IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. PD-0282-24 & PD-0283-24
CLIFFORD MILTON, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HARRIS COUNTY
PARKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which SCHENCK, P.J., and RICHARDSON, YEARY, NEWELL, WALKER, and FINLEY, JJ., joined. KEEL and MCCLURE, JJ., concurred.
OPINION
Can a child under 17 be a victim of trafficking by compelled prostitution if the conduct
involves the child having sex with adults more than three years older than her for pay? Under the
plain language of the statutes, the answer is resoundingly “yes.” Appellant and the court of appeals
focus on whether (and when) 14-to-16-year-olds can consent to have sex, but that is the wrong focus.
The proper focus is on whether the trafficking and compelling-prostitution statutes criminalize the
conduct at issue in this case. They do. MILTON — 2
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
A 15-year-old girl ran away from home. Appellant took her in and prodded her into having
sex with men for pay. He pocketed the money she earned. Based on this conduct, Appellant was
convicted of trafficking a child by compelling the child to engage in prostitution.1
B. Appeal
On appeal, Appellant relied upon the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’s decision in Turley v.
State.2 In Turley, the court of appeals held that, by virtue of age alone, a 4-year-old child could not
commit prostitution for the purpose of determining whether a defendant could be convicted of
compelling that child’s commission of prostitution.3 In so holding, that court relied upon Penal Code
1 Appellant was also convicted of trafficking by committing sexual assault of a child (he himself having sex with the victim). He did not attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support that conviction. See Milton v. State, 695 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024) (“Appellant Clifford Milton was indicted on two counts of trafficking of a child by prohibited conduct. In Cause Number 1612515, he was indicted for the offense of trafficking of a child by causing the complainant to become the victim of sexual assault, and in Cause Number 1612516, he was indicted for the offense of trafficking of a child by causing the complainant to become the victim of prostitution. . . . In three issues, Milton argues (1) there was legally insufficient evidence to prove he committed the offense of trafficking a person in Cause Number 1612516 because he did not cause the complainant to commit prostitution, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the admission of extraneous offense testimony, and (3) the judgments should be modified to reflect (a) a finding on the enhancement paragraphs of ‘N/A’ instead of ‘pleaded true’ and ‘found true,’ and (b) to state the sentences are to run concurrently.”) (emphasis added, ellipsis inserted). Nevertheless, Appellant filed a PDR for both of his cases, and this Court granted both. Our records show that the trial court cause number 1612515 corresponds to the court-of-appeals cause number 01-22-00335- CR, which in turn corresponds to our cause number PD-0282-24. Consequently, we dismiss the PDR in PD-0282-24, from the trafficking-by-committing-sexual-assault case, as improvidently granted. 2 597 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 691 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). 3 Id. at 40-44. MILTON — 3
§ 8.07 and the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in In re B.W.4 The court of appeals pointed out that
§ 8.07 drew lines at ages 15 and 10, younger than which children would not be criminally
responsible for certain conduct, and it pointed to B.W. as drawing a line at age 14, younger than
which a child could not be adjudicated delinquent for prostitution.5 The court of appeals specifically
relied upon the conclusion in B.W. that children younger than 14 lack the legal capacity to consent
to sex.6
Appellant argued to the court of appeals in this case that the holding in Turley should be
extended to children between the ages of 14 and 17 because minors are generally not legally
permitted to consent to sex. The State argued, among other things, that Turley was incorrectly
decided.
The court of appeals in Appellant’s case declined to address the correctness of Turley.7
Instead, the court of appeals declined to extend Turley to children ages 14 to 17.8 In part, the court
pointed to Texas establishing “a two-step scheme that differentiates between sex with a younger
child and sexual relations with an older teen.”9 The court concluded that there was a legislative
intent “to treat children older than thirteen different for purposes of consent involving sexual
4 Id. at 40 & n.12 (discussing TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.07), 43 (discussing In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. 2010)). 5 Id. 6 Id. at 43-44. 7 Milton, 695 S.W.3d at 710. 8 Id. at 710-11. 9 Id. at 710. MILTON — 4
conduct.”10
C. Post-Appeal and Discretionary Review
After the court of appeals’s decision in the present case, this Court decided Turley on
discretionary review.11 This Court did not address whether the Turley court of appeals was correct
in holding that age alone prevented a child from committing prostitution.12 Instead, this Court held
that the 4-year-old girl in Turley, who was asleep at the time the defendant solicited an undercover
officer to engage in sexual conduct with her, did not commit any acts that would constitute
prostitution.13
In his petition for discretionary review, Appellant asked, “Did the First Court of Appeals err
in holding that a child between the ages of fourteen and seventeen does not, as a matter of law, lack
the ability to consent to sex for purposes of committing prostitution?” Appellant continued to rely
upon the court of appeals’s Turley decision. He suggested that a child could commit prostitution
only when a defense to sexual assault would be available—a child 14 years or older having sex with
a marriage partner or person within 3 years of the child’s age. Even after this Court’s decision was
handed down, Appellant has argued in briefing that children under 17 are generally unable to consent
to sex under Texas law.
If Appellant’s position were accepted, then a prosecution for compelling prostitution of a
child, and trafficking based on compelling prostitution of a child, would be permissible only in
10 Id. at 711. 11 691 S.W.3d at 612 (delivered June 26, 2024); see Milton, supra (delivered April 26, 2024). 12 Turley, 691 S.W.3d at 618. 13 Id. MILTON — 5
limited circumstances—essentially only if the child in question was 17 years of age, or if the child
was 14 to 16 years of age and had paid sex with an individual within 3 years of the child’s age, or
by some odd chance, with the child’s marital partner. Because the victim in this case was younger
than 17, was more than 3 years younger than any of the men she had sex with, and was not married
to any of the men she had sex with, the victim would not fall within the limited circumstances
envisioned by Appellant.
II. ANALYSIS
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence questions sometimes turn on the meaning of the statute under
which the defendant is prosecuted.14 A court must interpret a statute in accordance with the plain
meaning of its text, unless the text is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the
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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. PD-0282-24 & PD-0283-24
CLIFFORD MILTON, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HARRIS COUNTY
PARKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which SCHENCK, P.J., and RICHARDSON, YEARY, NEWELL, WALKER, and FINLEY, JJ., joined. KEEL and MCCLURE, JJ., concurred.
OPINION
Can a child under 17 be a victim of trafficking by compelled prostitution if the conduct
involves the child having sex with adults more than three years older than her for pay? Under the
plain language of the statutes, the answer is resoundingly “yes.” Appellant and the court of appeals
focus on whether (and when) 14-to-16-year-olds can consent to have sex, but that is the wrong focus.
The proper focus is on whether the trafficking and compelling-prostitution statutes criminalize the
conduct at issue in this case. They do. MILTON — 2
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
A 15-year-old girl ran away from home. Appellant took her in and prodded her into having
sex with men for pay. He pocketed the money she earned. Based on this conduct, Appellant was
convicted of trafficking a child by compelling the child to engage in prostitution.1
B. Appeal
On appeal, Appellant relied upon the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’s decision in Turley v.
State.2 In Turley, the court of appeals held that, by virtue of age alone, a 4-year-old child could not
commit prostitution for the purpose of determining whether a defendant could be convicted of
compelling that child’s commission of prostitution.3 In so holding, that court relied upon Penal Code
1 Appellant was also convicted of trafficking by committing sexual assault of a child (he himself having sex with the victim). He did not attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support that conviction. See Milton v. State, 695 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024) (“Appellant Clifford Milton was indicted on two counts of trafficking of a child by prohibited conduct. In Cause Number 1612515, he was indicted for the offense of trafficking of a child by causing the complainant to become the victim of sexual assault, and in Cause Number 1612516, he was indicted for the offense of trafficking of a child by causing the complainant to become the victim of prostitution. . . . In three issues, Milton argues (1) there was legally insufficient evidence to prove he committed the offense of trafficking a person in Cause Number 1612516 because he did not cause the complainant to commit prostitution, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the admission of extraneous offense testimony, and (3) the judgments should be modified to reflect (a) a finding on the enhancement paragraphs of ‘N/A’ instead of ‘pleaded true’ and ‘found true,’ and (b) to state the sentences are to run concurrently.”) (emphasis added, ellipsis inserted). Nevertheless, Appellant filed a PDR for both of his cases, and this Court granted both. Our records show that the trial court cause number 1612515 corresponds to the court-of-appeals cause number 01-22-00335- CR, which in turn corresponds to our cause number PD-0282-24. Consequently, we dismiss the PDR in PD-0282-24, from the trafficking-by-committing-sexual-assault case, as improvidently granted. 2 597 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 691 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). 3 Id. at 40-44. MILTON — 3
§ 8.07 and the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in In re B.W.4 The court of appeals pointed out that
§ 8.07 drew lines at ages 15 and 10, younger than which children would not be criminally
responsible for certain conduct, and it pointed to B.W. as drawing a line at age 14, younger than
which a child could not be adjudicated delinquent for prostitution.5 The court of appeals specifically
relied upon the conclusion in B.W. that children younger than 14 lack the legal capacity to consent
to sex.6
Appellant argued to the court of appeals in this case that the holding in Turley should be
extended to children between the ages of 14 and 17 because minors are generally not legally
permitted to consent to sex. The State argued, among other things, that Turley was incorrectly
decided.
The court of appeals in Appellant’s case declined to address the correctness of Turley.7
Instead, the court of appeals declined to extend Turley to children ages 14 to 17.8 In part, the court
pointed to Texas establishing “a two-step scheme that differentiates between sex with a younger
child and sexual relations with an older teen.”9 The court concluded that there was a legislative
intent “to treat children older than thirteen different for purposes of consent involving sexual
4 Id. at 40 & n.12 (discussing TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.07), 43 (discussing In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. 2010)). 5 Id. 6 Id. at 43-44. 7 Milton, 695 S.W.3d at 710. 8 Id. at 710-11. 9 Id. at 710. MILTON — 4
conduct.”10
C. Post-Appeal and Discretionary Review
After the court of appeals’s decision in the present case, this Court decided Turley on
discretionary review.11 This Court did not address whether the Turley court of appeals was correct
in holding that age alone prevented a child from committing prostitution.12 Instead, this Court held
that the 4-year-old girl in Turley, who was asleep at the time the defendant solicited an undercover
officer to engage in sexual conduct with her, did not commit any acts that would constitute
prostitution.13
In his petition for discretionary review, Appellant asked, “Did the First Court of Appeals err
in holding that a child between the ages of fourteen and seventeen does not, as a matter of law, lack
the ability to consent to sex for purposes of committing prostitution?” Appellant continued to rely
upon the court of appeals’s Turley decision. He suggested that a child could commit prostitution
only when a defense to sexual assault would be available—a child 14 years or older having sex with
a marriage partner or person within 3 years of the child’s age. Even after this Court’s decision was
handed down, Appellant has argued in briefing that children under 17 are generally unable to consent
to sex under Texas law.
If Appellant’s position were accepted, then a prosecution for compelling prostitution of a
child, and trafficking based on compelling prostitution of a child, would be permissible only in
10 Id. at 711. 11 691 S.W.3d at 612 (delivered June 26, 2024); see Milton, supra (delivered April 26, 2024). 12 Turley, 691 S.W.3d at 618. 13 Id. MILTON — 5
limited circumstances—essentially only if the child in question was 17 years of age, or if the child
was 14 to 16 years of age and had paid sex with an individual within 3 years of the child’s age, or
by some odd chance, with the child’s marital partner. Because the victim in this case was younger
than 17, was more than 3 years younger than any of the men she had sex with, and was not married
to any of the men she had sex with, the victim would not fall within the limited circumstances
envisioned by Appellant.
II. ANALYSIS
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence questions sometimes turn on the meaning of the statute under
which the defendant is prosecuted.14 A court must interpret a statute in accordance with the plain
meaning of its text, unless the text is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the
Legislature could not have possibly intended.15 Plain meaning is determined by reading the statute
in context, reasonably giving effect to each word, phrase, clause, and sentence, and construing the
text according to applicable rules of grammar and common usage.16 Words that have statutory
definitions should be construed accordingly, and a court can consult standard dictionaries to ascertain
the meaning of undefined terms.17 As will be seen in the following discussion, all the statutes at
issue here are unambiguous, so we must interpret those statutes in accordance with the plain meaning
of their texts.
14 Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). 15 Cont’l Heritage Ins. Co. v. State, 683 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 16 Ex parte Reeder, 691 S.W.3d 628, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). 17 Id. MILTON — 6
At the time of Appellant’s conduct, the trafficking statute provided, in relevant part:
A person commits an offense if the person knowingly:
*** (7) traffics a child and by any means causes the child to engage in, or become the victim of, conduct prohibited by:
*** (H) Section 43.05 (Compelling Prostitution).18
Under the trafficking statute, a “child” means “a person younger than 18 years of age.”19 Thus, the
trafficking statute expressly applies to any victim of the conduct who is under age 18. But, because
subsection (a)(7) of that statute covers a broad array of sexual offenses against children,20 the
possibility remains that one or more of those underlying offenses imposes a further limitation on the
age the child. If there is such a further limitation relevant to the present case, it would have to be
found in the underlying compelling-prostitution statute.
The compelling-prostitution statute in effect at the time of Appellant’s conduct provided, in
relevant part:
*** (2) causes by any means a child younger than 18 years to commit prostitution, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the child at the time of the offense.21
The word “prostitution” in the compelling-prostitution statute means “the offense defined in Section
18 TEX. PENAL CODE § 20A.02(a)(7)(H) (West 2018). All further references to the Penal Code are to the version in the West 2018 publication unless otherwise noted. 19 Id. § 20A.01(1). 20 See id. at § 20A.02(a)(7)(A)-(K). 21 Id. § 43.05(a)(2). MILTON — 7
43.02.”22 As with the trafficking statute, the compelling-prostitution statute itself purports to apply
to any victim younger than age 18. Unlike the trafficking statute, however, the compelling-
prostitution statute does not cover a broad array of offenses; it covers only prostitution. So, imposing
a further age limitation on who can commit prostitution would seem inconsistent with the plain
language of the compelling-prostitution statute. If the prostitution statute contains an age limitation
despite the apparent broadness of the compelling-prostitution statute, one would expect that age-
limitation to be clearly apparent in the text.
At the time of Appellant’s conduct, the prostitution statute provided:
A person commits an offense if the person knowingly offers or agrees to receive a fee from another to engage in sexual conduct.23
Nothing in this statutory language limits the age of the individual who can commit prostitution.
Practically speaking, a child may be so young as to be unable to knowingly offer or agree to receive
a fee to engage in sexual conduct. At the extreme end, one would not expect an infant to be capable
of engaging in prostitution, as it is statutorily defined. But nothing in the prostitution statute draws
a specific age line. And the statute is clear that anyone who engages in the conduct described
“commits” the offense of prostitution.
Moreover, the prostitution statute contains a defense that suggests that a child can “commit”
prostitution without being criminally responsible for that offense:
It is a defense to prosecution for an offense under Subsection (a) that the actor engaged in conduct that constitutes the offense because the actor was the victim of conduct that constitutes an offense under Section 20A.02 [trafficking] or 43.05
22 Id. § 43.01(2). 23 Id. § 43.02(a). MILTON — 8
[compelling prostitution].24
So the Legislature set up a statutory scheme that (1) allows a child to “commit” prostitution for
purposes of being a victim of the compelling-prostitution and trafficking offenses, and (2) insulates
the child victim of compelling-prostitution or trafficking from criminal liability for the prostitution
offense the child commits.
The only other relevant statute is Penal Code § 8.07, which addresses the effect of young age
on criminal responsibility. That statute is littered with references to a child having “committed” an
offense for which, because of age, the child cannot be prosecuted or convicted.25 Under § 8.07, a
24 Id. § 43.02(d) (bracketed material added). 25 See id. § 8.07 (emphasis added):
(a) A person may not be prosecuted for or convicted of any offense that the person committed when younger than 15 years of age except:
*** (b) Unless the juvenile court waives jurisdiction under Section 54.02, Family Code, and certifies the individual for criminal prosecution or the juvenile court has previously waived jurisdiction under that section and certified the individual for criminal prosecution, a person may not be prosecuted for or convicted of any offense committed before reaching 17 years of age except an offense described by Subsections (a)(1)--(5).
(c) No person may, in any case, be punished by death for an offense committed while the person was younger than 18 years.
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (a), a person may not be prosecuted for or convicted of an offense described by Subsection (a)(4) or (5) that the person committed when younger than 10 years of age.
(e) A person who is at least 10 years of age but younger than 15 years of age is presumed incapable of committing an offense described by Subsection (a)(4) or (5), other than an offense under a juvenile curfew ordinance or order. This presumption may be refuted if the prosecution proves to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the actor had sufficient capacity to understand that the conduct engaged MILTON — 9
child might not be criminally responsible for an offense by virtue of age, but that does not preclude
the offense being “committed” for the purpose of a different Penal Code provision.
In the present case, we are not discussing whether a child can be prosecuted for or convicted
of an offense. We are discussing whether an adult who causes a child to commit an offense can be
prosecuted and convicted. All of the relevant statutes indicate that a child can “commit” an offense
for the purpose of prosecuting and convicting an adult who causes the child to commit it. And none
of the relevant statutes draw an age line for the child that prevents such an adult from being so
prosecuted and convicted.
Appellant relies on the sexual-assault statute to derive an age-of-consent of 17 and also a
limited consent range of ages 14 to 16. For purposes of the offense of sexual assault, “child” means
“a person younger than 17 years of age.”26 And if the child is 14 years of age or older, the actor
might have a defense if he is “not more than three years older” than the child or if he is married to
the child.27
But the statutes defining the offense of trafficking by compelling prostitution do not
incorporate these provisions from the sexual-assault statute. In fact, none of the statutory provisions
relating to the offense at issue before us reference “consent” at all.28 And after all, the compelling-
prostitution statute, by its very name, suggests that sex is being compelled, and is thus not
in was wrong at the time the conduct was engaged in. The prosecution is not required to prove that the actor at the time of engaging in the conduct knew that the act was a criminal offense or knew the legal consequences of the offense. 26 Id. § 22.011(c)(1) 27 See id. § 22.011(e)(1), (2). 28 Contrast id. § 22.011(b) (outlining when a “sexual assault” is “without consent”). MILTON — 10
“consensual.” Moreover, none of the statutes defining the offense before us calibrate the State’s
ability to prosecute to the age of the person trafficked or compelled to engage in prostitution in the
way that the sexual-assault statute does. The trafficking and compelling prostitution statutes apply
to a defendant who victimizes a child under 18 without any defenses or extra punishment based on
a child’s youth as a bar to consent to sexual conduct.
Further, the sexual-assault statute itself does not purport to use age to preclude a child from
committing an offense; it simply provides that certain sexual conduct by an actor toward a child is
an offense without requiring the State to show that the child did not consent.29 That statute, itself
designed to protect children, provides no basis whatsoever for a holding that would make more
difficult the prosecution of people who traffic and compel children into engaging in prostitution.
In summary, the trafficking and compelling-prostitution statutes expressly provide that
anyone under age 18 can be a victim of compelling prostitution. The prostitution statute does
nothing to limit that coverage and, in fact, feeds the scheme by providing a defense if the child
committed prostitution as a victim of a trafficking or compelling-prostitution offense.
The Texas Supreme Court’s B.W. decision does not persuasively show to the contrary. That
case addressed whether a child under age 14 could be subject to juvenile-delinquency proceedings
for the offense of prostitution.30 Whether a child can be adjudicated delinquent for prostitution is
29 See id. § 22.011(a)(2) (“(A) causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means; (B) causes the penetration of the mouth of a child by the sexual organ of the actor; (C) causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor; (D) causes the anus of a child to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor; (E) causes the mouth of a child to contact the anus or sexual organ of another person, including the actor.”). Compare to id. § 22.011(a)(1)(A)-(C) (requiring a show that the conduct against the victim occurred “without that person’s consent.”). 30 B.W., 313 S.W.3d at 819. MILTON — 11
not the same as whether a child can “commit” prostitution for the purposes of another statute
designed to punish an adult for causing that commission. In fact, the Texas Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the notion that its decision would hamper a prosecution for compelling prostitution.31 To
the extent B.W. might contain language supporting the notion that a child under age 14 cannot
“commit” prostitution, that language would be dicta, would not be binding on us even if it were a
holding,32 and should not be followed to the extent it conflicts with the plain meaning of the statutes
at issue before us.
The court-of-appeals decision in Turley was simply wrong to hold that children under age
14 were legally disabled from committing prostitution for the purpose of being a victim of a
trafficking or compelling-prostitution offense. That decision conflated committing an offense with
being criminally responsible for it. And it turned common-sense judicial observations about crimes
against children on their head by crafting a judicial rule that overrode the unambiguous language of
some statutes to actually make them less protective of children. Given the flaws in that decision, we
now disavow it. In this case, the court of appeals found a way to write around its sister court’s
Turley decision but, in doing so, perpetuated to some degree that decision’s flawed assumptions.
Appellant used the flawed opinion in Turley to frame his point of error to the court of appeals
as whether children of a certain age can “consent” to sex. The court of appeals accepted this framing
of the issue, and Appellant has continued that framing in his ground for review to this Court. While
31 Id. at 825 (“Similarly, pimps and other sexual exploiters of children may still be prosecuted for compelling prostitution and other crimes of sexual exploitation even though the child herself may not be prosecuted for prostitution.”). 32 In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (“But Texas Supreme Court decisions are generally not binding precedent in criminal cases.”). MILTON — 12
it might seem to some to be an exercise in judicial restraint to respond to the issue as framed,
allowing Appellant to blow us off course in that manner is in fact the opposite of restraint because
such an approach would stray from construing the statute based on its language. As we stated in
Boykin, “the Legislature is constitutionally entitled to expect that the Judiciary will faithfully follow
the specific text that was adopted.”33 And we should not allow a flawed framing of an issue by the
parties or the court of appeals to divert us from the statutory language because “our judgments are
precedents.”34 Nor should this Court twist itself into knots to account for cases that are not based
on the text of the applicable statutes, are not binding on this Court, and are ultimately factually
distinguishable. As it is, our analysis answers the question before us, if in a way Appellant did not
expect: Any child under age 18 that is able to satisfy the elements of the prostitution statute can
commit prostitution for the purpose of being a victim of the offenses of trafficking and compelling
prostitution.
Because the statutes at issue before us are unambiguous, and the plain meaning of the
statutory language allows for the prosecution in Appellant’s case, we agree with the court of appeals
that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. We affirm the court of appeals’s
judgment.
Delivered: July 2, 2025
Publish
33 818 S.W.2d at 785. 34 See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942) (“Furthermore, our judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties.”); Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“This Court must still independently examine the error confessed because ‘our judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties.’”).