UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TANYA ALLEGRA MILLS,
Plaintiff, v. No. 19-cv-3061 (EGS) ANADOLU AGENCY NA, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff Tanya Mills (“Ms. Mills”) brings this action
against Defendant Anadolu Agency NA, Inc. (“Anadolu”) under the
District of Columbia Payment and Collection of Wages Law
(“DCPCWL”), DC Code § 32-1301 et. seq., arising out of the
termination of her employment. Ms. Mills alleges that Anadolu
has not compensated her for her unused paid leave days upon her
discharge. Pending before the Court is Anadolu’s motion to
dismiss. Upon careful consideration of the motion, the
opposition, the reply thereto, the applicable law, and the
entire record herein, the Court GRANTS Anadolu’s Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 12; and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ms. Mills’s
DCPCWL claim.
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the filed document. I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts reflect the allegations in the
operative complaint, which the Court assumes are true for the
purposes of deciding this motion and construes in Ms. Mills’s
favor. See Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
2015). Anadolu is a broadcasting company “under the ownership
and control of Anadolu Ajansi Turk A.S. (“A. A. Turk”), a
corporation owned and controlled by the government of Turkey.”
See Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 1 ¶ 1. Ms. Mills alleges that on
“April 6, 2018, [she] entered into an employment contract with
A. A. Turk by signing an offer letter to work as an Executive
Producer in Turkey.” Id. at 4 ¶ 8. The offer letter stated,
among other things, that Ms. Mills’s compensation package
included “[p]aid leave – [a]nnual entitlement of 20 days plus
all Turkish national and public holidays, timing subject to
clearance with [Ms. Mills’] line managers.” Offer Letter, Apr.
4, 2018 (“OL”), Def.’s Ex. 4, ECF No. 12-6 at 2.2 In addition,
the offer letter stated “[j]urisdiction – [t]his agreement is
2 Though this action is not at the summary judgement stage, “[w]here an attachment to a motion to dismiss is a document ‘upon which the complaint necessarily relies, and because plaintiff does not dispute its authenticity, the Court may consider [it] without converting [the] motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.’” Feld Entm't Inc. v. Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 873 F. Supp. 2d 288, 323 (D.D.C. 2012). 2 subject to Turkish employment laws.” Id.
However, upon her arrival in Turkey to begin her
employment, Ms. Mills states that she was told that she would
need to sign “a fixed-term consultancy agreement” in order to
receive her salary since she did not have a Turkish work visa.
See Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 4 ¶ 10. She further alleges that
she was told that once she received her Turkish work visa, the
consultancy agreement would no longer be necessary. Id.
Nevertheless, Ms. Mills indicates that she signed a new
“consultancy agreement approximately every 60 days” until the
end of her employment. Id. at 5 ¶ 11. Each consultancy
agreement, which specified that the agreement was between A. A.
Turk as the “agency” and Ms. Mills, stated in relevant parts:
The consultant is obliged to comply with the rules and regulations in the place where he tries to perform his services and, the standards of the Agency.
The AGENCY agrees to pay [sic] net per month as service fee to the CONSULTANT who will be providing services under the Joint Broadcasting Project in order to provide a world class news production to be presented to the channel.
The Consultant will never be considered as an employee of current Labor Laws in any case and at any time with this agreement. The services provided by the consultant [sic], are entirely professional and commercial, do not create any business relationship that give rise to the right to work in anyway.
This agreement is the entire agreement between
3 the parties in relation to the subject matter, invalidates and replaces all previous written or oral agreements, agreement samples, representations or proposals not contained in this agreement.
The Agency shall have the right to end the contract at any given time.
The Ankara Courts and enforcement offices shall be the exclusive authorized venues for the resolution of any matter of controversy or dispute between the parties relates there to.
This agreement consists of fourteen (14) articles, two (2) pages and two (2) copies, one for each party.
See Consultancy Serv. Procurement Agreements (“Consultancy
Agreement”) May 15, 2018 – May 31, 2019, Def.’s Ex. 2, ECF No.
12-4 at 2-3. Ms. Mills notes that the “offer letter never
mentioned a consultancy agreement and did not contain an
expiration term.” See Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 5 ¶ 11; see
generally, OL, ECF No. 12-6.
On January 31, 2019, Ms. Mills returned to the United
States, where she continued to sign a new consultancy agreement
with A. A. Turk every 60 days. See id. ¶¶ 11-12. In March 2019,
Ms. Mills contends that “A. A. Turk assigned her to work in
Anadolu’s Washington D.C. bureau.” Id. ¶ 12. While working in
Anadolu’s Washington D.C. bureau, Ms. Mills’ “job title remained
the same”; she “received the same salary[;] and received the
same benefits.” Id. Ms. Mills alleges that she was
“simultaneously employed by A. A. Turk,” and Anadolu. Id. ¶ 13.
4 Ms. Mills asserts that as of July 31, 2019, she “had
accrued but unused annual leave of 20 hours.” Id. ¶ 14. Further,
Ms. Mills alleges that between “March, 2019 and the end of her
employment, [she] worked during several Turkish holidays and she
earned [four] compensatory days of leave,” which “brought her
leave total (at the time of termination) to 24 days.” Id. at 6 ¶
14. According to Ms. Mills, on April 18, 2019, she emailed “Kim
Adams, [a] Senior Newsroom Coordinator, employed by A. A. Turk,
to inquire about the remaining balance of her available paid
leave.” See Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 6 ¶ 15. Ms. Adams
allegedly responded, “‘You should have only used 8 annual leave
days, so presumably you [sic] still have 12 Days remaining to
use. Your leave balance will renew on May 15, 2019 . . . .’” Id.
Ms. Mills alleges that she was discharged by Anadolu and A.
A. Turk on July 29, 2019 when she received an “email from Mehmet
Ali Sevgi, who works at Anadolu’s D.C. Bureau, telling her
[that] A. A. Turk was not renewing her most recent Consultancy
Agreement executed on June 1, 2019.” Id. at 6 ¶ 16. Further, Ms.
Milles asserts that Mr. Mehmet “orally instructed [her] not to
return to work after that day (July 29, 2019), even though the
Consultancy Agreement did not end until July 31, 2019.”
According to Ms. Mills, she is owed the “full value of the
accrued but unused leave ($14,555.52) plus an amount equal to
three times the value of the unpaid leave as liquidated damages
5 ($43,666.56), [for] a total of $58,222.08.” Id. at 7 ¶ 21. In
addition, Ms. Mills claims that since she “did not receive
payment of her wages for the month of July, 2019 (the gross
amount of $10,916.67) until August 24, 2019, which was 17
working days after the August 1, 2019 due date . . . Anadolu
must pay liquidated damages in the amount of 1.7 times the
amount of the wages, which is $18,558.34.” Id. ¶ 22.
B. Procedural History
On October 14, 2019, Ms. Mills filed the current action.
See Compl., ECF No. 1. After Anadolu moved to dismiss the
initial complaint on January 9, 2020, see Def.’s First Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 8, Ms. Mills filed an Amended Complaint on
January 28, 2020. See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 10. Anadolu
then filed its current motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint
on February 11, 2020, see Def.’s Second Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s
Mot.”), ECF No. 12; and Ms. Mills filed her opposition brief on
March 25, 2020, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 18. Anadolu then filed
its reply brief on April 1, 2020. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 19.
The motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.
II. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
6 the pleader is entitled to relief,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),
“in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only if it
“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
[a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint
alleging facts which are “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s
liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).
Though at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court generally
will accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and give
the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can reasonably
be drawn from the allegations, see Browning, 292 F.3d at 242;
the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if
such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the
complaint or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual
7 allegations. See Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 963 (D.C. Cir.
2004). “Nor must [the Court] accept as true the plaintiff’s
factual allegations insofar as they contradict exhibits to the
complaint or matters subject to judicial notice.” Id. (citing
Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir.2002)).
III. Analysis
Anadolu argues that Ms. Mills’s action should be dismissed
because she has failed to state a claim under the DCWPCL. See
Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 12-1 at 12.3 DCWPCL requires, inter alia,
that upon an employee’s discharge, “the employer shall pay the
employee's wages earned not later than the working day following
such discharge.” D.C. Code § 32-1303(1). However, if “an
employee (not having a written contract of employment for a
period in excess of 30 days) quits or resigns, the employer
shall pay the employee's wages due upon the next regular payday
or within 7 days from the date of quitting or resigning,
whichever is earlier.” D.C. Code Ann. § 32-1303(2). As Anadolu
is the only defendant in this action, prior to evaluating any of
Ms. Mills’ claims against the entity under DCPCWL, the Court
must first establish that there was an “employer-employee
3 Anadolu advances two other arguments for dismissal: (1) forum non conveniens, see Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 12-1 at 6; and (2) personal jurisdiction, see id. at 9. Because the Court finds that Ms. Mills has failed to state a claim under the DCWPCL, it need not reach Anadolu’s other arguments. 8 relationship” between Anadolu and Ms. Mills. See Harris v. Med.
Transportation Mgmt., Inc., 300 F. Supp. 3d 234, 240 (D.D.C.
2018).
“Because the DCWPCL and the [Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”)] contain nearly identical provisions with respect to
employers' liability, the DCWPCL is to be construed consistently
with the FLSA.” Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1,
5 n. 2 (D.D.C. 2010)). Similar to the FLSA’s definition, see 29
U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(1), DCWPCL defines an “employee” as “any person
suffered or permitted to work by an employer,” D.C. Code Ann. §
32-1301(2). The Supreme Court, in analyzing the FLSA, has held
that “‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts'
[shall] be the test of employment.” See Goldberg v. Whitaker
House Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961). To test the economic
reality of the parties’ employer-employee relationship, the
Court looks at several factors:
[W]hether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment . . .(4) maintained employment records. . . . [In addition, a court may also examine] [5] the degree of control exercised by the employer over the [employee], [6] the [employee’s] opportunity for profit or loss and their investment in the business, [7] the degree of skill and independent initiative required to perform the work, [8] the permanence or duration of the working relationship and [9] the extent to which the work is an integral
9 part of the employer's business.
Morrison v. Int'l Programs Consortium, Inc., 253 F.3d 5, 11
(D.C. Cir. 2001)(citing Henthorn v. Department of Navy, 29 F.3d
682, 684 (D.C.Cir.1994); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d
1054 (2d Cir.1988)). “No one factor standing alone is
dispositive and courts are directed to look at the totality of
the circumstances and consider any relevant evidence.” Morrison,
253 F.3d at 11 (citing Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d
132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999), holding modified by Zheng v. Liberty
Apparel Co. Inc., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003)). “[T]he final and
determinative question must be whether the total of the testing
establishes the personnel are so dependent upon the business
with which they are connected that they come within the
protection of the [DCWPCL] or are sufficiently independent to
lie outside its ambit.” Morrison, 253 F.3d at 11 (citing Usery
v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311–12 (5th Cir.1976)).
Ms. Mills argues that Anadolu and A. A. Turk “are a single
employer because they perform interrelated operations for a
common purpose.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 1-2 ¶ 1. Further, she
alleges that “[b]oth entities are also under common management
and financial control which is centralized in A. A. Turk’s
headquarters in Turkey [and] [a]s a single employer, Anadolu and
A. A. Turk are regarded as a single entity and each is liable
for the actions of the other.” Id. Ms. Mills contends that both
10 entities (1) “suffered or permitted” her to work, see id. at 2 ¶
2;(2) “had the power to hire and fire” her, id.; and (3)
“supervised” and “directed” her work, id. Further, Ms. Mills
states that “A. A. Turk performed the human resources function
on its own behalf and on behalf of Anadolu because it paid [Ms.
Mills] her salary and administered her employment benefits” and
“A. A. Turk provided her with a work space [before she arrived
into D.C.] but beginning in March 2019, Anadolu provided [her]
work space at the D.C. Bureau [as well as] provided her with the
tools and materials necessary to perform her job in D.C.” Id.
She goes on to allege that Anadolu “had control over the work
[she] performed,” id. at 3 ¶ 3; (2) “had control over her hours
of work and made [her] work schedule,” id.; and (3) “made the
work rules that [she] was obligated to follow,” id.
Anadolu argues that Ms. Mills is suing the wrong defendant in
the wrong court. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 12-1 at 1. Noting that
Ms. Mills entered a contract with A. A. Turk to “provide
consulting services as an independent contractor for [A. A.
Turk] from June 1, 2019 until July 31, 2019,” see id. at 2;
Anadolu contends that it “never employed [Ms.] Mills in the
District of Columbia,” id. at 4. It argues that it “is [a]
separate and distinct legal entity from” A. A. Turk, with
“separate bank accounts, payroll, telephone numbers employees,
and offices.” Id. Finally, Anadolu argues that it “never had any
11 employment relationship with [Ms.] Mills; never entered into a
contract with [Ms.] Mills; never made any payment to [Ms.]
Mills; and never transacted any business in the District of
Columbia with [Ms.] Mills.” Id. Anadolu then notes that neither
it, “nor any of its employees, discharged or terminated [Ms.]
Mills.” Id.
In response, citing to Harris, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 240, Ms.
Mills argues that, for purposes of DCPCWL, “Anadolu and A. A
[Turk] jointly employed [her] under the economic reality test.”
Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 21. She contends that “[j]oint
employment can . . . be present in the case of a parent
subsidiary relationship, where the operations of the two are
related or intertwined.” Id. Further, Ms. Mills argues that
since “Anadolu is under the ownership and control of A. A.
[Turk], [with] both entities perform[ing] interrelated
operations for a common purpose, [and] are under common
management . . . they are a single employer, each liable for the
actions of the other.” Id. Finally, she contends that
“[i]ndependent contractor agreements have no bearing on whether
a plaintiff is an employee or independent contractor.” Id. at
22.
Anadolu replies that it has never employed Ms. Mills, and
notes that the “[c]ontract” that Ms. Mills is suing under is
between her and A. A. Turk. Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 19 at 15.
12 Anadolu states that, “[w]hile [it] recognizes the viability of a
‘joint employer’ theory, there are no facts here to support such
a theory.” Id. at 16. Anadolu observes that (1) “[n]owhere in
the Amended Complaint does [Ms.] Mills allege that Anadolu had
the power to hire and fire [her],” id.; (2) “it is undisputed
that [Ms.] Mills was hired by [A. A. Turk],” id.; (3) “the
individual that decided not to renew [Ms.] Mills’ contract,
Mehmet Ali Sevgi, was never employed by Anadolu,” id.; and (4)
“nowhere does [Ms.] Mills allege that Anadolu controlled the
terms and conditions of [her] employment, determined the rate
and method of [her] pay, and maintained [her] employment
records,” id. Finally, Anadolu avers that there is “no dispute
that Anadolu and [A. A. Turk] maintained separate offices and
management.” Id.
The Court is unpersuaded that Ms. Mills has alleged facts to
establish that she was employed by A. A. Turk’s subsidiary,
Anadolu, under the theory of joint employer liability. “The
doctrine of limited liability creates a strong presumption that
a parent corporation is not the employer of its subsidiary's
employees and only evidence of control suggesting a significant
departure from the ordinary relationship between a parent and
its subsidiary is sufficient to establish a joint employer
relationship.” In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment
Practices Litig., 735 F. Supp. 2d 277, 338 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
13 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)(citing Lusk v.
Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 778 (5th Cir.1997), aff'd,
683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012)). Here, Ms. Mills attempts to hold
the subsidiary liable for the alleged actions of the nonparty
parent company. The ultimate question when reviewing cases of
“joint” or “parent-subsidiary” liability is one of “control.”
See Miles v. Howard Univ., 83 F. Supp. 3d 105, 114 (D.D.C.
2015), aff'd, 653 F. App'x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting that both
judicial tests for conducting a “joint employment inquiry,”
found in Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831–32
(D.C.Cir.1979) and NLRB v. Browning–Ferris Indus. Of
Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir.1982)), involve
questions of “control”). None of the cases Ms. Mills cites to,
relevant to joint employment, involve a complainant prevailing
in a claim against a subsidiary based on the control of a
nonparty parent. See Harris, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 236-39 (the
defendant drivers claimed that a “general contractor” was
“legally liable for their unpaid wages . . . under federal and
local laws,” because they alleged that the general contractor
“control[ed] their ‘daily operations’” as part of the general
contractor’s authority over the drivers’ subcontractor
employers); Perry v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F. Supp. 3d 1,
14 (D.D.C. 2017) (the plaintiff alleged DCWPCL violations
against his direct employer, but the court found that his
14 position was exempt from the wage statute); Flannigan v. Vulcan
Power Grp., LLC, 642 F. App'x 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2016) (the
plaintiff, an employee of a subsidiary company, brought a claim
against the parent company and one of its officers for wage
violations where the defendants admitted to having the power to
hire, fire and supervise the employee); Jackam v. Hosp. Corp. of
Am. Mideast, 800 F.2d 1577, 1580 (11th Cir. 1986) (employees of
a subsidiary company brought claims against a parent company,
based on the theory that the subsidiary was an agent of the
parent, making the parent a joint employer of the employees).
In Saint-Jean v. D.C. Pub. Sch. Div. of Transp., 815 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011), plaintiffs, former District of Columbia
Division of Transportation (“DOT”) employees, attempted to hold
their DOT supervisor liable for their FLSA claims. Plaintiffs
claimed that their supervisor could be considered their employer
because “she ‘was responsible for assigning overtime to DOT
employees’ and controlled the times at which drivers were to
sign in and out.” Saint-Jean, 815 F. Supp. 2d. at *4. In denying
the motion for default judgment,4 even though the defendant
failed to properly respond to the complaint, the court found
4 Similar to a motion to dismiss, a motion for default judgement involves the court centering its inquiry on the “well-pleaded allegations of the complaint.” Int'l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Zak Architectural Metal and Glass, LLC, 635 F.Supp.2d 21, 24 (D.D.C.2009). 15 that the “plaintiffs [pled] no facts showing that [the
defendant] had the power to hire them,” noting that “[i]ndeed,
the plaintiffs themselves aver that ‘DOT hired’ them . . . and
that DOT subsequently employed them” Id. (emphasis in original).
Further, the court found that the defendant “was authorized only
to issue written warnings against plaintiffs . . . not to fire
them outright.” Id. Finally, the court observed that “the
plaintiffs ma[de] no allegation that [the Defendant] determined
the rate and method of payment or maintained employment
records.” Id.
Ms. Mills offers similarly insufficient allegations to
establish Anadolu’s liability as a subsidiary. However, alleging
that the parent and subsidiary are regarded as a single entity
and each is liable for the actions of the other does not allow
the Court to make a plausible inference that the requisite
control would flow from the from subsidiary to the parent.
The first factor of the economic reality test—power to hire
and fire—weighs against Ms. Mills’s claim. Morrison, 253 F.3d at
11. Ms. Mills argues that she was hired by A. A. Turk on “April
6, 2018, [when she] entered into an employment contract with A.
A. Turk.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 4 ¶ 8. She then states that
this contract “set forth the terms of [her] employment,
including . . . [her] annual salary and . . . benefits.” Id. Ms.
Mills adds that she signed a “fixed-term consultancy agreement”
16 that listed her and A. A. Turk as the parties, id. ¶ 10, and
would go on to sign a new consultancy agreement, still listing
herself and A. A. Turk as the parties, “approximately every 60
days” until she was discharged, id. 5 ¶ 11. Importantly, Ms.
Mills states “in early March, 2019, A. A. Turk assigned her to
work in Anadolu’s Washington D.C. bureau.” Id. 5 ¶ 12. At no
point does Ms. Mills provide any facts that indicate that
Anadolu had any power to hire her, and based on her statement
that A. A. Turk assigned her to Anadolu’s office, Anadolu seems
to have had little say in her placement as well. See Saint-Jean,
815 F. Supp. 2d at 4. Furthermore, although Ms. Mills alleges in
her Amended Complaint that she was “discharged by Mehmet Ali
Sevgi, an employee of Anadolu who worked at the D.C Bureau,” Am.
Compl., ECF No. 10 at 2 ¶ 2; in her Opposition, and after
Anadolu’s declaration that Mehmet Ali Sevgi was not an employee
of Anadolu, Ms. Mills states that she was terminated by “Mehmet
Ali Sevgi, who physically worked at Anadolu’s D.C. office,”
Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 31. Ms. Mills does not dispute
Anadolu’s contention that he is an employee of A. A. Turk.
The third factor—determination of the rate and method of
payment—also weighs against Anadolu’s liability. Morrison, 253
F.3d at 11. After she began working in Anadolu’s location, Ms.
Mills states that (1) “her job title remained the same,” Am.
Compl., ECF No. 10 at 5 ¶ 12; and (2) she received the “same
17 salary and received the same benefits,” id.; which indicates
that Anadolu exhibited no control over her the conditions of her
employment or her rate of pay. Ms. Mills states that “A. A. Turk
performed the human resources function on its own behalf and on
behalf of Anadolu because it paid [Ms. Mills] her salary and
administered her employment benefits,” Id. at 2 ¶ 2; but admits
that it was A. A. Turk that administered her salary and
benefits, as she never provides any facts indicating how Anadolu
exerted any control over those important aspects of her
employment.
The fourth factor—the maintenance of employment records—
provides further weight against Anadolu’s liability. Morrison,
253 F.3d at 11. Ms. Mills acknowledges that, when attempting to
determine how many leave days she had accrued, while physically
working at Anadolu’s Washington D.C. location, she reached out
to “Kim Adams, [a] Senior Newsroom Coordinator, employed by A.
A. Turk, to inquire about the remaining balance of her available
paid leave.” See Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 6 ¶ 15 (emphasis
added).
Further, a final factor—the permanence or duration of the
working relationship—also weighs against Anadolu’s liability,
because, as noted above, it was A. A. Turk who (1) was a party
to the initial offer letter, (2) required several consultancy
agreements which specified the employment periods, (3) assigned
18 her to Anadolu’s office, and (4) employed the representative
that notified Ms. Mills that her contract would not be renewed.
To be sure, Ms. Mills did make several allegations that
directly reference Anadolu, but the Court finds those
allegations unavailing as they were “formulaic recitation[s] of
the elements” of the “economic reality” test. See Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. Though, Ms. Mills, citing Harris, 300 F. Supp. 3d
at 243, notes that “defeating a claim [based on joint, single,
or parent-subsidiary theories] at the motion to dismiss stage is
no easy task,” it is not impossible. See Attanasio v. Cmty.
Health Sys., Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 417 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Coffen
v. Washington Convention & Sports Auth., 271 F. Supp. 3d 211
(D.D.C. 2017); Al-Quraan v. 4115 8th St. NW, LLC, 113 F. Supp.
3d 367 (D.D.C. 2015); Arencibia v. 2401 Rest. Corp., 699 F.
Supp. 2d 318 (D.D.C. 2010).
Attanasio is particularly instructive because in that case, as
in this case, where the plaintiffs provided generalized
statements of FLSA liability against the parent company for the
actions of the wholly-owned subsidiary, even though the parent
company did not own the subsidiary during the time most of the
claims arose, see Attanasio, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 419; the
court found the plaintiffs’ allegations to be “conclusory and
implausible,” id. at 425. As part of its finding, the court
noted that plaintiffs’ “allegations establishing employer
19 control by the [subsidiary] and later [by the parent company
were] effectively identical,” and observed that the duplicate
allegations “foreclose[d] the possibility that the[] pleadings
[were] particularized and demonstrate[d] that the[] allegations
[were] devoid of any actual factual support.” Id. Further, the
court stated that “even beyond that these pleadings are
boilerplate, is that there are no operative details suggesting
exactly how [the parent company] exercised authority over the
particular employees, how these employees were supervised by
[the parent company]. . . and how they oversaw the
administration of the business records.” Id.(emphasis in
original). “Such details are the backbone of a well-pleaded
allegation.” Id. at 424.
In this action, Ms. Mills alleges that Anadolu and A. A.
Turk, which is not a party in this case, “both ‘suffered or
permitted’ [her] to work,” Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 2 ¶ 3;
“both entities had the power to hire and fire,” id.; and “both
entities supervised” her work, id. Lumping both the parent and
subsidiary company together with the elements of the “economic
reality” test is not sufficient to state a plausible allegation
for the subsidiary’s liability. Even in Jackam, cited by Ms.
Mills, the court found the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient
when they included such details as the subsidiary company
“execut[ing] personnel and labor relations polic[ies]
20 established by the parent corporation”; the parent company
“actively recruit[ed] individuals” to the subsidiary; and the
parent company even “drafted the employee relations manual” for
the subsidiary. See 800 F.2d at 1580. The only fact Ms. Mills
includes in her allegations that weigh in favor of Anadolu’s
liability was that she “was supervised by Maxine Hughes who is
employed by Anadolu.” Compl., ECF No. 10 at 5 ¶ 12.
No one factor is dispositive in determining whether an
employer-employee relationship exists. But viewing the totality
of the circumstances—(1) Ms. Mills was hired by A. A. Turk; (2)
A. A. Turk paid Ms. Mills’s wages and administered her benefits
throughout her entire period of employment; (3) A. A. Turk
assigned her to Anadolu’s office; (4) A. A. Turk remained the
only party to Ms. Mills’s alleged employment contracts; and (5)
an A. A. Turk employee informed her of her alleged discharge—the
Court must conclude that Anadolu was not Ms. Mills’s employer
for the purposes of DCPCWL liability. See Morrison, Inc., 253
F.3d at 11.
21 IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Anadolu’s
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12. A separate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge November 24, 2020