Millet Harrison Jr. v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided September 5, 2013·No. 09-13-00069-CV·Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-13-00069-CV ____________________

MILLET HARRISON JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee __________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 94-66306 __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 1994, Millet Harrison Jr. was found not guilty by reason of insanity for

the murder of his mother and was committed to a mental health facility. See

Harrison v. State, 179 S.W.3d 629, 631 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied).

The trial court has renewed Harrison’s commitment each year. Id. In January 2013,

the trial court again entered an order of commitment continuing Harrison’s in-

patient mental health services. In two appellate issues, Harrison challenges the

legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s order

1 extending Harrison’s in-patient mental health treatment. We affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

Under a legal sufficiency review when the burden of proof is clear and

convincing, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding

to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or

conviction that its finding was true. Id. at 634. We assume the factfinder resolved

disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could. Id. Under a

factual sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence, both in support of and

contrary to the trial court’s findings, and we give due consideration to evidence

that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. Id. at

634-35. We must determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations. Id. at

635. We consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact

could not have reconciled that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. Id.

Dr. George Howland, a staff psychiatrist at Rusk State Hospital (“Rusk”)

and Harrison’s treating psychiatrist since March 2012, testified that Harrison

suffers from schizophrenia chronic paranoid-type that will continue for a period of

at least ninety days. Harrison told Howland that the drug Ambien had caused him

to become psychotic. Howland explained that some patients become psychotic

2 when using Ambien because psychosis is a potential side effect of Ambien.

Harrison also told Howland that he had been drugged in the past and believed that

this contributed to him becoming psychotic. Howland supposed this could be

possible or could be a delusional thought.

Howland was unaware that in January 2012, Harrison had arguments with

Rusk staff members, had feelings of being persecuted by the staff, and believed the

staff to be placing false information in his medical records. Howland was also

unaware that in February 2012, Harrison attempted to have information on his

identification card changed. Howland testified that in June 2012, Harrison was still

having paranoid thoughts even while taking medication and was having delusions

about the origin of his illness. However, Howland testified that Harrison was not

currently voicing suicidal or homicidal thoughts, had not been paranoid, had not

heard voices or seen things, had complied with Howland’s treatment regimen, has

a client worker job, participates in ward government, and has improved since he

first began seeing Howland. He testified that Harrison had not been physically or

verbally aggressive, shown signs of psychosis, or been involved in altercations.

Howland testified that Harrison is a role model for other patients.

Howland was unaware that Harrison wanted to stop his medications in

September 2011 to show he is no longer mentally ill or that Harrison had refused

3 medical treatment in October and November 2012. Howland opined that, if left

untreated, Harrison will grow worse and become likely to cause harm to himself or

others, continue suffering from abnormal, mental, emotional, or physical distress,

and continue experiencing deterioration of his ability to function independently.

However, Howland testified he looks at how a patient is doing in the present. He

testified that Harrison was currently taking his medications and had not refused his

psychotropic medications. He explained that Harrison knows he has a mental

illness and needs medication, and Howland believed that Harrison would continue

taking his medication if released into the community. Howland did not believe that

Harrison was malingering, as it would be difficult for a person having persistent

delusions to fake normalcy over a period of time. He testified that Harrison needed

a place with structure to help him transition, make his psychiatric appointments,

and comply with medication. Although Howland believed this type of out-patient

setting would be appropriate for Harrison, he admitted that Harrison may possibly

stop taking his medication someday and have delusional or paranoid schizophrenic

thoughts.

Dr. Dan Roberts, a clinical psychologist, testified that Harrison is a paranoid

schizophrenic and, if not treated, is likely to cause harm to himself or others,

continue suffering from abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, and

4 continue experiencing deterioration of his ability to function independently.

Roberts testified that Harrison has a history of periods of delusional thinking

followed by periods of calm. Roberts testified that in December 2011 the Rusk

treatment team recommended that Harrison remain hospitalized. Medical records

indicated that in January 2012, Harrison felt persecuted by the Rusk staff, believed

the staff to be falsifying his records, cursed at another patient, and had impaired

insight. In February 2012, Harrison received permission to leave Rusk to obtain an

identification card, but attempted to persuade his driver to take him other places.

Roberts admitted that Harrison was able to function well enough in society to

obtain the card. In March 2012, Harrison claimed to have been stable since 1995.

Roberts testified that Harrison’s records also show that in 2012, Harrison believed

that his illness originated from the use of Ambien. In April 2012, Harrison’s

treatment team asked him to consider the possibility that his illness developed

naturally. In June 2012, Harrison still had fixed delusions about the origin of his

mental illness. In July 2012, Harrison expressed persecutory thoughts about the

trial judge, district attorney, and court system. Thus, Roberts testified that the

medical records indicate that Harrison has had delusions after March 2012.

Roberts spoke with Harrison the day before the hearing, during which

Harrison stated that he had been told by others that the trial judge and the district

5 attorney were members of the Ku Klux Klan. Roberts testified that Harrison had

previously asserted that the trial judge and district attorney were members of the

Klan. Roberts believed that Harrison was attempting to provide an explanation for

his prior statements. He noted that in the past Harrison had made comments that he

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