J-S14003-26 2026 PA Super 165
MAHDI MILLS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JASMINE DUNHAM : : Appellant : No. 818 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered May 23, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Civil Division at No(s): CV-2024-01112
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: JULY 30, 2026
Jasmine Dunham appeals from the final order granting the petition for
protection from abuse (PFA) filed by Mahdi Mills. She challenges the denial of
a continuance based on her pending criminal charges from the same
underlying incident. We reject a per se rule that pending criminal charges will
always outweigh other circumstances that a PFA court must consider in ruling
on a motion for continuance of a final PFA hearing. In this case, the PFA
court’s ruling was within its discretion. We thus affirm.
On June 20, 2024, Mills petitioned for a PFA order on behalf of himself
and two minor children, describing the most recent incident of abuse on June
18, 2024. The PFA court granted a temporary PFA order effective “until June
20, 2025 or until otherwise modified or terminated by [the PFA court] after
notice and hearing.” See Temporary PFA Order, 6/20/24, at 3. The PFA court
scheduled a final hearing for July 3, 2024. The final hearing was continued J-S14003-26
once at Mills’ request and three times at Dunham’s. Dunham’s first motion
for a continuance provided that she had “pending criminal charges resulting
from these allegations” and would “be unable to defend herself by testifying.”
Application for Continuance, 7/31/24. A subsequent amended temporary PFA
order (entered by a different judge) provided the same reason for an agreed
continuance of the temporary protective order:
[Dunham’s] request to continue the order until such time as the criminal case connected with this matter is settled is granted. The PFA hearing shall be continued for 11 months from the date of the filing of the temporary order.
Temporary PFA Order, 9/16/24, at 2. The final hearing was thus scheduled
for May 21, 2025.
Mills, Dunham’s adult daughter Shantelle Mullins, the minor children,
and both parties’ attorneys appeared for the final hearing on May 21, 2025.
Before Dunham arrived, her attorney requested a continuance for the same
reason as before: Dunham’s testifying to defend against the PFA allegations
would require her to waive her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. N.T., 5/21/25, at 5–6. Mills’ attorney gave two reasons for
opposing a continuance: First, the temporary order was in effect for only one
more month, and counsel believed “a temporary order by statute has to expire
within one year.” Id. at 5. Second, Mills “would prefer to have the cases
move forward” and did not consent to a continuance. Id. at 6.
The PFA court denied a continuance. Once Dunham arrived, Mills
presented testimony from himself and from Shantelle Mullins. Dunham cross-
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examined both witnesses but did not present any other evidence on her own
behalf, citing the pending criminal matter. Id. at 66. The PFA court granted
Mills’ petition for a final PFA order.
Dunham timely appealed. Dunham and the PFA court complied with
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. The PFA court articulated
three reasons for its denial of Dunham’s continuance motion: (1) Mills was
present with counsel and witnesses to proceed, (2) at the time of the hearing,
there was no firm date for the resolution of the criminal case and any appeal,
and (3) the temporary order was set to expire in one month. See PFA Court
Opinion, 9/23/25, at 2. “[Dunham] was provided an opportunity to resolve
the criminal matter; however, the concerns of fairness to the alleged victims
of abuse, for resolution of the civil PFA before it expired, had to take
precedence.” Id. at 3.
On appeal, Dunham maintains that the PFA court abused its discretion
by denying her continuance request despite her pending criminal charges from
the same incident. She states that those charges were “ultimately resolved
on October 16, 2025,” with her entry into an accelerated rehabilitative
disposition (ARD) program. Dunham emphasizes that Mills would not have
suffered any prejudice from a continuance, as the PFA court could have
extended the terms of the temporary order to protect Mills and the children.
By contrast, she argues that the denial of a continuance improperly pitted her
right to present evidence in the civil PFA case against her right to remain silent
in the related criminal case.
-3- J-S14003-26
Mills contends that Dunham’s proposed remedy would effectively require
an indefinite continuance, as ARD does not resolve the criminal charges. He
notes a final order provides finality that a temporary order does not. Mills
submits that the relevant factors support the trial court’s discretionary denial
of Dunham’s continuance request.
By statute, a PFA court has discretion to continue a final hearing.
Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 926 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 6107(c)). Accordingly, we review a PFA court’s ruling on a continuance
request to determine whether the court abused its discretion. Id. at 925. “An
abuse of discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, the
[PFA] court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the record
discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the
results of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (quoting Baysmore v.
Brownstein, 771 A.2d 54, 57 (Pa. Super. 2001)).
We have articulated four general factors to determine whether the denial
of a continuance is an abuse of discretion: “whether there was prejudice to
the opposing party by a delay, whether opposing counsel was willing to
continue the case, the length of the delay requested, and the complexities
involved in presenting the case.” Rutyna v. Schweers, 177 A.3d 927, 933
(Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Papalia v. Montour Auto Serv. Co.,
682 A.2d 343, 345 (Pa. Super. 1996)). In a related situation, where a
defendant requests a continuance to retain new counsel, we have looked to
the depth of the inquiry conducted by the trial court, as well as the number of
-4- J-S14003-26
prior continuances, the timing of the request, and whether the newly retained
counsel is ready to proceed in a reasonable amount of time. See
Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539, 543 (Pa. Super. 2009).
We reject a per se rule that a PFA final hearing must be continued if it
stems from an incident that also produced pending criminal charges. Although
this is the normal practice, which was previously followed in this case, such a
mandatory rule is inconsistent with a determination that is vested in a PFA
court’s sound discretion. Rather, consistent with the relevant factors above,
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J-S14003-26 2026 PA Super 165
MAHDI MILLS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JASMINE DUNHAM : : Appellant : No. 818 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered May 23, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Civil Division at No(s): CV-2024-01112
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: JULY 30, 2026
Jasmine Dunham appeals from the final order granting the petition for
protection from abuse (PFA) filed by Mahdi Mills. She challenges the denial of
a continuance based on her pending criminal charges from the same
underlying incident. We reject a per se rule that pending criminal charges will
always outweigh other circumstances that a PFA court must consider in ruling
on a motion for continuance of a final PFA hearing. In this case, the PFA
court’s ruling was within its discretion. We thus affirm.
On June 20, 2024, Mills petitioned for a PFA order on behalf of himself
and two minor children, describing the most recent incident of abuse on June
18, 2024. The PFA court granted a temporary PFA order effective “until June
20, 2025 or until otherwise modified or terminated by [the PFA court] after
notice and hearing.” See Temporary PFA Order, 6/20/24, at 3. The PFA court
scheduled a final hearing for July 3, 2024. The final hearing was continued J-S14003-26
once at Mills’ request and three times at Dunham’s. Dunham’s first motion
for a continuance provided that she had “pending criminal charges resulting
from these allegations” and would “be unable to defend herself by testifying.”
Application for Continuance, 7/31/24. A subsequent amended temporary PFA
order (entered by a different judge) provided the same reason for an agreed
continuance of the temporary protective order:
[Dunham’s] request to continue the order until such time as the criminal case connected with this matter is settled is granted. The PFA hearing shall be continued for 11 months from the date of the filing of the temporary order.
Temporary PFA Order, 9/16/24, at 2. The final hearing was thus scheduled
for May 21, 2025.
Mills, Dunham’s adult daughter Shantelle Mullins, the minor children,
and both parties’ attorneys appeared for the final hearing on May 21, 2025.
Before Dunham arrived, her attorney requested a continuance for the same
reason as before: Dunham’s testifying to defend against the PFA allegations
would require her to waive her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. N.T., 5/21/25, at 5–6. Mills’ attorney gave two reasons for
opposing a continuance: First, the temporary order was in effect for only one
more month, and counsel believed “a temporary order by statute has to expire
within one year.” Id. at 5. Second, Mills “would prefer to have the cases
move forward” and did not consent to a continuance. Id. at 6.
The PFA court denied a continuance. Once Dunham arrived, Mills
presented testimony from himself and from Shantelle Mullins. Dunham cross-
-2- J-S14003-26
examined both witnesses but did not present any other evidence on her own
behalf, citing the pending criminal matter. Id. at 66. The PFA court granted
Mills’ petition for a final PFA order.
Dunham timely appealed. Dunham and the PFA court complied with
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. The PFA court articulated
three reasons for its denial of Dunham’s continuance motion: (1) Mills was
present with counsel and witnesses to proceed, (2) at the time of the hearing,
there was no firm date for the resolution of the criminal case and any appeal,
and (3) the temporary order was set to expire in one month. See PFA Court
Opinion, 9/23/25, at 2. “[Dunham] was provided an opportunity to resolve
the criminal matter; however, the concerns of fairness to the alleged victims
of abuse, for resolution of the civil PFA before it expired, had to take
precedence.” Id. at 3.
On appeal, Dunham maintains that the PFA court abused its discretion
by denying her continuance request despite her pending criminal charges from
the same incident. She states that those charges were “ultimately resolved
on October 16, 2025,” with her entry into an accelerated rehabilitative
disposition (ARD) program. Dunham emphasizes that Mills would not have
suffered any prejudice from a continuance, as the PFA court could have
extended the terms of the temporary order to protect Mills and the children.
By contrast, she argues that the denial of a continuance improperly pitted her
right to present evidence in the civil PFA case against her right to remain silent
in the related criminal case.
-3- J-S14003-26
Mills contends that Dunham’s proposed remedy would effectively require
an indefinite continuance, as ARD does not resolve the criminal charges. He
notes a final order provides finality that a temporary order does not. Mills
submits that the relevant factors support the trial court’s discretionary denial
of Dunham’s continuance request.
By statute, a PFA court has discretion to continue a final hearing.
Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 926 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 6107(c)). Accordingly, we review a PFA court’s ruling on a continuance
request to determine whether the court abused its discretion. Id. at 925. “An
abuse of discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, the
[PFA] court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the record
discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the
results of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (quoting Baysmore v.
Brownstein, 771 A.2d 54, 57 (Pa. Super. 2001)).
We have articulated four general factors to determine whether the denial
of a continuance is an abuse of discretion: “whether there was prejudice to
the opposing party by a delay, whether opposing counsel was willing to
continue the case, the length of the delay requested, and the complexities
involved in presenting the case.” Rutyna v. Schweers, 177 A.3d 927, 933
(Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Papalia v. Montour Auto Serv. Co.,
682 A.2d 343, 345 (Pa. Super. 1996)). In a related situation, where a
defendant requests a continuance to retain new counsel, we have looked to
the depth of the inquiry conducted by the trial court, as well as the number of
-4- J-S14003-26
prior continuances, the timing of the request, and whether the newly retained
counsel is ready to proceed in a reasonable amount of time. See
Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539, 543 (Pa. Super. 2009).
We reject a per se rule that a PFA final hearing must be continued if it
stems from an incident that also produced pending criminal charges. Although
this is the normal practice, which was previously followed in this case, such a
mandatory rule is inconsistent with a determination that is vested in a PFA
court’s sound discretion. Rather, consistent with the relevant factors above,
a court that is asked to continue a PFA hearing should consider the complete
circumstances of the case. The court commits an abuse of discretion in doing
so if it misapplies the law or enters a ruling that is manifestly unreasonable or
the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
Here, the PFA court also noted that Dunham did not present the motion
at issue until the beginning of the PFA hearing, which had been rescheduled
for several months. Furthermore, Mills had secured witnesses to testify at the
hearing and opposed Dunham’s latest request. Contrary to the belief
expressed by Mills’ attorney at the hearing, the PFA Act does not impose a
one-year time limit on temporary orders. Cf. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(c). However,
the temporary order in this case was set to expire in one month, and there
was no indication of when Dunham’s related criminal case would be resolved
so they could proceed with the civil PFA matter. The PFA court’s decision to
weigh Mills’ interest in receiving a final ruling on his petition greater than
Dunham’s interest in avoiding potential self-incrimination was not a
-5- J-S14003-26
misapplication of the law or otherwise an abuse of discretion. Dunham’s issue
fails.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 07/30/2026
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