NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1185
MILLY MARTINEZ
vs.
PARKING CLERK OF BOSTON.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Milly Martinez was issued a parking citation (citation) for
parking in a loading zone on Boylston Street in Boston (city).
A hearing officer upheld that citation after an administrative
hearing at the office of the parking clerk (agency), and
Martinez subsequently sought judicial review in the Superior
Court. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14. The parties filed cross-motions
for judgment on the pleadings, see Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365
Mass. 754 (1974), and after a hearing, the motion judge ruled in
favor of the agency. We affirm.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review both the
judge's ruling on Martinez's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and the hearing officer's conclusions of law, de novo.1 See Barron v. Kolenda, 491 Mass. 408, 415 (2023), citing
Mullins v. Corcoran, 488 Mass. 275, 281 (2021) (judgment on
pleadings); Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Milton v. HD/MW Randolph
Ave., LLC, 490 Mass. 257, 262 (2022), citing Craft Beer Guild,
LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 512
(2019) (conclusions of law). We then review the hearing
officer's decision using the standards set forth in G. L.
c. 30A, § 14 (7). See G. L. c. 90, § 20A 1/2. According to
those standards, "a final administrative agency decision will be
set aside if, among other grounds, it is '[u]nsupported by
substantial evidence,' G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e), or
'[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law,' G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g)."
Commissioner of Admin. & Fin. v. Commonwealth Employment
Relations Bd., 477 Mass. 92, 95 (2017). "Substantial evidence
[is] such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. The applicable standard of review is
highly deferential to the agency and requires the reviewing
court to accord due weight to the experience, technical
1 Under this standard, we do not give deference to the motion judge's determinations. See Caron v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 218, 221 (2013). We therefore need not and do not address Martinez's objection to the motion judge's specific conclusions, or to the judge's reference to the effect of a "no stopping anytime" sign in the area in which Martinez was ticketed for the loading zone violation.
2 competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as
to the discretionary authority conferred upon it" (quotations
and citation omitted). Cave Corp. v. Conservation Comm'n of
Attleboro, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 767, 773-774 (2017). We will thus
affirm a finding of the board unless the administrative record
"points to an overwhelming probability of the contrary"
(citation omitted). Anderson v. Commonwealth Employment
Relations Bd., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 910 (2009).
2. Martinez's arguments. a. Arguments not raised before
hearing officer. Martinez's appellate brief, like her motion
before the Superior Court judge, includes arguments that were
not raised before the hearing officer.2 Although some or all of
these arguments were presented to the motion judge in the
Superior Court, they are not properly before us on appeal, and
we do not address them. See Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole
Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 535 (2014), citing Catlin v. Board
of Registration of Architects, 414 Mass. 1, 7 n.7 (1992); Rico's
of the Berkshires, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n,
19 Mass. App. Ct. 1026, 1026 (1985), citing G. L. c. 30A,
§ 14 (5).
2 These include arguments about the application of G. L. c. 85, § 2, and the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, to the merits of Martinez's challenge to the citation.
3 b. Preserved arguments. The thrust of Martinez's appeal
is that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law in
affirming the citation, as a single sign facing away from
oncoming traffic was the only indication of the loading zone
parking prohibition where Martinez was ticketed.3 We are not
persuaded.
The city's parking rules require "at least one (1)
regulatory sign marking the limits of [a loading zone]," Traffic
Rules and Regulations, City of Boston (2012) (City Parking
Rules), Art. I, § 1, and provide that "[a] parking restriction,
which is indicated by the placement of an Official Traffic Sign
shall continue in effect until . . . [t]he end of the block."
City Parking Rules, Art. IV, § 16(2)(c). On appeal, Martinez
"does not deny that when she parked at Boylston St[reet], she
[saw] . . . the back side of a regulatory sign." She likewise
does not deny that the sign was, although "far away," posted on
the block on which she parked. We discern no error in the
hearing officer's conclusion that a single sign on the block
where Martinez was parked met the minimum requirements for
3 Martinez does not appear to challenge the determination that the area in which she was parked was, in fact, a loading zone at the time the citation was issued. To the extent that Martinez does make that argument, she has not rebutted the prima facie evidence of the violation established by the citation itself. See G. L. c. 90, § 20A 1/2.
4 marking the loading zone. See City Parking Rules, Art. I, § 1,
and Art. IV, § 16(2)(c).
Similarly, the hearing officer did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously, or commit an error of law, in concluding that
Martinez's parking in the loading zone was not excused by the
fact that the relevant sign was mounted to face away from
oncoming, one-way traffic on Boylston Street, rather than toward
or parallel with it. From Martinez's testimony at the hearing,
the hearing officer could have found that the sign was visible
to Martinez once she had parked.4 Likewise, the hearing officer
could have found that Martinez saw the sign (even if she did so
after passing it and parking farther up the same block) and
simply ignored it or misinterpreted its importance. Where the
city's parking rules place the onus on the driver to ensure
parking is permitted in the spot the driver chooses, as the
rules do here, the hearing officer acted permissibly. See City
Parking Rules, Art. III, § 3 ("The driver of any vehicle . . .
shall obey the instructions of any official traffic control
sign"), and Art. IV, § 16(2)(c). See also Ten Local Citizen
Group v. New England Wind, LLC, 457 Mass. 222, 228 (2010)
(absent appellant's demonstration of error under G. L. c. 30A,
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1185
MILLY MARTINEZ
vs.
PARKING CLERK OF BOSTON.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Milly Martinez was issued a parking citation (citation) for
parking in a loading zone on Boylston Street in Boston (city).
A hearing officer upheld that citation after an administrative
hearing at the office of the parking clerk (agency), and
Martinez subsequently sought judicial review in the Superior
Court. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14. The parties filed cross-motions
for judgment on the pleadings, see Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365
Mass. 754 (1974), and after a hearing, the motion judge ruled in
favor of the agency. We affirm.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review both the
judge's ruling on Martinez's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and the hearing officer's conclusions of law, de novo.1 See Barron v. Kolenda, 491 Mass. 408, 415 (2023), citing
Mullins v. Corcoran, 488 Mass. 275, 281 (2021) (judgment on
pleadings); Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Milton v. HD/MW Randolph
Ave., LLC, 490 Mass. 257, 262 (2022), citing Craft Beer Guild,
LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 512
(2019) (conclusions of law). We then review the hearing
officer's decision using the standards set forth in G. L.
c. 30A, § 14 (7). See G. L. c. 90, § 20A 1/2. According to
those standards, "a final administrative agency decision will be
set aside if, among other grounds, it is '[u]nsupported by
substantial evidence,' G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e), or
'[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law,' G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g)."
Commissioner of Admin. & Fin. v. Commonwealth Employment
Relations Bd., 477 Mass. 92, 95 (2017). "Substantial evidence
[is] such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. The applicable standard of review is
highly deferential to the agency and requires the reviewing
court to accord due weight to the experience, technical
1 Under this standard, we do not give deference to the motion judge's determinations. See Caron v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 218, 221 (2013). We therefore need not and do not address Martinez's objection to the motion judge's specific conclusions, or to the judge's reference to the effect of a "no stopping anytime" sign in the area in which Martinez was ticketed for the loading zone violation.
2 competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as
to the discretionary authority conferred upon it" (quotations
and citation omitted). Cave Corp. v. Conservation Comm'n of
Attleboro, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 767, 773-774 (2017). We will thus
affirm a finding of the board unless the administrative record
"points to an overwhelming probability of the contrary"
(citation omitted). Anderson v. Commonwealth Employment
Relations Bd., 73 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 910 (2009).
2. Martinez's arguments. a. Arguments not raised before
hearing officer. Martinez's appellate brief, like her motion
before the Superior Court judge, includes arguments that were
not raised before the hearing officer.2 Although some or all of
these arguments were presented to the motion judge in the
Superior Court, they are not properly before us on appeal, and
we do not address them. See Doucette v. Massachusetts Parole
Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 535 (2014), citing Catlin v. Board
of Registration of Architects, 414 Mass. 1, 7 n.7 (1992); Rico's
of the Berkshires, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n,
19 Mass. App. Ct. 1026, 1026 (1985), citing G. L. c. 30A,
§ 14 (5).
2 These include arguments about the application of G. L. c. 85, § 2, and the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, to the merits of Martinez's challenge to the citation.
3 b. Preserved arguments. The thrust of Martinez's appeal
is that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law in
affirming the citation, as a single sign facing away from
oncoming traffic was the only indication of the loading zone
parking prohibition where Martinez was ticketed.3 We are not
persuaded.
The city's parking rules require "at least one (1)
regulatory sign marking the limits of [a loading zone]," Traffic
Rules and Regulations, City of Boston (2012) (City Parking
Rules), Art. I, § 1, and provide that "[a] parking restriction,
which is indicated by the placement of an Official Traffic Sign
shall continue in effect until . . . [t]he end of the block."
City Parking Rules, Art. IV, § 16(2)(c). On appeal, Martinez
"does not deny that when she parked at Boylston St[reet], she
[saw] . . . the back side of a regulatory sign." She likewise
does not deny that the sign was, although "far away," posted on
the block on which she parked. We discern no error in the
hearing officer's conclusion that a single sign on the block
where Martinez was parked met the minimum requirements for
3 Martinez does not appear to challenge the determination that the area in which she was parked was, in fact, a loading zone at the time the citation was issued. To the extent that Martinez does make that argument, she has not rebutted the prima facie evidence of the violation established by the citation itself. See G. L. c. 90, § 20A 1/2.
4 marking the loading zone. See City Parking Rules, Art. I, § 1,
and Art. IV, § 16(2)(c).
Similarly, the hearing officer did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously, or commit an error of law, in concluding that
Martinez's parking in the loading zone was not excused by the
fact that the relevant sign was mounted to face away from
oncoming, one-way traffic on Boylston Street, rather than toward
or parallel with it. From Martinez's testimony at the hearing,
the hearing officer could have found that the sign was visible
to Martinez once she had parked.4 Likewise, the hearing officer
could have found that Martinez saw the sign (even if she did so
after passing it and parking farther up the same block) and
simply ignored it or misinterpreted its importance. Where the
city's parking rules place the onus on the driver to ensure
parking is permitted in the spot the driver chooses, as the
rules do here, the hearing officer acted permissibly. See City
Parking Rules, Art. III, § 3 ("The driver of any vehicle . . .
shall obey the instructions of any official traffic control
sign"), and Art. IV, § 16(2)(c). See also Ten Local Citizen
Group v. New England Wind, LLC, 457 Mass. 222, 228 (2010)
(absent appellant's demonstration of error under G. L. c. 30A,
§ 14, appellate court defers to agency decision).
4 We infer that the hearing officer so found.
5 Additionally, the record does not support Martinez's
contention that the hearing officer failed to review the video
recording and photographs that Martinez presented at the
administrative hearing. It is apparent from the hearing
transcript that Martinez presented her evidence to the hearing
officer, and that the hearing officer reviewed at least some of
that evidence with Martinez during the brief hearing.
Martinez has also failed to point to any evidence, other
than the hearing officer's adverse ruling, to support her claim
that the hearing officer was biased against her and in favor of
the city.5 See Passero v. Fitzsimmons, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 83
(2017), quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
(1994) ("'judicial rulings alone . . . constitute a valid basis
for a bias or partiality motion' . . . only 'in the rarest
circumstances' where they 'reveal such a high degree of
favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible'").
Moreover, Martinez's evidence showing that the city changed
the signage on the portion of Boylston Street on which she was
ticketed after the citation issued in her case did not establish
5 We pause to note, as did the motion judge, that the hearing transcript reveals that the hearing officer "was not patient and perhaps lacked courtesy." In our view, Martinez's (albeit unfounded) concerns about potential bias might well have been allayed by more professional behavior on the part of the hearing officer.
6 that the signs in place when Martinez was ticketed failed to
comply with the relevant regulations. The city's parking rules
established the minimum requirements for signage and, as we have
explained, the hearing officer was within her authority to
conclude that the city met those minimum requirements here.
Finally, Martinez's arguments that the hearing officer's
and motion judge's rulings caused her emotional distress,
resulted in damage to her reputation, or amounted to "libel" do
not rise to the level of appellate argument, and we do not
consider them. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing
in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). The same is true of Martinez's
suggestion that the signs on Boylston Street are ineffective
because they may be blocked by trucks using the loading zone.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, Hand & Brennan, JJ.6),
Clerk
Entered: December 31, 2024.
6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.