Milton Jacobs v. Carolyn Colvin

Fourth Circuit

Milton Jacobs v. Carolyn Colvin

606 F. App'x 122

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedJuly 7, 2015

Docket14-2361

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 606 F. App'x 122 (Milton Jacobs v. Carolyn Colvin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Milton Jacobs v. Carolyn Colvin, 606 F. App'x 122 (4th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

’ Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Milton Jacobs appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012). We review the denial of a motion for fees under the EAJA for abuse of discretion. Meyer v. Colvin, 754 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir.2014).

■ At issue is whether the Commissioner was substantially justified in her litigation position in Jacobs’ suit in federal district court following the completion of Jacobs’ administrative proceedings. See id. (explaining that attorney’s fees are awarded under the EAJA only if the Government’s litigation position is not substantially justified and that, for a position to be substantially justified, it must be reasonable “in law and fact” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Specifically, the Commissioner advanced that this court’s holding in Bird v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir.2012), did not require a remand to the administrative law judge for reconsideration of the weight to afford the disability rating Jacobs previously received from the Department of Veterans Affairs, because the administrative law judge had fully explained his reasons for affording that rating little weight.

The district .court ruled that the Commissioner’s position, although ultimately not successful, was substantially justified and thus that Jacobs was not entitled to attorney’s fees. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in this conclusion and therefore affirm the denial of Jacobs’ motion for attorney’s fees for the reasons stated by the district court. See Jacobs v.. Colvin, No. 2:12-cv-00508-HCM-DEM, F.Supp.3d -, 2014 WL 9867407 (E.D.Va. Oct. 24, 2014). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

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Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

’ Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Milton Jacobs appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012). We review the denial of a motion for fees under the EAJA for abuse of discretion. Meyer v. Colvin, 754 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir.2014).

■ At issue is whether the Commissioner was substantially justified in her litigation position in Jacobs’ suit in federal district court following the completion of Jacobs’ administrative proceedings. See id. (explaining that attorney’s fees are awarded under the EAJA only if the Government’s litigation position is not substantially justified and that, for a position to be substantially justified, it must be reasonable “in law and fact” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Specifically, the Commissioner advanced that this court’s holding in Bird v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir.2012), did not require a remand to the administrative law judge for reconsideration of the weight to afford the disability rating Jacobs previously received from the Department of Veterans Affairs, because the administrative law judge had fully explained his reasons for affording that rating little weight.

The district .court ruled that the Commissioner’s position, although ultimately not successful, was substantially justified and thus that Jacobs was not entitled to attorney’s fees. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in this conclusion and therefore affirm the denial of Jacobs’ motion for attorney’s fees for the reasons stated by the district court. See Jacobs v.. Colvin, No. 2:12-cv-00508-HCM-DEM, F.Supp.3d -, 2014 WL 9867407 (E.D.Va. Oct. 24, 2014). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

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Bluebook (online)

606 F. App'x 122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/milton-jacobs-v-carolyn-colvin-ca4-2015.

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