Thomas, J.
This is a petition to this court, sitting in equity, and as such having, by the St. of 1838, c. 163, the jurisdiction and the supervision of . all proceedings in insolvency. The averments of the petition are admitted by the answers of the respondents. Nor is there a question upon the facts agreed that a copartnership was entered into by the Whittenton Mills and the said Mason, and for the purposes stated, if the corporation was capable in law of entering into and forming such partnership and for such ends.
But the petitioners say, first, that the Whittenton Mills could not enter into any legal partnership ; secondly, that if it were so capable, it could not form a copartnership for the prosecution of a business foreign to the purpose for which alone it was created ; thirdly, that if such legal partnership existed, the petitioners were not liable to be declared insolvent upon the petition of Mason and under the St. of 1838, c. 163, and the acts in addition thereto; such acts respecting only natural persons and making no provision for bodies corporate.
[595]*595At the threshold of the cause and of its elaborate discussion is the question, Was this corporation capable of forming a partnership, of entering into the contract ? This question presents itself in two forms. The more general one is : Has a corporation, as one of its usual inherent powers, the capacity to form a contract of copartnership ? The narrower question, but for this case the practical and pertinent one, is, Can a manufacturing corporation in this commonwealth, incorporated since February 1831, and subject to the provisions of the thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes, enter into a contract or society of copartnership ?
This corporation was created in March 1836 as a manufacturing corporation, for the purpose of manufacturing cotton goods in the town of Taunton, and for that purpose was invested with all the powers and privileges and made subject to all the duties, restrictions and liabilities set forth in the thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes, passed on the fourth of November preceding, but not to take effect till the first of May eighteen hundred and thirty six. St. 1836, c. 19. This charter, with the provisions of the chapters referred to and made part of it, is the origin and source of the powers and functions of the corporation. What powers are granted expressly, or by implication, because necessary or usual for the purposes which this charter was given to effect, the corporation has, and no more.
There is one obvious and important distinction between such a society as this charter creates and that of a partnership. An act of the corporation, done either by direct vote or by agents authorized for the purpose, is the manifestation of the collected will of the society. No member of the corporation, as such, can bind the society. In a partnership each member binds the society as a principal. If then this corporation may enter into partnership with an individual, there would be two principals, the legal person and the natural person, each having, within the scope of the society’s business, full authority to manage its concerns, including even the disposition of its property.
The second section of c. 38 of the Rev. Sts. provides that the [596]*596business of every such manufacturing corporation shall be managed and conducted by the president and directors thereof and such other officers, agents and factors as the company shall think proper to authorize for that purpose. It is plain that the provisions of this section cannot be carried into effect where a partnership exists. The partner may manage and conduct the business of the corporation, and bind it by his acts. In so doing he does not act as an officer or agent of the corporation by authority received from it, but as a principal in a society in which all are equals, and each capable of binding the society by the act of its individual will.
Indeed, in examining this chapter, it will be found that there is scarcely a provision for the conduct of the business of a manufacturing corporation that is not inconsistent with the existence of a contract by which the power to manage the business of the company and to bind the corporation by his acts is vested in one not a member of the corporation nor its officer or agent. Such are the third, fourth and fifth sections, providing how the president and directors, and other officers, agents and factors of the corporation shall be chosen. Such too is the sixth section, which authorizes every such company to make by-laws for its own regulation and government. Such are the several provisions authorizing the stockholders to fix the amount of the capital stock, to increase the same within the limit fixed by law or to reduce it. §§ 9, 11, 19. And such is the provision requiring the president and directors to give annual notice of the amount of the debts of the corporation; the means of stating which would not be in their power if another principal had the power of creating the debts. § 22. Of the same character is the twenty-fifth section, by which it is declared that the whole amount of the debts which the corporation shall at any time owe shall not exceed the amount of the capital stock actually paid in, and which renders the directors, under whose administration an excess shall occur, liable personally to the extent of such excess ; a provision evidently based upon the ground that the exclusive power to contract debts is vested in such directors, and that they cannot be divested of it, and which is wholly in[597]*597consistent with the existence of a power in the corporation to enter into a contract of partnership, by which another principal would be created, having equal power to contract debts and to bind the partnership and the corporation in solido.
Indeed the effect of all our statutes, the settled policy of our legislature, for the regulation of manufacturing corporations is that the corporation is to manage its affairs separately and exclusively ; certain powers to be exercised by the stockholders, and others by" officers who are the servants of the corporation and act in its name and behalf. And the formation of a contract, or the entering into a relation, by which the corporation or the officers of its appointment should be divested of that power, or by which its franchises should be vested in a partner with equal power to direct and control its business, is entirely inconsistent with that policy.
The power to form a partnership is not only not among the powers granted expressly or by reasonable implication, but is wholly inconsistent with the scope and tenor of the powers expressly conferred, and the duties expressly imposed, upon a manufacturing corporation under the legislation of the Commonwealth.
The difficulties would be obviously greater in holding such a partnership to be valid, when formed and carried on for the prosecution of a business other than that, if not foreign from that, for which the corporation was created. It is difficult to see how the corporation should engage in such business, even when under its own control, still less to enter into copartnership with third persons for that purpose.
By the St. of 1852, c.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Thomas, J.
This is a petition to this court, sitting in equity, and as such having, by the St. of 1838, c. 163, the jurisdiction and the supervision of . all proceedings in insolvency. The averments of the petition are admitted by the answers of the respondents. Nor is there a question upon the facts agreed that a copartnership was entered into by the Whittenton Mills and the said Mason, and for the purposes stated, if the corporation was capable in law of entering into and forming such partnership and for such ends.
But the petitioners say, first, that the Whittenton Mills could not enter into any legal partnership ; secondly, that if it were so capable, it could not form a copartnership for the prosecution of a business foreign to the purpose for which alone it was created ; thirdly, that if such legal partnership existed, the petitioners were not liable to be declared insolvent upon the petition of Mason and under the St. of 1838, c. 163, and the acts in addition thereto; such acts respecting only natural persons and making no provision for bodies corporate.
[595]*595At the threshold of the cause and of its elaborate discussion is the question, Was this corporation capable of forming a partnership, of entering into the contract ? This question presents itself in two forms. The more general one is : Has a corporation, as one of its usual inherent powers, the capacity to form a contract of copartnership ? The narrower question, but for this case the practical and pertinent one, is, Can a manufacturing corporation in this commonwealth, incorporated since February 1831, and subject to the provisions of the thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes, enter into a contract or society of copartnership ?
This corporation was created in March 1836 as a manufacturing corporation, for the purpose of manufacturing cotton goods in the town of Taunton, and for that purpose was invested with all the powers and privileges and made subject to all the duties, restrictions and liabilities set forth in the thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes, passed on the fourth of November preceding, but not to take effect till the first of May eighteen hundred and thirty six. St. 1836, c. 19. This charter, with the provisions of the chapters referred to and made part of it, is the origin and source of the powers and functions of the corporation. What powers are granted expressly, or by implication, because necessary or usual for the purposes which this charter was given to effect, the corporation has, and no more.
There is one obvious and important distinction between such a society as this charter creates and that of a partnership. An act of the corporation, done either by direct vote or by agents authorized for the purpose, is the manifestation of the collected will of the society. No member of the corporation, as such, can bind the society. In a partnership each member binds the society as a principal. If then this corporation may enter into partnership with an individual, there would be two principals, the legal person and the natural person, each having, within the scope of the society’s business, full authority to manage its concerns, including even the disposition of its property.
The second section of c. 38 of the Rev. Sts. provides that the [596]*596business of every such manufacturing corporation shall be managed and conducted by the president and directors thereof and such other officers, agents and factors as the company shall think proper to authorize for that purpose. It is plain that the provisions of this section cannot be carried into effect where a partnership exists. The partner may manage and conduct the business of the corporation, and bind it by his acts. In so doing he does not act as an officer or agent of the corporation by authority received from it, but as a principal in a society in which all are equals, and each capable of binding the society by the act of its individual will.
Indeed, in examining this chapter, it will be found that there is scarcely a provision for the conduct of the business of a manufacturing corporation that is not inconsistent with the existence of a contract by which the power to manage the business of the company and to bind the corporation by his acts is vested in one not a member of the corporation nor its officer or agent. Such are the third, fourth and fifth sections, providing how the president and directors, and other officers, agents and factors of the corporation shall be chosen. Such too is the sixth section, which authorizes every such company to make by-laws for its own regulation and government. Such are the several provisions authorizing the stockholders to fix the amount of the capital stock, to increase the same within the limit fixed by law or to reduce it. §§ 9, 11, 19. And such is the provision requiring the president and directors to give annual notice of the amount of the debts of the corporation; the means of stating which would not be in their power if another principal had the power of creating the debts. § 22. Of the same character is the twenty-fifth section, by which it is declared that the whole amount of the debts which the corporation shall at any time owe shall not exceed the amount of the capital stock actually paid in, and which renders the directors, under whose administration an excess shall occur, liable personally to the extent of such excess ; a provision evidently based upon the ground that the exclusive power to contract debts is vested in such directors, and that they cannot be divested of it, and which is wholly in[597]*597consistent with the existence of a power in the corporation to enter into a contract of partnership, by which another principal would be created, having equal power to contract debts and to bind the partnership and the corporation in solido.
Indeed the effect of all our statutes, the settled policy of our legislature, for the regulation of manufacturing corporations is that the corporation is to manage its affairs separately and exclusively ; certain powers to be exercised by the stockholders, and others by" officers who are the servants of the corporation and act in its name and behalf. And the formation of a contract, or the entering into a relation, by which the corporation or the officers of its appointment should be divested of that power, or by which its franchises should be vested in a partner with equal power to direct and control its business, is entirely inconsistent with that policy.
The power to form a partnership is not only not among the powers granted expressly or by reasonable implication, but is wholly inconsistent with the scope and tenor of the powers expressly conferred, and the duties expressly imposed, upon a manufacturing corporation under the legislation of the Commonwealth.
The difficulties would be obviously greater in holding such a partnership to be valid, when formed and carried on for the prosecution of a business other than that, if not foreign from that, for which the corporation was created. It is difficult to see how the corporation should engage in such business, even when under its own control, still less to enter into copartnership with third persons for that purpose.
By the St. of 1852, c. 195, not adverted to in the argument, corporations created for the manufacture of woollen and cotton goods are authorized to carry on certain other manufactures, bu this only when four fifths of the stockholders shall, by vote at a special meeting called for the purpose, consent to the same. This statute furnishes a pretty strong implication that the power to carry on a different business from that for which the corporation was chartered, did not exist before the statute was passed.
[598]*598We are therefore all of opinion that in the formation of the alleged partnership the corporation exceeded the powers given by its charter expressly or by implication, and that the contract of copartnership was illegal and void.
It is said however by the respondents that if this be so, such violation of the charter can only be alleged by the Commonwealth upon proceedings for a forfeiture of the charter, and that the validity of the partnership cannot be called in question by the corporation or by its creditors or debtors.
As the basis of proceeding against the Whittenton Mills in insolvency upon the petition of Mason under the St. of 1838, c. 163, § 21, even supposing that the provisions of that statute are not limited to natural persons, it was necessary to show the existence of an actual copartnership between Mason and the corporation. It was not sufficient to show that they had so conducled as to be liable to third persons as partners; they must be partners inter sese. Hanson v. Paige, 3 Gray, 239. There must be a contract of copartnership between them. Into such a contract the petitioners were incapable of entering.
But the case rests upon broader grounds. The charter of the corporation is part of the public law. Rev. Sts. c. 2, § 3. Those who deal with the corporation must take notice of the extent of its powers, and that the corporation is legally incapable of entering into the contract of partnership ; that that contract was beyond the scope of its authority, and that this incapacity resulted from considerations not personal or peculiar to this corporation or its members, but from general grounds of public policy, which the corporation and those dealing with it cannot be permitted to contravene and defeat. That policy is to confine these corporations within the limits prescribed by law, to protect the stockholders from liabilities which the charter and laws do not create ; and, while it imposes upon the stockholders of the corporation heavy responsibilities, to retain to them the legal control of its business and conduct of its affairs.
The precise point at issue before us is the validity of these proceedings in insolvency. That depends, as before remarked, upon the existence of the partnership between the Whittenton [599]*599Mills and Mason. Upon that only could the petition of Mason be sustained.
It is not necessary for this purpose to decide how far these considerations will affect those claiming to be the creditors or debtors of the alleged partnership. It is in this point of view only, that the cases of Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16 Mass. 94, Quincy Canal v. Newcomb, 7 Met. 276, and White v. South Shore Railroad, 6 Cush. 412, can be deemed material. They have the tendency to show the existence of a contract between the Whittenton Mills and Mason, which the former is estopped to question.
In the case of Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, one ground of defence to the recovery for goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff corporation was, that the corporation was prohibited from trading. The court held, that the legislature did not intend to prohibit the supply of goods to those employed in the manufactory. That certainly was the end of the matter. The court however added, that the defendant could not refuse payment on this ground, but that the legislature may enforce the prohibition by causing the charter to be revoked. This suggestion will be entitled to consideration if a question should arise as to the right of the alleged company to recover for goods sold, but it certainly is not conclusive upon the relation of the partners inter sese.
In Quincy Canal v. Newcomb, it was held, that, where a canal was opened and toll claimed and the defendant used the canal, he was liable to the payment of such toll and could not avoid such payment by showing that the canal had not been made so deep as the statute required.
In White v. South Shore Railroad, it was held, that the defendants were liable for damages in constructing their road through and across a mill pond authorized by the general court to be raised in a navigable river, though in erecting the dam for raising the pond the condition of the act permitting it had not been complied with. The court said, that the railroad company could not take the petitioners’ pond from them because the dam was not constructed in compliance with the act; that whether it had been so constructed was a matter between the government and the petitioner.
[600]*600If the assent of all the stockholders were shown to the formation of the partnership—which is not the fact—it could not enlarge the powers of the corporation, or make that legal which was inconsistent with the law limiting their powers and prescribing their duties. Whether, if such assent were available, it could be manifested in any other mode but a vote of the stockholders, it is not necessary to inquire.
The decision of the question as to the existence of the partnership between the Whittenton Mills and William Mason in the negative renders unnecessary the inquiry whether, if a partnership had existed, the petitioners could be -subjected to the provision of the insolvent law of 1838, c. 163, and the acts in addition thereto.
The proceedings in insolvency founded upon the petition of Mason as the partner of said Whittenton Mills under the firm of William Mason & Company were illegal and must be vacated and set aside, so far as they affect the estate of the Whittenton Mills. A mandamus must issue to the judge in insolvency for the county of Bristol to proceed upon the petition of the Whittenton Mills, to hear the parties, and, good cause being shown, to issue his warrant thereon.
Decree accordingly.