STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A24-1757
Hennepin County Procaccini, J. Took no part, Gaïtas, J.
Milton K. Sanders,
Appellant,
vs. Filed: July 2, 2025 Office of Appellate Courts State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
________________________
Milton K. Sanders, Moose Lake, Minnesota, pro se.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
to correct a sentence under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9,
because appellant’s consecutive sentences were authorized by law.
2. Any error in the district court’s failure to pronounce appellant’s criminal
history score at sentencing was harmless.
1 Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
OPINION
PROCACCINI, Justice.
Appellant Milton K. Sanders argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to correct a sentence under Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9. In 1997, a jury found Sanders guilty of one count of
first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. The district court
convicted Sanders of all counts, sentencing him to life in prison for the first-degree murder
conviction and to consecutive 180-month prison sentences for the attempted first-degree
murder convictions. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal in 1999.
Nearly 25 years later, in May 2024, Sanders filed a motion to correct a sentence,
arguing that his sentences were unauthorized by law because they unfairly exaggerated the
criminality of his conduct and were based on the wrong criminal history score. The district
court denied Sanders’s motion, and Sanders appealed. Because we conclude that the
consecutive sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of Sanders’s conduct and
any error related to Sanders’s criminal history score was harmless, we affirm.
FACTS
On October 5, 1997, Sanders fired shots outside an apartment building in
Minneapolis, killing a 16-year-old victim and injuring two other victims. State v. Sanders
(Sanders I), 598 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. 1999). Respondent State of Minnesota charged
Sanders with one count of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree
2 murder. The State’s theory of the case was that Sanders shot and injured two of the victims
because he was angry with them, but the 16-year-old victim was an innocent bystander. A
jury found Sanders guilty of all three counts. The district court convicted Sanders and
sentenced him to life in prison for his first-degree murder conviction and to consecutive
180-month sentences for his two attempted first-degree murder convictions.
Sanders filed a direct appeal raising several claims. Relevant here, he argued that
his consecutive sentences unfairly exaggerated the criminality of his conduct. We affirmed
Sanders’s convictions and sentences. In doing so, we concluded that Sanders’s life
sentence for first-degree murder and two consecutive 180-month sentences for attempted
first-degree murder did not exaggerate the criminality of his conduct because each offense
involved a different victim. In other words, we determined that Sanders’s consecutive
sentences were commensurate with his culpability.
Since his direct appeal, Sanders has filed four different petitions or motions seeking
relief from his convictions or sentences. Sanders filed his first petition for postconviction
relief in May 2000, making several arguments that are not relevant to this appeal. 1 See
Sanders v. State (Sanders II), 628 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Minn. 2001). The district court denied
the petition, and Sanders appealed. We affirmed the district court, concluding that
Sanders’s claims were procedurally barred by the rule stated in State v. Knaffla,
1 In his first petition, Sanders argued that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; his absence from two pretrial hearings violated his constitutional rights; the prosecutor engaged in misconduct; and the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the jury for some of a witness’s testimony to determine how much of the testimony was admissible.
3 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976), and that Sanders failed to show that he met an exception to
that rule. 2
Sanders filed his second postconviction petition in March 2010. Sanders v. State
(Sanders III), 791 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Minn. 2010). Sanders again made several arguments,
none of which are at issue in this appeal. 3 The district court denied Sanders’s petition, and
Sanders appealed. We again affirmed the district court, concluding that Sanders’s claims
were time-barred under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4 (2022), and that
no exception to the time bar applied.
2 Under the Knaffla rule, if a postconviction claim was raised, known, or should have been known at the time of a direct appeal, that claim is procedurally barred and will not be considered in a later petition for postconviction relief. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007) (citing Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741). There are two exceptions to this rule for an unraised claim: when “an issue is ‘so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available at the time of the direct appeal’ ” or when “a court decides that hearing the claim is ‘in the interest of justice.’ ” Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 9–10 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Quick v. State, 757 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Minn. 2008)). Similarly, the postconviction review statute bars claims in a postconviction petition “that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2024). The Legislature enacted this rule in 2005. Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 12, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1097 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1). We have not yet decided whether the Knaffla rule or its common law exceptions survived the 2005 amendment to the postconviction review statute. See Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 787 n.2 (Minn. 2013); Fox v. State, 913 N.W.2d 429, 433 n.2 (Minn. 2018); Onyelobi v. State, 932 N.W.2d 272, 279 n.3 (Minn. 2019). 3 In his second petition, Sanders argued that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; the district court abused its discretion by denying his requests for a continuance; the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the district court erred in instructing the jury; the district court improperly allowed certain testimony; and our application of Knaffla to Sanders’s first postconviction petition violated his right to due process of law.
4 In August 2020, Sanders filed a motion asserting that his sentences were
unauthorized by law and unfairly exaggerated the criminality of his conduct; his sentences
violated his right to a trial under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); 4 and the
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Although Sanders captioned the
motion as a motion to correct a sentence, the district court construed Sanders’s motion as
a petition for postconviction relief. The district court concluded that Sanders’s claims were
time-barred under section 590.01, subdivision 4, and procedurally barred under Knaffla.
In the alternative, the district court concluded that Sanders’s sentences were lawful and that
he was not entitled to a Blakely trial. As a result, the district court denied Sanders’s petition.
Sanders did not appeal.
Nearly four years later, in May 2024, Sanders filed the pending motion to correct
his sentence. In this motion, Sanders argued that his sentences were unauthorized by law
because his consecutive sentences unfairly exaggerated the criminality of his conduct and
because the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score. The district court
denied Sanders’s motion on the merits, concluding that Sanders’s sentences were
authorized by law. As to Sanders’s first claim, the district court determined that Sanders’s
consecutive sentences did not exaggerate the criminality of his conduct because his
underlying convictions involved multiple victims. As to Sanders’s second claim, the
4 In Blakely v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. at 301, 305; see also Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635, 642–43 (Minn. 2025) (explaining this aspect of Blakely and conducting a Blakely analysis under Minnesota law).
5 district court concluded that “[t]here [was] nothing to indicate that” the district court used
the incorrect criminal history score at sentencing. Sanders appeals.
ANALYSIS
Sanders challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to correct a sentence
under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9. Under this rule, a
“court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03,
subd. 9. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to correct a sentence for an abuse
of discretion. Townsend v. State, 867 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Minn. 2015). The district court
abuses its discretion “when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422
(Minn. 2018) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Sanders contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to correct a sentence because his sentences were unauthorized by law. 5 “A sentence is not
authorized by law when it is ‘contrary to law or applicable statutes.’ ” Johnson v. State,
992 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 2023) (quoting State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 301
5 Sanders also argues that the district court erred by construing his motion to correct a sentence as a petition for postconviction relief. In making this argument, Sanders appears to confuse his August 2020 motion with his May 2024 motion. The May 2024 motion is at issue here, and the district court did not construe that motion as a petition for postconviction relief. For that reason, we decline to consider whether the May 2024 motion could have or should have been construed as a petition for postconviction relief. Relatedly, Sanders contends that his May 2024 motion is neither time-barred nor procedurally barred. Because the district court did not consider whether Sanders’s motion was time-barred or procedurally barred, these arguments are not properly before us, and we decline to consider them. See State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn. 1989) (explaining that, in general, “we will not decide issues which are not first addressed by the [district] court”).
6 (Minn. 2015)). As he did below, Sanders argues here that his consecutive sentences were
unauthorized by law because (1) the sentences unfairly exaggerated the criminality of his
conduct, and (2) the district court miscalculated his criminal history score. We address
each argument in turn.
I.
Sanders first contends that his consecutive sentences unfairly exaggerated the
criminality of his conduct. We disagree.
To begin, Sanders’s argument is barred by the law of the case doctrine. “The law
of the case doctrine functions to bar issues that were previously considered and denied in
the same case.” Smith v. State, 974 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Minn. 2022). “We apply this
doctrine to a Rule 27 motion when the claim underlying the motion was previously denied
on direct appeal.” Id. at 582. On direct appeal, Sanders argued that “the [district] court
unfairly exaggerated [his] criminality by imposing a life sentence for the first-degree
murder conviction and two consecutive 180-month sentences for the two attempted
first-degree murder convictions.” Sanders I, 598 N.W.2d at 656. This argument is
identical to the claim Sanders makes here. Because we have already determined that
Sanders’s consecutive sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct,
that determination is the law of the case, and it bars Sanders’s claim here. See id. at 656–57;
Smith, 974 N.W.2d at 581.
In addition to being barred by the law of the case doctrine, Sanders’s argument fails
on the merits. Sanders asserts that his consecutive sentences unfairly exaggerated the
criminality of his conduct because Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subdivision 1
7 (2024), prohibits a person from being punished for multiple offenses that occurred during
the same behavioral incident. 6 Although Sanders correctly points to this general rule, he
overlooks an important exception to the rule: We have long held that a person can be
punished for multiple offenses occurring during the same behavioral incident if the
offenses involve multiple victims. State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 453 (Minn. 1997).
This multiple-victim exception is consistent with the purpose of section 609.035—ensuring
that a defendant’s punishment is commensurate with their culpability—because “a
defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent to harm more than one person or
by means likely to cause harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who
harms only one person.” State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 161 N.W.2d 667, 672
(Minn. 1968) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the multiple-victim exception to section 609.035, a district court may impose
“multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident
if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly
exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d
423, 426 (Minn. 2006). In such cases, the district court has discretion to impose multiple
6 Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subdivision 1, states: “[I]f a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them.” This statute “generally ‘prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.’ ” State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn. 2012) (quoting State v. Norregaard, 384 N.W.2d 449, 449 (Minn. 1986)). Section 609.035, subdivision 1, is designed “ ‘to protect against exaggerating the criminality of a person’s conduct and to make both punishment and prosecution commensurate with culpability.’ ” Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d at 589 (quoting Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 672).
8 sentences concurrently or consecutively. State v. Cruz-Ramirez, 771 N.W.2d 497, 512
(Minn. 2009).
As we explained when Sanders first appealed his convictions and sentences,
imposing consecutive sentences for Sanders’s first-degree murder conviction and two
attempted first-degree murder convictions—each of which involved a different
victim—did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his conduct. Sanders I, 598 N.W.2d
at 656–57. When determining “ ‘whether a consecutive sentence unfairly exaggerates a
defendant’s criminality, we are guided by past sentences received by other offenders for
similar offenses.’ ” State v. Alger, 941 N.W.2d 396, 403 (Minn. 2020) (quoting Carpenter
v. State, 674 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Minn. 2004)). During the incident here, Sanders shot three
individuals, killing one and wounding the other two. We have repeatedly affirmed the
imposition of multiple consecutive sentences in cases involving violent crimes against
multiple victims. See, e.g., Cruz-Ramirez, 771 N.W.2d at 504, 511–12 (upholding
consecutive sentences for three counts of attempted first-degree murder involving three
victims); State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 891–94 (Minn. 2021) (upholding consecutive
life sentences for two counts of first-degree murder); Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d at 447
(upholding consecutive sentences for one count of first-degree murder, one count of
attempted first-degree murder, and six counts of second-degree assault). We have also
reversed the imposition of concurrent sentences where the defendant committed violent
crimes against multiple victims and the imposition of concurrent sentences understated the
defendant’s criminality. See State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 452 (Minn. 1999).
9 Given our case law holding that consecutive sentences are appropriate when
a defendant commits violent crimes against multiple victims, Sanders does not present
a compelling argument for reversing his sentences. As a result, in addition to being
barred by the law of the case doctrine, Sanders’s assertion that his consecutive sentences
unfairly exaggerated the criminality of his conduct fails on the merits.7 We therefore
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the
sentences were authorized by law.
II.
Sanders next contends that the district court miscalculated his criminal history score
at sentencing. Sanders specifically asserts that the district court failed to sentence him
using a criminal history score of zero, as courts are required to do when imposing
permissive consecutive sentences. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F (1997) (sentencing
guidelines in effect at the time Sanders was sentenced); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.b
7 To the extent that Sanders argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing multiple consecutive sentences because the imposition of such sentences was an unsupported upward dispositional departure, this argument is based on a misunderstanding of the law. Sanders’s sentences were permissive consecutive sentences under the sentencing guidelines that were in effect at the time Sanders was sentenced and the sentencing guidelines that are in effect today. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F.2 (1997) (authorizing permissive consecutive sentences for “[m]ultiple current felony convictions for crimes against persons”); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a(1)(ii), 6 (2024) (authorizing permissive consecutive sentences for “multiple current felony convictions for [certain enumerated] crimes,” including first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder); Bilbro v. State, 927 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Minn. 2019) (explaining that permissive consecutive sentences may be imposed without departing from the sentencing guidelines). Accordingly, Sanders’s consecutive sentences did not constitute an upward dispositional departure.
10 (2024) (current sentencing guidelines). This claim fails because any error related to
Sanders’s criminal history score was harmless.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide that a defendant’s presumptive
sentence is determined by the severity level of the offense and the defendant’s criminal
history score. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II, IV (1997); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2, 4.A (2024).
When a district court imposes consecutive sentences for multiple offenses, it must use a
zero criminal history score or the mandatory minimum for the offense (whichever is
greater) to determine the presumptive sentence for each offense after the first offense.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F (1997); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.b (2024).
Here, the district court sentenced Sanders to life in prison for the first-degree murder
conviction and to consecutive 180-month sentences for the two attempted first-degree
murder convictions. Sanders’s criminal history score at the time of sentencing is not
apparent from the record, and the district court did not pronounce a criminal history score
when sentencing Sanders. But, on this record, we conclude that any error in the district
court’s failure to pronounce Sanders’s criminal history score at sentencing was harmless
for two reasons: (1) Sanders’s criminal history score would have had no bearing on his
sentence for first-degree murder, and (2) the sentences imposed for attempted first-degree
murder were consistent with a sentence based on a criminal history score of zero, as
required by the sentencing guidelines.
First, Sanders’s criminal history score at the time of sentencing is irrelevant to his
first-degree murder sentence. First-degree murder carries a mandatory life sentence. Minn.
Sent. Guidelines II.A (1997); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.A.3 (2024). As a result, Sanders’s
11 criminal history score had no impact on his sentence for first-degree murder. See Minn.
Sent. Guidelines II.A (1997); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.A.3 (2024); see also Greer v. State,
973 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Minn. 2022) (concluding that a violation of the defendant’s right to
allocution was harmless because it did not affect the defendant’s mandatory life sentence).
Second, Sanders’s sentences for attempted first-degree murder were consistent with
the required criminal history score for consecutive sentencing. Once the district court
determined that Sanders’s sentences for his two attempted first-degree murder convictions
should be imposed consecutively to his life sentence, the district court was required to use
a criminal history score of zero when sentencing Sanders for these convictions. Minn.
Sent. Guidelines II.F (1997); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.b (2024). Although the district
court did not pronounce that it was sentencing Sanders based on a criminal history score
of zero, the district court appears to have done just that. At the time of Sanders’s
sentencing, the presumptive sentencing range for attempted first-degree murder with a
criminal history score of zero was 176–184 months in prison, with 180 months representing
a middle-of-the-box sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.G (1997). By contrast, the
presumptive sentencing range for the same offense with a criminal history score of one was
186–194 months in prison, with a 190-month middle-of-the-box sentence. Id. Because
Sanders’s consecutive 180-month sentences not only represent middle-of-the-box
sentences for attempted first-degree murder with a criminal history score of zero but also
fall below the presumptive sentencing range for the same offense with a criminal history
score of one, we can confidently presume that the district court used a criminal history
score of zero when sentencing Sanders, as the guidelines prescribe. We therefore conclude
12 that any error in the district court’s failure to pronounce Sanders’s criminal history score
at sentencing was harmless.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.
GAÏTAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.