Milner v. Lamont

CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJuly 27, 2021
Docket3:20-cv-01245
StatusUnknown

This text of Milner v. Lamont (Milner v. Lamont) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Milner v. Lamont, (D. Conn. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

SHAWN MILNER, Plaintiff,

v. No. 3:20-cv-01245 (JAM)

NED LAMONT et al., Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Shawn Milner is an unsentenced prisoner in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”). He has filed an amended complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against some thirty persons, the Governor of Connecticut, a mix of DOC officials, medical practitioners, and other state officials, all in their individual and official capacities for damages and injunctive relief.1 Milner principally alleges that the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his safety and medical needs by denying him medical treatment and not complying with COVID-19 guidelines from the DOC and the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”).2 Milner has now moved for a temporary restraining order in connection with his claims, seeking an order requiring the DOC to provide him with medical care and to preserve certain video footage.3 Milner argues that he suffers from “life-threatening COVID-19 needs,” including

1 Doc. #5 at 1. Milner has also filed a motion to leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In light of Milner’s claims of life-threatening illness, I provisionally granted his motion. Docs. #18, #20. 2 Id. at 3-31. Milner was previously incarcerated at Northern Correctional Institution and has more recently been transferred to MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution. He has yet to file a change of address with the Court and is instructed to promptly do so. 3 Doc. #17 at 1. After filing his initial motion on February 4, 2021, Milner filed a second motion for temporary restraining order on March 17, 2021, and then a third motion on July 19, 2021. See Docs. #32, #68. The motions substantially overlap, and so I will consider them together. swelling in his neck and head, and that the defendants “have been intentionally not treating” and retaliating against him for requesting medical care.4 As reflected in the docket, the Court entered an order appointing pro bono counsel for Milner in light of the gravity of his stated medical concerns and his insistence that these concerns were being ignored.5 But then Milner refused to cooperate with his appointed counsel and moved

to “waive” counsel.6 The Court granted this motion and his appointed counsel’s corresponding motion to withdraw due to Milner’s refusal to speak with and cooperate with his counsel.7 The Court entered an order for the defendants to file a response to Milner’s request for temporary injunctive relief. The defendants have filed an opposition accompanied by more than 4,000 pages of Milner’s medical records.8 Both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are extraordinary remedies for which a plaintiff ordinarily bears the burden to show (1) irreparable harm, (2) a likelihood of success on the merits or a sufficiently serious question going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the plaintiff’s favor, and (3) that the public interest

weighs in favor of granting an injunction. See, e.g., Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2010). Where, as here, a prisoner seeks a mandatory injunction that would require a change in the status quo, it is not enough for the prisoner simply to show that there are serious questions at issue; instead, the prisoner must meet the more rigorous standard of showing a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits. See Johnson v.

4 Doc. #17 at 1. 5 Doc. #21. 6 Doc. #31. I do not credit Milner’s allegation that his appointed counsel had “severe conflicts of interest” or engaged in “verbally assaultive” conduct of telling him to “‘shut up’ and to ‘jump in a lake’ simply for requesting medical care.” Doc. #31 at 1. 7 Doc. #41. 8 Docs. #56, #57. Connolly, 378 Fed. Appx. 107, 108 (2d Cir. 2010); Rodriguez v. McCormick, 2021 WL 3115981, at *3 (D. Conn. 2021). Because Milner is a pre-trial detainee, his claims for deliberate indifference to his serious medical and safety needs are subject to review under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir.

2017). The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause protects the rights of pretrial detainees against intentional or deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs or unsafe conditions of confinement. In order to establish such a claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) his conditions of confinement objectively “post an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health,” and (2) the official subjectively “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with the reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Id. at 30, 35; see also Charles v. Orange Cty., 925 F.3d 73, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2019) (applying same two-part objective/subjective standard to detainee’s claim

for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment). Milner alleges that he has tested positive for the COVID-19 virus, is symptomatic, and is medically vulnerable to COVID-19 because he is epileptic.9 He alleges that he suffers from loss of sense of smell and taste, has “sustained extensive and ongoing neurological, neurotropic, and neuroinvasive [sic] COVID-19 near fatal complications such as seizures, convulsions, changes in mental status and has several broken bones.”10 Milner further alleges that he has swollen gums, a swollen throat, and an ulcer in his mouth.11

9 Doc. #5 at 5, 8, 12 (¶ 10); Doc. #64 at 1. 10 Doc. #5 at 8. 11 Ibid. I will assume that Milner has alleged facts to show that he suffers from medical conditions sufficient to satisfy the objective prong of the Fourteenth Amendment standard for deliberate indifference. Nevertheless, the facts do not adequately establish that any of the defendants recklessly disregarded a substantial risk to Milner’s health because there is no evidence in the record that any of the defendants denied him treatment or are retaliating against

him for requesting medical treatment. To the contrary, Milner’s extensive medical record reflects that Milner has repeatedly declined to accept the medical care offered him. First, Milner’s medical records belie his allegations that the DOC is not treating his hand fractures. On March 15, 2020, Milner complained that he had a broken finger.12 The next day, a DOC medical provider examined his hand.13 Although the DOC medical provider scheduled an X-ray of his hand, Milner refused to come to medical for the X-ray.14 A few days later, a DOC nurse met with Milner to discuss his refusal to have the X-ray, at which point Milner showed the nurse his hand and complained that it was broken and “[n]o one is doing anything about it.”15 The hand was not visibly broken.16

A couple months later, Milner was admitted to an outside emergency room due to a seizure and complained of hand pain in his right thumb and left index finger.17 The index finger had a “small non-displaced fracture,” which was treated with a splint.18 The medical record notes that “no further medical intervention is needed at this time” for the fracture and that it “should heal up without any difficulty.”19

12 Id. at 1588. 13 Id. at 1808. 14 Id. at 1173, 1808. 15 Id. at 1768. 16 Ibid.

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Related

Johnson v. Connolly
378 F. App'x 107 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Darnell v. City of New York
849 F.3d 17 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Charles v. Orange County
925 F.3d 73 (Second Circuit, 2019)
Johnson v. Wright
412 F.3d 398 (Second Circuit, 2005)

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Bluebook (online)
Milner v. Lamont, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/milner-v-lamont-ctd-2021.