The Department filed exceptions requesting a reversal of the
ALJ’s initial decision. Minks responded, and the staff adjudicator of
1 the Office of Administrative Courts’ Office of Appeals (the Agency)
issued a final agency decision reversing the ALJ’s initial decision
and confirming the Department’s original finding that Minks was
responsible for intrafamilial sexual abuse — minor severity of A.M.
¶4 Pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act, section
24-4-106(4), C.R.S. 2024, Minks sought judicial review in the
district court of the final agency decision, arguing that the Agency’s
decision to set aside evidentiary facts found by the ALJ was
arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law. The district court
reversed the final agency decision, concluding that the Agency
exceeded its authority by making improper credibility
determinations and disregarding admitted evidence supporting the
ALJ’s ultimate conclusion of fact — that the Department failed to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Minks was
responsible for intrafamilial sexual abuse — minor severity of A.M.
¶5 According to the Department, the district court’s order to
reinstate the initial decision left the administrative record without a
final agency decision. The Department thus moved to amend the
judgment, asking the court to include a remand order for the
Agency to reissue a final agency decision in accordance with the
2 court’s order and the law. After holding a hearing, the court agreed
that its order created an absence of a final agency decision.
¶6 The court then issued an amended order remanding the
matter to the Agency with directions to enter a final agency decision
“consistent with the [amended] order and affirming the [ALJ’s]
Initial Decision[] holding that the . . . Department’s confirmation of
[Minks] as responsible for ‘intrafamilial sexual abuse — minor
severity’ of A.M. [wa]s reversed.” This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
¶7 The Department does not dispute that the district court
properly reversed and remanded the matter to the Agency. But it
contends that the court exceeded its authority by ordering the
Agency to adopt the ALJ’s initial decision as a final agency decision
rather than remanding for further proceedings.1 We agree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 When reviewing a district court’s decision in an administrative
review proceeding, we sit in the same position as the district court
1 The Department does not challenge the district court’s conclusion
that the Agency exceeded its authority by setting aside the ALJ’s credibility determinations and disregarding evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion of fact.
3 and apply the same standard of review as the district court. Ansel
v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 COA 172M, ¶ 12. In each such case
under review, the court “shall determine all questions of law and
interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved and
shall apply the interpretation to the facts duly found or
established.” § 24-4-106(7)(d). We may set aside a final agency
action if it is contrary to law. Ansel, ¶ 12.
¶9 Whether the district court exceeded its authority in directing
the Agency to enter a final agency decision affirming the ALJ’s
initial decision is a question of law that we review de novo. See id.
at ¶ 13; Whitelaw v. Denver City Council, 2017 COA 47, ¶ 8 (noting
that appellate court’s review of district court’s decision in
administrative matter).
¶ 10 Section 24-4-106(7) grants district courts the authority to
review final agency actions to determine whether, inter alia, the
agency exceeded its authority or abused its discretion. If the court
finds no error, “it shall affirm the agency action.” § 24-4-106(7)(a).
If, on the other hand, the court determines that the agency has
acted contrary to law or exceeded its authority, inter alia, under
subsection (7)(b), the court “shall hold unlawful and set aside the
4 agency action and . . . remand the case [to the agency] for further
proceedings.” § 24-4-106(7)(b) (emphasis added). On remand back
to the agency for further proceedings, the agency has the
responsibility to make its own conclusions of fact. See Nixon v. City
& Cnty. of Denver, 2014 COA 172, ¶¶ 26-27.
B. Discussion
¶ 11 Here, the district court found that the Agency exceeded its
authority. Section 24-4-106(7)(b) prescribes the remedies available
to the district court, including remanding the case. While the
district court properly remanded the case to the Agency, it did not
“remand the case for further proceedings” as required by the statute,
§ 24-4-106(7)(b) (emphasis added), and instead directed the Agency
to adopt a specific final agency decision. See City & Cnty. of Denver
v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 947 P.2d 1373, 1380 (Colo. 1997)
(recognizing that when reviewing administrative proceedings under
section 24-4-106(7), both district and appellate courts have plenary
authority to review and remand the case for further proceedings).
¶ 12 In Nixon, a division of our court noted, “[O]nce the [district]
court determined that the [agency] had abused its discretion by
misapplying the law, the court was required to remand the case to
5 the [agency] for review under the correct legal standard.” Nixon,
¶ 33. The division held that the district court “erred by making its
own findings in lieu of remanding the case to the [agency].” Id. The
division acknowledged that “[t]hese [we]re not mere legal
technicalities”; rather, “[t]his outcome [wa]s dictated by
longstanding Colorado statutory and case law and rules.” Id. at
¶ 9. Finally, the court recognized that the agency was not bound by
the hearing panel’s findings to decide an issue in any particular
way, and the court did “not mean to suggest any particular outcome
on remand to the [agency].” Id. at ¶ 32; see also Lawley v. Dep’t of
Higher Educ., 36 P.3d 1239, 1247 (Colo. 2001) (concluding that the
subject agency was not bound by the ALJ’s determination that the
defendant-university’s action was not arbitrary and capricious).
¶ 13 Therefore, while the district court properly reversed and
remanded the case to the Agency, it exceeded its authority by
directing the Agency to enter a final agency decision affirming the
ALJ’s initial decision. As the applicable statute and case law make
clear, the district court should have simply remanded the case to
the Agency for further proceedings.
6 III. Disposition
¶ 14 We affirm the portion of the district court’s order reversing the
Agency’s final decision and remanding the case to the Agency with
directions to enter a final agency action. We reverse the portion of
the order requiring the Agency to enter a final agency decision
consistent with the order and affirming the ALJ’s initial decision
holding that the “Department’s confirmation of [Minks] as
responsible for ‘intrafamilial sexual abuse — minor severity’ of A.M.
is reversed.” We direct the district court to remand the case to the
Agency for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s and the
district court’s opinion.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.