Milles Property Corp. v. Joy

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Milles Property Corp. v. Joy

54 A.D.2d 853, 388 N.Y.S.2d 292, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14623

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 16, 1976

StatusPublished

This text of 54 A.D.2d 853 (Milles Property Corp. v. Joy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Milles Property Corp. v. Joy, 54 A.D.2d 853, 388 N.Y.S.2d 292, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14623 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on July 13, 1976, modifying respondent’s determination by changing the effective date of the maximum base rent orders, unanimously reversed, on the law, and vacated, without costs and without disbursements, and respondent’s determination fixing the effective date of such orders as February 1, 1973 reinstated. Petitioner was required to remove all violations by virtue of the escrow agreement executed by it. The inspection of petitioner’s premises, after the completion of its latest attempt to cure the violations, and following its earlier erroneous representations that it had done so, was reasonably prompt. The respondent based the effective date of the maximum base rent orders on the removal of violations of record rather than on the date of possible actual physical curing thereof. On this record there is nothing at all irrational about respondent’s utilization of such record date (Lutzker v Leventhal, 44 AD2d 655) and, accordingly, Special Term was without power to interfere with the administrative determination. Concur&emdash; Kupferman, J. P., Birns, Capozzoli, Nunez and Yesawich, JJ.

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Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on July 13, 1976, modifying respondent’s determination by changing the effective date of the maximum base rent orders, unanimously reversed, on the law, and vacated, without costs and without disbursements, and respondent’s determination fixing the effective date of such orders as February 1, 1973 reinstated. Petitioner was required to remove all violations by virtue of the escrow agreement executed by it. The inspection of petitioner’s premises, after the completion of its latest attempt to cure the violations, and following its earlier erroneous representations that it had done so, was reasonably prompt. The respondent based the effective date of the maximum base rent orders on the removal of violations of record rather than on the date of possible actual physical curing thereof. On this record there is nothing at all irrational about respondent’s utilization of such record date (Lutzker v Leventhal, 44 AD2d 655) and, accordingly, Special Term was without power to interfere with the administrative determination. Concur&emdash; Kupferman, J. P., Birns, Capozzoli, Nunez and Yesawich, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

54 A.D.2d 853, 388 N.Y.S.2d 292, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14623, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/milles-property-corp-v-joy-nyappdiv-1976.