Miller v. U.S. Department of Treasury

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1621
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN W. MILLER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01621 (UNA) ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, ) ) Defendant. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on plaintiff ’s pro se petition for a writ of mandamus (“Pet.”),

ECF No. 1, and his application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP App.”), ECF No. 2.

For the reasons explained below, the court denies plaintiff’s IFP application and dismisses this

matter without prejudice.

At the outset, the court denies plaintiff’s IFP application. In the application, plaintiff states

only that he cannot afford the filing fee because he is “currently under financial distress caused by

the unlawful delay in disbursement of a final default judgment owed to [him] by the U.S.

Department of the Treasury.” IFP App. at 1. No other information is provided, including any

details regarding plaintiff ’s employment circumstances, income, assets, debts, expenses, or other

financial obligations, if any. Having failed to submit any relevant information regarding his

financial circumstances, plaintiff has not established his inability to pay the filing fee for this

matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Plaintiff’s claims fare no better. He seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the U.S.

Department of Treasury “to immediately disburse $750,000 pursuant to Final Default Judgment

entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Case No. 3:22-cv- 2694, and now subject to nationwide enforcement including S.D.N.Y. Case No. 1:25-cv1172.”

Pet. at 1. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim or to establish this court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

First, the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus is available to compel an “officer or

employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to plaintiff.” 28

U.S.C. § 1361. A plaintiff bears a heavy burden of showing that his right to a writ of mandamus

is “clear and indisputable.” In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

“It is well-settled that a writ of mandamus is not available to compel discretionary acts.” Cox v.

Sec'y of Labor, 739 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases). Mandamus is considered

“drastic,” and is available only in extraordinary situations. See Cheney, 406 F.3d at 729 (citations

omitted). Only if “(1) a plaintiff has a clear right to relief, (2) a defendant has a clear duty to act,

and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available to the plaintiff,” Thomas v. Holder, 750 F.3d

899, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2014), is mandamus relief granted.

Plaintiff has neither sued a federal officer or employee, nor addressed any of the required

elements noted above, thus failing to meet his burden. Indeed, the public record of the cases cited

by plaintiff directly contradict his position. 1 See Miller v. United States Gov’t, No. 3:22-cv-2694

(N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 2, 2022) (“Miller I”); Miller v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:25-cv1172 (S.D.N.Y. filed

Feb. 10, 2025) (“Miller II”). Plaintiff was never awarded an entry of default or a default judgment

in Miller I; in fact, his repeated requests for default were denied, see Miller I at Dkt., “clerk declines

to issue default at this time” (dated Feb. 10, 2023, Feb. 14, 2023, May 22, 2023); id. at Order

denying Pet.’s Motion to Certify Default and Default Judgment (dated Aug. 29, 2024), ECF No.

78. To the contrary, defendant United States’ motion to dismiss was granted in full in Miller I on

1 A court may take judicial notice of the docket and facts on the public record in other court proceedings. See Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005). August 15, 2023, and that matter was then dismissed and closed. See Judgment, ECF No. 54.

Likewise, in Miller II, plaintiff’s multiple requests for default were all denied, see Miller II Dkt.

at Order (dated Mar. 21, 2025), ECF No. 69, and defendant Apple’s motion to dismiss was granted

in full, and that case was also dismissed and closed, see id. at Opinion & Order (dated June 2,

2025), ECF No. 329; id. at Judgment (dated June 2, 2025), ECF No. 330.

Insofar as plaintiff challenges the determinations made in Miller I or Miller II, he must file

for relief with those presiding courts, respectively, or with the applicable United States Courts of

Appeals, because this court is without jurisdiction to review or otherwise intervene in those

matters. See In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Panko v. Rodak, 606 F. 2d 168, 171 n.6

(7th Cir. 1979) (finding it “axiomatic” that a federal court may order judges or officers of another

federal court “to take an action.”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Choi, 818

F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that federal district courts “generally lack[] appellate

jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts”)

(citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)); Fleming v. United States, 847 F.

Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), aff’d, No. 94-5079, 1994 WL 474995 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

For all of these reasons, this matter is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

__________/s/_____________ Date: June 26, 2025 AMIT P. MEHTA United States District Judge