PD-1595-15 PD-1595-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 12/7/2015 5:53:10 PM Accepted 12/10/2015 5:16:42 PM ABEL ACOSTA NO. CLERK
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
NO. 10-14-0347-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
TENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT WACO, TEXAS
CLINTON DOUGLAS MILLS, Appellant
V. December 10, 2015 THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
JOHN DONAHUE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT TBA #05968300 CLINTON DOUGLAS MILLS th 204 N. 6 St. Waco, Texas 76701 (254) 752-9090 (254) 753-1232 FAX Texascriminalattorney@yahoo.com
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED SUBJECT INDEX PAGE
Identification of the parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Statement Regarding Oral Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
List of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
GROUND FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to conduct an Almanza analysis of Mills’ claim that the prosecutor erroneously asked the jury to speculate as to Mills’ reasons for selecting the jury to assess punishment.
2. Whether the Trial Court erred in ruling a juror disabled and discharging him from jury service.
Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Statement of the Procedural History of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Statement of Facts Pertinent To Petitioner's Grounds for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Ground for Review Number One (Restated) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Reasons for Review as to Ground for Review Number One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Arguments and Authorities in Support of Petitioner’s Ground for Review Number One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Ground for Review Number Two (Restated) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Reasons for Review as to Ground for Review Number Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Arguments and Authorities in Support of Petitioner’s Ground for Review Number Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
i Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Prayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Certificate of Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
APPENDIX - Opinion of 10th Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . end
ii STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Petitioner respectfully asserts that this Court would be aided in the resolution
of the matters which are the subject of this Petition for Discretionary Review if oral
argument were granted. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court set
this case for oral argument.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Pursuant to Tex.R.App. 68.4(a), a complete list of the names of all interested
parties is provided below:
Abelino “Abel” Reyna - District Attorney of McLennan County, Texas Robert Moody, Amanda Dillon - Assistant District Attorneys 219 N. 6th St., Waco, TX 76701
Clinton Douglas Mills - Appellant #01969510 McConnell Unit 3001 S. Emily Dr. Beeville, TX 78102
Sam Martinez - Counsel for Appellant in trial court 1105 Wooded Acres, Suite 200, Waco, TX 76710
John Donahue - Counsel for Appellant on appeal 204 N. 6th St., Waco, TX 76701
Hon. Ralph T. Strother - Presiding Judge
iii LIST OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
Allen v. State, 867 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1993, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . 9
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,5
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Dumesnil v. State, 2002 Tex.App.Lexis 344 (Tex.App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)(unpublished) . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Edwards v. State, 981 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1998, no pet.) . . . . . . 9
Freeman v. State, 838 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd) . 9
Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,8
Owens v. State, 202 S.W.3d 276 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2006, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . 8
Reyes v. State, 30 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Sanchez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Villareal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
STATUTES
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,8
iv STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a jury trial on punishment in the 19th District Court,
McLennan County, Texas, the Honorable Ralph T. Strother, presiding, Cause Number
2012-1455-C1. The State instituted proceedings against the Appellant, Clinton
Douglas Mills, for the offense of murder, a first degree felony. Tex. Penal Code
§19.02. Mills pleaded guilty to the Trial Court before trial and elected to have his
punishment assessed by the jury. Punishment was assessed by the jury at life in TDC.
No fine was imposed.
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
On November 13, 2014, Mr. Mils timely filed his Notice of Appeal. His brief
was filed on September 9, 2015. The State’s reply brief was filed on October 8, 2015.
On November 5, 2015, the Tenth Court of Appeals issued an opinion overruling
Mills’ points of error and affirming his conviction and sentence.
No motion for rehearing was filed. This petition for discretionary review is
being filed within 30 days of the Court of Appeal’s opinion. See Tex.R.App.Proc.
4.1.
1 STATEMENT OF FACTS
In July, 2012, Matthew Ray Easley was found at his house, unconscious. He
had been beaten, suffering severe head injuries. He later died from those injuries.
Three individuals were later identified as the people responsible, Shane Sims, Joe
Guitierrez, Jr., and Clinton Douglas Mills. Mills was the first to be tried. He pleaded
guilty to the charge of murder and elected to have the jury assess his punishment.
During the voir dire, the prosecutor asked the jury to speculate as to reasons
why the defense would choose to have the jury assess punishment as opposed to the
jury. (R. 6, ppg. 70-72). The jurors answered with various different opinions, some
of which were agreed to by the prosecutor. The prosecutor also, when speaking with
a juror, also suggested some reasons, seeing if the panel agreed with that. These
reasons included to wanting more emotion from the jury; the judge seeing these cases
on a daily basis. In response to a juror’s comment about appealing to emotion, the
prosecutor mentioned that the judge might have seen too many of these and might be
jaded.
At the conclusion of the trial, after the defense had rested, Juror number 2 had
a meeting with the judge. During the defense case, a photograph of Mills’ family was
introduced into evidence. In the photograph were Mills’ son and the child’s mother.
The juror stated that he lived four doors down from the mother but was not aware of
2 the relationship to Mills because she did not have the same last name as Mills. The
juror said he socialized with the mother and saw the child on a daily basis. The juror
claimed to have been suffering some emotional distress and stated that he would be
unable to reach a verdict sending defendant to prison. The juror did not know Mills,
nor Mills’ family, nor had the juror spoken to the mother about this case. In the end,
the Trial Court declared the juror disabled and dismissed him. (R. 8, ppg. 75-86).
The Trial Court asked the defense to agree to proceed with 11 jurors. The defense
declined and objected to the dismissal of the juror. This objection was overruled. (R.
8, pg. 83).
Court of Appeals
As to Mills’ first point of error, the Court of Appeals held that the error was
waived by the failure to object in the trial court.
As to Mills’ second point of error, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court
did not abuse his discretion in declaring the juror disabled.
3 GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE (RESTATED)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to conduct an Almanza analysis of Mills’ claim that the prosecutor erroneously asked the jury to speculate as to Mills’ reasons for selecting the jury to assess punishment.
REASONS FOR REVIEW AS TO GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE
The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state or federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER’S GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE
The Court of Appeals did not address the merits of Mr. Mills’ claim. The
Court held simply that since there was no objection, the error was waived. Mills had
argued, however, that the failure of trial counsel to object should be excused in this
case.
Mills acknowledged the general rule that complain on appeal an appellant must
show he objected and pursued his objection to an adverse ruling.” Cockrell v. State,
933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.1996). Otherwise, an appellant forfeits his right
to complain. Id. However, in this case Mills urges that the Court adopt the reasoning
of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985), as applied in Dumesnil
v. State, 2002 Tex.App.Lexis 344 (Tex.App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no
4 pet.)(unpublished). By this, Mills means that in those instances where the
prosecutor’s conduct (like an erroneous jury charge) is so egregious as to deprive the
accused of a fair trial, the failure to object should be excused.
The Court of Appeals’ opinion addressed Mr. Mills’ claim without conducting
an analysis using the reasoning of Almanza . Almanza has not been overruled or
disavowed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. To the contrary, the Almanza analysis
has been used recently in Villareal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
Mills contends that when the record Is reviewed in its entirety, it becomes
apparent that the error above was not harmless. Mills had never before been
convicted of a felony. Two other people were involved in the offense. Yet Mills
received a life sentence. The complainant was suspected of being a daily user and
drug dealer who was using methamphetamine to keep Mills around. The notion that
the prosecutor’s actions had an impact was apparent during the voir dire of defense
attorney. See R. 6, pg. 137). Parroting the prosecutor, Juror 33 asked Mr. Martinez
why the defense had chosen to have the jury assess punishment as opposed to the
judge: “...even though the judge is there and fair and balanced.” Once this issue was
introduced by the prosecutor, the defense was unable to overcome the question in the
jurors’ minds.
By bringing up the issue during voir dire, the prosecutor encouraged the jury
5 to speculate as to why a defendant would not want the judge to assess punishment.
The responses are mentioned above. In this manner, the prosecutor encouraged the
jury to suggest that there may be evidence or reasons outside the record for the
defendant’s decision. The actions of the prosecutor were a deliberate move on her
part to deprive Mills of a fair trial. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000).
Voir dire error affects the trial from the very beginning. The prosecution goes
first in the process and is able to infect the trial from that point forward. The defense
can attempt to ameliorate the error introduced by the prosecution, but it is difficult to
quantify its effect in voir dire. Mr. Mills contends that the Court of Appeals should
have reviewed the error using the Almanza analysis and asks the Court to remand the
case for that analysis.
6 GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER TWO (RESTATED)
Whether the Trial Court erred in ruling a juror disabled and discharging him from jury service.
REASONS FOR REVIEW AS TO GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER TWO
The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state or federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER’S GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER TWO
If a juror becomes disabled after the beginning of a felony trial, the trial court
may excuse the juror and proceed with the remaining eleven jurors. Art. 36.29
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. The language of Article 36.29 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure and the cases applying it make clear that the Legislature's intent was to
limit the Article's application to those cases where the juror was physically or
mentally impaired in some way which hindered his ability to perform his duty as a
juror. Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A juror is
disabled if she has a "physical illness, mental condition, or emotional state" which
hinders her ability to perform her duties as a juror. Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d 308, 315
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
The overall goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the collective
7 intent or purpose of the Legislature that enacted the statute. Boykin v. State, 818
S.W.2d 782,785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). To do so, one must focus on the literal text
of the statute and try to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text. Id. If the
meaning of the text is clear and unambiguous, the court should give effect to that
meaning. Sanchez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 324, 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). If
however, the statute is ambiguous or the plain meaning of the statute would lead to
absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended,
extratextual sources may "then and only then, out of absolute necessity," be
consulted. Id.
Mills contends that article 36.29, and the cases interpreting it, demonstrate that
the trial court erred in excusing the juror in this case. In Hill v. State, supra, the
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the district court’s declaration of disability since
the juror was unable to perform her duties due to “debilitating panic attacks”. Id. In
Owens v. State, 202 S.W.3d 276 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2006, pet. ref’d), the excused
juror informed the trial court that she was unable to obtain care and transportation for
her special needs child. The juror was a single parent whose only relative was a 94
year old mother in a nursing home. Because of the problems with her child, she was
unable to focus her attention on the trial.
The dismissal of jurors as "disabled from sitting" have been upheld for varied
8 reasons beyond physical illness. See e.g., Edwards v. State, 981 S.W.2d 359, 366-7
(Tex. App.--Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (juror's inability to find child care for son led
trial judge to believe that she could not be fair juror or impartially deliberate upon
evidence); Allen v. State, 867 S.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1993, no
pet.) (juror distraught over two family deaths within twenty-four hour period);
Freeman v. State, 838 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd) (juror
who provided sole financial support for his family so concerned about absence from
job that he did not feel that he could be attentive during trial). Reyes v. State, 30
S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Mills contends, however, that a fundamental difference exists between the
impairment of a juror’s ability to perform her functions and the mere desire to avoid
having to do them. The cases cited above deal with situations where the juror’s
ability to perform their duties would be impaired whether the trial proceeded or was
delayed. In the instant case, however, the juror’s “disability” was simply a desire to
avoid having to perform his duties. Defense counsel made an effort to keep the juror
on the panel. When the trial court declared the juror disabled, defense counsel
objected, thus preserving error.
The Court of Appeals cited to Reyes v. State, supra, for the proposition that the
trial court properly considered the juror disabled. However, in Reyes, the Court of
9 Criminal Appeals held that knowledge of the defendant may result in rendering the
juror disabled. None of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals supported the notion
that knowledge of a child with a girl to whom Mills was not married constituted such
a disability.
In summary, Mills contends that the trial court erred in excusing the juror for
a condition that, at most, was simply an effort on the juror’s part to avoid having to
make a difficult decision. However, this kind of decision is one that jurors are called
upon to make every day. To allow this ‘disability’ to stand begs the question of
where to draw the line between being able to perform the duties as a juror and not
being able to do so. Therefore, Mills contends that his sentence should be reversed
and a new trial ordered on punishment.
Conclusion
Mr. Mills, based on either or both of the above grounds of review, contends
that his sentence should be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for a new
trial on punishment.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Mr. Mills respectfully requests
that this Honorable Court review the transcript of the proceedings in this case, and
after such review, determine that the Court of Appeals improperly decided his points
10 of error; reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand to the Court of
Appeals with instructions to conduct an analysis under Almanza as to ground for
review number one. As to ground for review number two, the punishment should be
vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for a new punishment trial.
Respectfully submitted,
/S/ John Donahue JOHN DONAHUE TBA #05968300 204N. 6th St. Waco, Texas 76701 (254) 752-9090 Fax (254) 753-1232 Texascriminalattorney@yahoo.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Corrected Petition for Discretionary Review was forwarded to the following on December 7, 2015
/S/ John Donahue JOHN DONAHUE
Sterling Harmon Clinton Douglas Mills, #01969510 Ass’t District Attorney McConnell Unit McLennan County, Texas 3001 S. Emily Dr. Waco, TX 76701 Beeville, TX 78102 (254) 757-5084 (254) 757- 5021 Sterling.Harmon@co.mclennan.tx.us
11 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 Certificate of Compliance with Type-Volume Limitation, Typeface Requirements, and Type Style Requirements
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i) because:
O this brief contains 2994 words, including the parts of the brief exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1), or,
G this brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains _____ lines of text, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements and the type style requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) because:
O this brief has been produced on a computer in conventional typeface using Corel Wordperfect 8.0 in Times New Roman 14 point font in the body of the brief and Times New Roman 12 point font in the footnotes.
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/S/ John Donahue JOHN DONAHUE Attorney for Appellant Dated: December 7, 2015
12 IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14-00347-CR
CLINTON DOUGLAS MILLS, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 19th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2012-1455-C1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two issues, appellant, Clinton Douglas Mills, challenges the punishment
assessed in this murder case. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West 2011). Specifically,
Mills contends that: (1) during voir dire, the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to
speculate as to why he elected for the jury, rather than the judge, to assess punishment;
and (2) the trial court committed reversible error in determining that a juror was disabled
under article 36.29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.29 (West Supp. 2014). Because we overrule both of Mills’s arguments, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
Here, Mills was charged for the murder of Matthew Ray Easley. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.02. The record reflects that Mills was one of three co-conspirators in the
murder and that Mills was the first of the three to be tried. Prior to trial, Mills pleaded
guilty to the charged offense and elected for a jury to assess his punishment. The trial
court accepted Mills’s guilty plea and found him guilty of the charged offense. The case
proceeded to the punishment phase. At the conclusion of the punishment phase, the jury
assessed punishment Mills to life imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. The trial court certified Mills’s right of appeal, and this
appeal followed.
II. VOIR DIRE
In his first issue, Mills argues that the prosecutor improperly asked the jury during
voir dire to speculate as to why Mills elected to have a jury, rather than the judge, assess
punishment.
A. Facts
In his introductory remarks to the venire panel, the trial judge noted that:
This trial is going to be a little different because the Defendant in this case yesterday waived his right to a trial by jury at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, pled guilty to the offense of murder and was found guilty of
Mills v. State Page 2 murder by the Court, so what the jury is going to be asked to determine in this case, “What is the proper punishment for the offense of murder?”
Thereafter, during the State’s portion of voir dire, the following exchange
occurred:
[The State]: Now the judge has told you that the—it’s the Defendant’s right to pick a judge or a jury to assess punishment, okay? He can say, “Judge, I want you to do it, or, no, I want twelve people of this county to do it.” Let’s see. Where did we stop when we were going through? I think we jumped over here, didn’t we? Thirty-four, okay, Ms. White—or, no, Mr. White, 34, why would someone, you think pick a jury instead of a judge to assess their punishment?
VENIREPERSON: Well, that becomes more of the—the peers. The Judge deals with it on a daily basis—
[The State]: Uh-huh.
VENIREPERSON: —and the—the community doesn’t—
VENIREPERSON: —so—so they’ll look at it probably in a different—
[The State]: A different set of glasses?
VENIREPERSON: Yes.
[The State]: Okay, what about Juror 35? Why do you think someone would choose a jury over a judge to assess punishment?
VENIREPERSON: Hoping to appeal to emotion maybe.
[The State]: Sure. Something maybe the Judge has seen too many of these. He—he’s jaded. Thirty-six, why would Mills v. State Page 3 someone pick a jury over a judge to assess punishment?
VENIREPERSON: You have more people involved in the process who can argue together and bring out points you may have missed. Someone else will say, “Well, we missed this,” and you talk about it, and sometimes it takes a group.
[The State]: “Sometimes it takes a group,” sure. Thirty-seven, can you think of any other reasons?
VENIREPERSON: No. I agree with all of those—
[The State]: Okay.
VENIREPERSON: —that, you know, it’s just better to have different opinions—
VENIREPERSON: —rather than the one.
[The State]: Sure. I guess more people to convince?
[The State]: Thirty-eight.
VENIREPERSON: The same, twelve different emotions, twelve different mindsets just going through it.
[The State]: Does everybody kind of agree with that? Does anybody have any other viewpoints on that?
THE VENIRE: (No response).
Mills did not object to the aforementioned exchange; however, it is this exchange that
forms the basis of his complaint in this issue.
Mills v. State Page 4 B. Discussion
Contentions that the State asked an improper question during voir dire require a
timely and specific objection from the defendant at the earliest possible opportunity to
preserve error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 741, 764 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995); Ross v. State, 154 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004,
pet. ref’d); see also Wampler v. State, No. 11-13-00374-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 Tex. App.
LEXIS 10155, at **4-5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 30, 2015, no pet. h.). Because Mills failed
to timely object to the complained-of exchange, he has waived this complaint on appeal.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Penry, 903 S.W.2d at 764; Ross, 154 S.W.3d at 807; see also
Wampler, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10155, at **4-5.
Nevertheless, despite the general rule regarding preservation, Mills urges this
Court to apply the Almanza egregious-harm standard to this issue. See generally Almanza
v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). This is essentially a fundamental-error
argument, which can be waived by failure to object in the trial court. See Mays v. State,
318 S.W.3d 368, 393-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (concluding that appellant failed to
preserve his complaints about “a series of egregiously improper remarks” by not
objecting to those arguments at trial); Morris v. State, 460 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“Appellant, however, argues that the jury argument
is incurable fundamental error. Even if the State’s arguments were incurable and rose to
the level that it deprived appellant of his right to due process of law, appellant waived
Mills v. State Page 5 this complaint by failing to object in the trial court.”); see also Harvey v. State, No. 10-15-
00067-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 9757, at **8-9 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 17, 2015, no pet.
h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). Because Mills did not object to the
complained-of exchange in the trial court, we are not persuaded by Mills’s reliance on
Almanza in this issue. We overrule Mills’s first issue.
III. JUROR DISABILITY
In his second issue, Mills asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that a juror was
disabled and thereby discharged him from service on the jury.
A. Applicable Law
If a juror becomes disabled after the trial of a felony begins, the remaining
members of the jury may render a verdict. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.29(a);
see also Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d 308, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In other words, article
36.29(a) mandates that the trial court proceed with the remaining eleven jurors. See Hill,
90 S.W.3d at 315. A juror is considered disabled when he has a physical illness, mental
conditions, or emotional state that renders him unable to perform his duties. See Hill, 90
S.W.3d at 315; see also Owens v. State, 202 S.W.3d 276, 277 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, pet.
ref’d). A trial court’s decision to declare a juror disabled and subsequently excuse the
juror is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Owens, 202 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Brooks v.
State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Landrum v. State, 788 S.W.2d 577,
579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Mills v. State Page 6 B. Discussion
At the close of evidence, the trial court went into recess to prepare the charge.
During the recess, a juror approached the bailiff to report an issue he was having with
the case. The juror explained that when a photo of Mills’s family was shown to the jury,
he realized that he knew Mills’s child and the child’s mother, but not Mills himself. The
juror also noted that Mills’s family has been to his house on numerous occasions and that
he waves to Mills’s child every morning. Furthermore, the juror asserted that:
You know, like I said, I see [Mills’s child] on a daily basis. I mean he’s always riding his bike around the neighborhood. If I’m outside, he comes up and talks to me. You know, like I said, he’s always standing outside waiting on the bus. We wave at each other every morning. Just I don’t think I could—I don’t think I could do that.
When asked what he could not do, the juror clarified that he could not reach a verdict in
this case.
Later, the juror stated that, because of his relationship with Mills’s family, he “can’t
sentence that kid’s father. You know, I mean—I mean I deal with them” and that he did
not feel like he could render a fair and impartial verdict in this matter. When questioning
the juror about the situation, the trial judge noted that the juror seemed “emotionally
distraught now as we’re sitting here.” The trial judge also recounted that the juror’s
“voice is quavering now, and you’re pretty distraught about this.” After the juror left the
courtroom, the trial judge stated the following on the record:
The juror was quite emotional about this situation, and he had no way of knowing until now that he knew anything about this case, or it just wasn’t Mills v. State Page 7 an issue that had come up, but he was very emotional. He was about to cry in here, and he says there is no way that he could be fair and impartial in this matter. There’s no way he could reach a verdict that would send the father of that child to the penitentiary for any period of time, life or any other sentence, and that he just could not do it, and he was—as I said, he was emotional.
Over Mills’s objection, the trial court determined the juror to be disabled, excused the
juror from service on the jury, and ordered that the trial proceed with eleven jurors.
With respect to a juror’s disability, the Court of Criminal Appeals has mentioned:
In interpreting the language concerning "disability" as it relates to the various provisions of art. 36.29, we have recognized that a disability is not limited to physical disease, but also includes “any condition that inhibits a juror from fully and fairly performing the functions of a juror.” Griffin v. State, 486 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). See also, Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1198, 117 S. Ct. 1556, 137 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1997); Bass v. State, 622 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965, 102 S. Ct. 2046, 72 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1982). We have further held that this condition may result from physical illness, mental condition, or emotional state. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 956, 120 S. Ct. 384, 145 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1999); Landrum v. State, 788 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Carrillo v. State, 597 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Thus, the dismissal of jurors as “disabled from sitting” have been upheld for varied reasons beyond physical illness. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 981 S.W.2d 359, 366-7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (juror's inability to find child care for son led trial judge to believe that she could not be fair juror or impartially deliberate upon evidence); Allen v. State, 867 S.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1993, no pet.) (juror distraught over two family deaths within twenty-four hour period); Freeman v. State, 838 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd) (juror who provided sole financial support for his family so concerned about absence from job that he did not feel that he could be attentive during trial).
We have also held that a juror's bias or prejudice for or against a defendant does not render a juror “disabled.” Ex parte Hernandez, 906 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Hatch Mills v. State Page 8 v. State, 958 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Carrillo, 597 S.W.2d at 769-71. However, in each of these cases, the juror merely had some knowledge of the defendant; nothing in the record indicates that there was any evidence that such knowledge resulted in inhibiting the juror from “fully and fairly” performing his functions as a juror. See Hernandez, 906 S.W.2d at 931-2; Carrillo, 597 S.W.2d at 770. Thus, these cases do not foreclose the possibility that a juror is “disabled,” as that term has been construed with regard to art. 36.29, through knowledge of a defendant when such knowledge “inhibits [him] from fully and fairly performing the functions of a juror.” Griffin, 486 S.W.2d at 948. That is, while mere knowledge of a defendant cannot, in and of itself, render a juror “disabled,” the effect of such knowledge on a juror's mental condition or emotional state may result in rendering the juror “disabled” as that term has been construed with regard to art. 36.29.
Reyes v. State, 30 S.W.3d 409, 411-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
As stated earlier, the trial judge noted on the record that the juror was emotionally
distraught, had a “quavering voice” when describing his relationship with Mills’s family,
and was about to cry about the prospect of having to sentence Mills. Additionally, the
juror informed the trial court that he was emotionally incapable of rendering a fair and
impartial verdict in this case. Based on this information, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in concluding that the juror was disabled on account of his
emotional state. See Reyes, 30 S.W.3d at 411-12; Brooks, 990 S.W.2d at 286; Landrum, 788
S.W.2d at 579; see also Owens, 202 S.W.3d at 277. We overrule Mills’s second issue.
Mills v. State Page 9 IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Mills’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
AL SCOGGINS Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed November 5, 2015 Do not publish [CRPM]
Mills v. State Page 10