Milton v. Nelson

2026 Ohio 1513
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided April 27, 2026·No. 2025-T-0054·Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY

STEPHANIE L. MILTON, CASE NO. 2025-T-0054

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Civil Appeal from the

- vs - Newton Falls Municipal Court

JENNA NELSON, Trial Court No. 2025 CVI 00137 Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: April 27, 2026

Judgment: Affirmed

Danamarie K. Pannella, Holland & Muirden, Attorneys at Law, P.O. Box 345, Sharon Center, OH 44274 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).

April L. Woodward, 12373 Kinsman Road, Suite C111, Newbury, OH 44065 (For Defendant-Appellee).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Stephanie L. Milton, appeals the order entering judgment in favor of appellee, Jenna Nelson, on Milton’s claims. We affirm.

{¶2} In 2024, Milton adopted a seven-year-old mustang mare named “Lily”

through a program administered by the Bureau of Land Management. Milton contracted with Nelson for the care and training of Lily at Nelson’s facility. After transferring Lily to a different facility, Milton brought a small claims action against Nelson alleging breach of contract and animal cruelty.

{¶3} After trial, on July 21, 2025, the court issued a judgment in favor of Nelson.

{¶4} On appeal, Milton assigns two errors, which we address in reverse order to facilitate our discussion. In her second assigned error, Milton argues:

{¶5} “The judgment of the Trial Court was against the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reversed.”

{¶6} “‘Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.”’” Koller v. Zellman, 2018-Ohio-2463, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 24, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed. 1990). “A challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence requires an appellate court to review the evidence presented ‘including the reasonable inferences and the credibility of the witnesses, to determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the decision must be reversed.’” Straight v. Straight, 2020- Ohio-4692, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.), quoting Chandler v. Chandler, 2017-Ohio-710, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.), citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. “The weight to be given evidence and witness credibility are primarily for the trier of fact.” (Citation omitted.) Straight at ¶ 25. “The trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

{¶7} Here, Milton brought claims for a breach of contract and for civil liability for damages resulting from animal cruelty. “In order to be successful on a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff must provide evidence of the following: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant; and (4) damages.” Huffman v. Kazak Bros., 2002-Ohio-1683, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.), citing Doner v. Snapp, 98 Ohio App.3d 597, 600 (2d Dist. 1994).

PAGE 2 OF 14

{¶8} Milton brought her claim for animal cruelty under R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) and R.C. 959.13(A)(1). Under R.C. 2307.60(A)(1):

Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless specifically excepted by law, may recover the costs of maintaining the civil action and attorney’s fees if authorized by any provision of the Rules of Civil Procedure or another section of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state, and may recover punitive or exemplary damages if authorized by section 2315.21 or another section of the Revised Code.

{¶9} Relevant to this appeal, R.C. 959.13(A)(1) provides:

No person shall . . . [t]orture an animal, deprive one of necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, needlessly mutilate or kill, or impound or confine an animal without supplying it during such confinement with a sufficient quantity of good wholesome food and water. . . .

{¶10} “Civil liability for damages resulting from a criminal act, pursuant to R.C.

2307.60(A)(1), does not require an underlying criminal conviction.” Machlup v. Bowman, 2021-Ohio-4370, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.), citing Buddenberg v. Weisdack, 2020-Ohio-3832, ¶ 6- 14.

{¶11} At trial, the evidence established that Milton and Nelson entered into a contract for Nelson to board and train Lily. The contract contained the following provisions relevant to this appeal:

Client understands that Trainer offers no guarantee or warranty of any kind regarding Trainer’s services. In particular, Client understands that while Trainer will develop a training program for Horse designed to meet Client’s goals, Trainer can offer no guarantee that Client’s goals will be met within the time period that Client would like, or at all. Each horse is an individual and will progress at its own rate and according to its own talents and limitations.

...

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Horse may lose weight and suffer muscle strain or other stress- or labor-induced injuries . . . Client understands and expressly assumes all risks of putting horse in training, including the risk that Trainer and/or Trainer’s shareholders, officers, directors, members, managers, employees, agents, contractors and family members (collectively, the “Trainer Parties”) may be negligent. Accordingly, Client agrees to hold the Trainer Parties harmless for loss of or injury to Horse.

(Boldface omitted.)

{¶12} After the parties executed the agreement, Lily arrived at Nelson’s facility on June 15, 2024. When Lily arrived, she had significant nasal discharge. Nelson put Lily in quarantine and collected a sample of the discharge to have it tested by a veterinarian. Thereafter, the veterinarian determined that Lily had strep. Lily remained in quarantine for approximately one month while she recovered.

{¶13} Milton arrived at the facility in August to visit Lily. Milton testified that Lily’s “weight appeared fine at that time.” Milton observed Nelson run Lily through a series of basic training behaviors.

{¶14} Milton maintained that the parties communicated less frequently from August into September. Milton testified that she requested pictures and videos during this time, but Nelson did not send her sufficient information for her to be able to gauge how Lily was progressing. In September, Milton began to question whether Lily was receiving proper training. Milton’s associate, Julie Nation, who had also adopted a mustang that was initially transported with Lily, boarded her mustang at a facility owned by Nelson’s colleague, MacKenzie Duncan. Nation informed Milton that her mustang had received far more advanced training than Lily.

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{¶15} In late September, Milton gave Nelson notice that she would be removing Lily from Nelson’s facility. Milton recalled that Nelson called her, and Nelson seemed reluctant to let Milton remove the horse because Nelson was worried that the horse had not progressed as much as she would have liked, and she was concerned about her reputation. Milton testified that she agreed to post a message of gratitude on social media, crediting Nelson for training Lily, which seemed to appease Nelson. Milton asked Nelson to give Lily trailer training so she could be safely moved. Thereafter, Nelson sent her a video of Lily walking on to a trailer. Milton decided to engage Duncan to board and train Lily.

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Machlup v. Bowman
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State v. Thompkins
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