Milo v. Milo

Massachusetts Appeals Court

Milo v. Milo

326 N.E.2d 32, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 732

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court

DecidedApril 7, 1975

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 326 N.E.2d 32 (Milo v. Milo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Milo v. Milo, 326 N.E.2d 32, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 732 (Mass. Ct. App. 1975).

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Opinion

Our study of the statutory report of material facts leads us to the conclusion that the amounts which the libellee was ordered to pay the libellant for alimony and for the maintenance of the minor child were influenced to a considerable extent by the judge’s finding that the libellant still had in her possession or under her control some $10,000 in cash, representing a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the marital home. Although that finding was warranted by some of the testimony of the libellant, we are of the opinion that it was plainly wrong, particularly when considered in the light of (1) the testimony of the libel-lee concerning the portion of the sale proceeds which was turned over to the libellant and (2) other testimony of the libellant concerning the purchase of her present home. As we are in no position to determine the degree of weight which the judge attached to the erroneous finding, so much of the decree of January 16, 1974, as makes provision for alimony and for the maintenance of the minor child is reversed. Those phases of the case are to be tried anew and redetermined in the light of the present circumstances of the parties. Compare Hillery v. Hillery, 342 Mass. 371, 374-375 (1961). See G. L. c. 208, § 34, as appearing in St. 1974, c. 565.

So ordered.

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Our study of the statutory report of material facts leads us to the conclusion that the amounts which the libellee was ordered to pay the libellant for alimony and for the maintenance of the minor child were influenced to a considerable extent by the judge’s finding that the libellant still had in her possession or under her control some $10,000 in cash, representing a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the marital home. Although that finding was warranted by some of the testimony of the libellant, we are of the opinion that it was plainly wrong, particularly when considered in the light of (1) the testimony of the libel-lee concerning the portion of the sale proceeds which was turned over to the libellant and (2) other testimony of the libellant concerning the purchase of her present home. As we are in no position to determine the degree of weight which the judge attached to the erroneous finding, so much of the decree of January 16, 1974, as makes provision for alimony and for the maintenance of the minor child is reversed. Those phases of the case are to be tried anew and redetermined in the light of the present circumstances of the parties. Compare Hillery v. Hillery, 342 Mass. 371, 374-375 (1961). See G. L. c. 208, § 34, as appearing in St. 1974, c. 565.

So ordered.

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Bluebook (online)

326 N.E.2d 32, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 732, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/milo-v-milo-massappct-1975.

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