Miller v. Straub

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: August 8, 2002
• Docket: 00-2150
• Status: Published

Opinion

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,Q0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVZHUHILIWHHQDQGVL[WHHQ\HDUV ROG UHVSHFWLYHO\  (DFK RQ WKH DGYLFH RI KLV RZQ GHIHQVH FRXQVHO SOHG JXLOW\ LQ 0LFKLJDQ VWDWH FRXUW WR ILUVW GHJUHH PXUGHU7KHLUDWWRUQH\VEHOLHYHGLWOLNHO\WKDWWKHWULDOFRXUW ZRXOGLPSRVHMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHV7KHWULDOFRXUWGLGVHQWHQFH WKHPDVMXYHQLOHV,QHDFKFDVHWKHSURVHFXWLRQDSSHDOHGDQG WKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOVUHYHUVHG0LOOHUDQG+D\QHV HDFK WKHQ UHFHLYHG WKH RQO\ DYDLODEOH DGXOW VHQWHQFH XQGHU 0LFKLJDQODZOLIHLQSULVRQZLWKRXWSRVVLELOLW\RISDUROH 1HLWKHU 0LOOHU¶V QRU +D\QHV¶ WULDO FRXQVHO FRQVLGHUHG RU DGYLVHG WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH FOLHQWV WKDW the prosecutor could appeal the imposition of a juvenile sentence. Miller and Haynes petitioned for writs of habeas corpus, and the federal district court concluded that the failure of their defense attorneys to inform them of the prosecutor's right to appeal, particularly in light of their youth at the time of the pleas, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 7KH FRXUWIXUWKHUFRQFOXGHGWKDWDFRQWUDU\GHWHUPLQDWLRQRQWKH IDFWV DQG WKH ODZ E\ WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV FRQVWLWXWHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRIFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHG IHGHUDOODZDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUW LQ:LOOLDPVY7D\ORU529 U.S. 362 (2000)+LOOY/RFNKDUW 474 U.S. 52 (1985DQG6WULFNODQGY:DVKLQJWRQ466 U.S. 668 (1984)  $FFRUGLQJO\ WKH FRXUW separately JUDQWHG 0LOOHU¶VDQG+D\QHV¶SHWLWLRQVIRUZULWVRIKDEHDVFRUSXVRQ WKHJURXQGRILQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHO7KHZDUGHQV DSSHDO$IWHUDFDUHIXOUHYLHZRIWKHUHFRUGVLQWKHWZRFDVHV ZH$)),50WKHGLVWULFWFRXUW

 The Honorable Denise Page Hood, United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan.  The court published only one opinion. See Haynes v. Burke, 115 F.Supp.2d 813 (E.D.Mich 2000). The other opinion is unpublished, see Miller v. Straub, No. 98-CV-74655-DT (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2000), but the court analyzed the two cases similarly. ,Q ERWK FDVHV WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW RUGHUHG WKDW XQOHVV 0LFKLJDQ WRRN DFWLRQ ZLWKLQ  GD\V WR DIIRUG 0LOOHU DQG +D\QHV QHZ WULDOV WKH\ FRXOG DSSO\ IRU ZULWV RUGHULQJ WKHLU IRUWKZLWK UHOHDVH IURP FXVWRG\  0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

,%$&.*5281' PHDQVWKDWLWGLGQRWFRUUHFWO\LGHQWLI\DQGDSSO\6WULFNODQGDV WKHJRYHUQLQJIHGHUDOUXOH%XWHYHQLIZHZHUHWRSDUVHWKH Kermit Haynes and Cortez Miller are two of six youths WZRSDUWVRI6WULFNODQGLQWKLVZD\ZHZRXOGQRWFRQGXFWD FKDUJHGE\WKHVWDWHRI0LFKLJDQZLWKWKH PXUGHURI IXOOGHQRYRUHYLHZEXWUDWKHUD³LQGHSHQGHQW´UHYLHZDVODLG %HQMDPLQ*UDYHO7KHVWDWHFKDUJHG+D\QHVDQG0LOOHUHDFK RXWLQRXUUHFHQWFDVHRI+DUULVY6WRYDOO)G ZLWK ILUVW GHJUHH IHORQ\ PXUGHU, assault with intent to rob WK &LU   7KHUH ZH VDLG LQ D VLPLODU FDVH  ³7KDW while armed, and possession of a firearm during commission LQGHSHQGHQWUHYLHZKRZHYHULVQRWDIXOOGHQRYRUHYLHZRI of a felony. WKHFODLPVEXWUHPDLQVGHIHUHQWLDOEHFDXVHWKHFRXUWFDQQRW JUDQWUHOLHIXQOHVVWKH VWDWHFRXUW¶VUHVXOWLVQRWLQNHHSLQJ A. Miller’s Plea ZLWK WKH VWULFWXUHV RI WKH $('3$´  ,ELG  7KXV HYHQ LQ FRQGXFWLQJDQLQGHSHQGHQWUHYLHZZHPXVWGHWHUPLQHPRUH On March 23, 1990, Miller pled guilty before Chief Judge WKDQVLPSO\WKDWZHEHOLHYHWKHVWDWHFRXUWZDVZURQJLQLWV Roberson of the Recorder’s Court for the City of Detroit. He XOWLPDWHRXWFRPH was fifteen years old at the time. At the plea hearing, the court questioned Miller as to whether he understood that if he $VWKHDERYHDQDO\VLVRI6WULFNODQG:LOOLDPVDQG&RQH pled guilty, his "only hope" to avoid mandatory life VKRZV ZH FDQ E\ QR PHDQV WHUP WKH MXGJPHQW RI WKH imprisonment lay in convincing the court to treat him as a 0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOVXQUHDVRQDEOH7KHMXGJPHQWLV juvenile. Miller answered that he understood. Miller’s SHUKDSV GHEDWDEOH LI ZH LJQRUH 6WULFNODQG¶V FOHDU mother, who was present at the plea hearing, stated that UHTXLUHPHQWV ZH PLJKW VD\ LW ZDV LQFRUUHFW XQGHU QR Miller’s plea had been discussed with her and that she FLUFXPVWDQFHVFDQZHVD\LWZDVXQUHDVRQDEOH understood that the judge might sentence her son as a juvenile or as an adult. The prosecutor advised the court that his office would request that the court sentence Miller as an adult. The court then questioned Miller. Miller affirmed that he was making his plea freely, understandingly, and voluntarily.

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SRVVLELOLW\ RI D JRYHUQPHQW DSSHDO  $OO RI WKH FRXQVHO He acknowledged an understanding of the various trial rights LQYROYHG QRWHG WKDW WKH\ GLG QRW FRQWHPSODWH WKDW VXFK DQ he was foregoing by pleading guilty. Miller affirmed his DSSHDO FRXOG RFFXU RU WKDW LW ZRXOG EH VXFFHVVIXO  ,Q WKH understanding that first degree murder was punishable by a 0LOOHUFDVHRQWKLVDSSHDO0LOOHU¶VFRXQVHODQGFOLHQWZHUH maximum sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The LQFRXUWZKHQWKHSURVHFXWRUVDLGWKDWWKHVWDWHZRXOGDSSHDO court described the situation to Miller: "the only hope that DQGVSHFLILFDOO\WHVWLILHGWKDWKHIHOWWKDWWKHFKDQFHVRIVXFK you [have] in this plea is if I decide to treat you as a juvenile DQDSSHDOVXFFHHGLQJRQHKDGQHYHUEHHQWULHGLQ0LFKLJDQ for the purpose of disposition. You heard [the prosecutor] say WRWKLVSRLQWZHUHVXIILFLHQWO\ORZWKDWLWGLGQRWDIIHFWWKHLU that they are going to want to hold a lengthy disposition MXGJPHQW hearing, do you understand that?" Miller stated that he understood, and specifically acknowledged that he was -XGJH*LOPDQ¶VLQWHUHVWLQJPDWKHPDWLFDODQDO\VLVDWSDJH "taking that chance." EHJLQVWRDGGUHVVWKHFRUUHFWLQTXLU\EXWGRHVQRWJRIDU HQRXJK7KHUHOHYDQWTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUWKHXOWLPDWHDGYLFH The court then questioned Miller briefly as to the factual ZDV D VWUDWHJ\ ZLWKLQ WKH EURDG ERXQGV RI SURIHVVLRQDO basis for his plea. Miller stated that he was part of a group FRPSHWHQFH5HODWHGO\ZHDVNZKHWKHUWKHGHFUHDVHLQWKH that decided to steal a car. Sometime before the crime he SUREDELOLW\ RI D VXFFHVVIXO RXWFRPH GXH WR SURVHFXWRULDO gave Haynes a gun knowing that Haynes planned to use it to DSSHDOUHQGHUVFUHGLEOHSHWLWLRQHUV¶DVVHUWLRQVWKDWWKH\ZRXOG steal a car. Miller acknowledged knowing the inherent KDYHJLYHQXSWKHLUFKDQFHDWDMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHEHIRUH-XGJH danger to life when a car is taken at gunpoint. 5REHUVRQ7KHRQHFRXQVHOZKRWHVWLILHGVSHFLILFDOO\WKRXJKW WKDWWKHFKDQFHVRIWKHVWDWHVXFFHHGLQJRQDSSHDOZHUHIDLUO\ Over the course of the next year, Chief Judge Roberson VPDOODQGZHKDYHQREDVLVIRUGLVFRXQWLQJWKDWMXGJPHQW held several hearings RQWKHGLVSRVLWLRQRI0LOOHU¶VVHQWHQFH 7KXVLIFRXQVHOFDOFXODWHGWKHFKDQFHVRI-XGJH5REHUVRQ¶V 2Q )HEUXDU\   0LOOHU¶V FRXQVHO PDGH FORVLQJ VHQWHQFLQJ WKH GHIHQGDQWV DV MXYHQLOHV DW  ZKHQ WKH DUJXPHQWVWRWKHFRXUWDWWKHILQDOKHDULQJLQ0LOOHU¶VFDVH$W UHDOLW\WXUQHGRXWWREHDQGEHOLHYHGWKHFKDQFHRI WKDW KHDULQJ WKH SURVHFXWRU DQQRXQFHG WKDW LI WKH FRXUW VXFFHVVRQDSSHDOE\WKHVWDWHWREHFRQWLQJHQWRQWKH VHQWHQFHG0LOOHUDVDMXYHQLOHWKHSURVHFXWLRQZRXOGDSSHDO MXYHQLOH VHQWHQFLQJ EHORZ WKHQ WKH FKDQFHV RI XOWLPDWH On June 17, 1991, the court sentenced Miller to confinement VXFFHVVZRXOGKDYHVKUXQNIURPWR7KLVPLJKW in a juvenile institution until age twenty-one. VWLOO ORRN H[WUHPHO\ JRRG DV RSSRVHG WR D YHU\ ODUJH SUREDELOLW\RIFRQYLFWLRQRIILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHUDQGDVHQWHQFH B. Haynes’ Plea RIOLIHZLWKRXWSDUROH On March 27, 1990, Haynes pled guilty to all charges :KLOHP\DVVLJQLQJRIYDOXHVLVMXVWDVVSHFXODWLYHDV-XGJH against him, also before Chief Judge Roberson. He was *LOPDQ¶V LW GRHV HPSKDVL]H WKDW WKH SURSHU LQTXLU\ IRU HIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHOVKRXOGEHWKHRYHUDOOVWUDWHJ\ HPSOR\HG,WGRHVQRWDSSHDUWRPHWKDWZHFDQSURSHUO\VD\  XQGHUWKH$('3$VWDQGDUGWKDWWKHVWDWHFRXUWVXQUHDVRQDEO\ $  DPHQGPHQW WR 0LFKLJDQ VWDWXWRU\ ODZ JUDQWHG Michigan

DSSOLHG6WULFNODQG prosecutors an appeal of right from "[a] final judgment or final order of the . . . recorder’s court" in criminal cases. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 770.12 (as amended, Mich. Pub. Act 1988 No. 66) ,Q 1RYHPEHU  )LQDOO\,GRQRWDJUHHZLWK-XGJH*LOPDQWKDWWKHIDLOXUHRI WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV SXEOLVKHG D GHFLVLRQ LQ ZKLFK LW FRQVWUXHG WKHVWDWHFRXUWWRGLVFXVVWKHSUHMXGLFHSURQJRI6WULFNODQG WKH DPHQGPHQW WR DOORZ SURVHFXWRUV WR DSSHDO FULPLQDO VHQWHQFHV DV RI ULJKW 3HRSOH Y 5H\QROGV  1:G   0LFK $SS   0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

sixteen years old at the time. At the plea hearing, his counsel, 0RUHRYHU$('3$LPSRVHVDGGLWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWVRQWKH Wilfred Rice, stated that he had discussed the matter with DELOLW\RIIHGHUDOFRXUWVWRJUDQWDZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXV,Q Haynes and his family and that Haynes, with the acquiescence RUGHUWRPHHWWKHJDWHNHHSHUVWDQGDUGVVHWIRUWKE\$('3$ of his father, wanted to enter a plea of guilty as charged. Rice  86& † G IRU WKH LVVXDQFH RI ZULWV RI KDEHDV stated that Haynes understood that the court could sentence FRUSXV WKH VWDWH FRXUW DGMXGLFDWLRQ RI WKH FODLP WKDW LV him as an adult or as a juvenile, and affirmed that Haynes FKDOOHQJHG RQ FROODWHUDO DSSHDO PXVW KDYH UHVXOWHG LQ D understood that the prosecutor would attempt to convince GHFLVLRQWKDWZDV³FRQWUDU\WRRULQYROYHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOH Chief Judge Roberson that Haynes should be sentenced as an DSSOLFDWLRQRIFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHG)HGHUDOODZDVGHWHUPLQHG adult. E\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´,ELG&RQH 6&WDW The court questioned Haynes directly about whether he understood that, if he pled guilty, "the only option you have 7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWKHOGLQ:LOOLDPVY7D\ORU86 in this case, the only escape you have in terms of mandatory   WKDW ³>W@KH PRVW LPSRUWDQW SRLQW LV WKDW DQ life, [is] if the prosecution can’t convince me to treat you as XQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRIIHGHUDOODZLVGLIIHUHQWIURPDQ an adult." Haynes stated that he understood. LQFRUUHFWDSSOLFDWLRQRIIHGHUDOODZ´,GDWHPSKDVLVLQ RULJLQDO$VWDWHFRXUWGHFLVLRQFDQLQYROYHDQXQUHDVRQDEOH Haynes stated that he had talked to his parents about his DSSOLFDWLRQRI8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUWSUHFHGHQWLQRQO\ guilty plea. He affirmed that he was not being coerced into WZRZD\V)LUVWDVWDWHFRXUWPLJKWLGHQWLI\WKHFRUUHFWOHJDO his plea and that he made his plea freely, understandingly, and UXOHEXWXQUHDVRQDEO\DSSO\LWWRWKHIDFWV6HFRQGDVWDWH voluntarily. He also affirmed an awareness of the various FRXUWGHFLVLRQPLJKWXQUHDVRQDEO\H[WHQGD6XSUHPH&RXUW trial rights he was foregoing by pleading guilty. OHJDOSUHFHGHQWWRDQHZFRQWH[WZKHUHLWVKRXOGQRWDSSO\RU XQUHDVRQDEO\UHIXVHWRH[WHQGWKDWSULQFLSOHWRDQHZFRQWH[W The court then questioned Haynes briefly about the factual ZKHUH LW VKRXOG DSSO\ ,G DW   7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW basis for his plea. Haynes stated that other boys in the group UHFHQWO\ UHLWHUDWHG WKDW WKH :LOOLDPV REMHFWLYH pulled a tree branch into the street to force cars to stop. When XQUHDVRQDEOHQHVV VWDQGDUG DSSOLHV WR WKH LQHIIHFWLYH the victim, Gravel, stopped his car in front of the tree branch, DVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHOVHWWLQJ&RQH6&WDW,Q Haynes ran out to the car intending to steal it. He was &RQH WKH &RXUW KHOG WKDW ZKHQ D VWDWH FRXUW FRUUHFWO\ carrying a handgun Miller had given him. As Haynes LGHQWLILHVWKH6WULFNODQGVWDQGDUGDVDSSOLFDEOHDQGPDNHVD approached the car, it pulled away and he fired at the car. UHDVRQDEOH MXGJPHQW UHJDUGLQJ DWWRUQH\ SHUIRUPDQFH DQG Haynes specifically admitted that he shot at the car as part of SUHMXGLFHXQGHUWKHFRUUHFWVWDQGDUGDIHGHUDOFRXUWODFNVWKH his attempt to steal it. SRZHU WR JUDQW D ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV FRQWUDYHQLQJ WKDW GHWHUPLQDWLRQ  ,G DW   , ZRXOG QRW KROG WKDW WKH Over the course of the next year, Chief Judge Roberson 0LFKLJDQFRXUWZDVREMHFWLYHO\XQUHDVRQDEOHLQLWVMXGJPHQW held several hearings on the disposition of Haynes’ sentence. HYHQZHUH,WRGLVDJUHHZLWKLWDVWKHPDMRULW\GRHV On August 28, 1991, the court sentenced Haynes to confinement in a juvenile institution until age twenty-one. -XGJH*LOPDQ¶VFRQFXUUHQFHPDNHVDQXPEHURILQWHUHVWLQJ SRLQWVWKDWGHVHUYHDEULHIUHVSRQVH&RQWUDU\WRWKHVWDWHPHQW DWSDJH,KDGWKRXJKWWKDW,GLGQRWHLQWKHILUVWSDUDJUDSK RIWKLVGLVVHQWDQGGLGQRWGLVSXWHWKHREYLRXVIDFWVLQWKH UHFRUG WKDW FRXQVHO GLG QRW LQIRUP WKHLU FOLHQWV RI WKH  0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

$VIRUWKHSUHMXGLFHHOHPHQWRI6WULFNODQGLWVHHPVFOHDU C. Post-plea Events WKDWHYHQZLWKNQRZOHGJHRIWKHSRVVLELOLW\RISURVHFXWRULDO DSSHDOSHWLWLRQHUVZRXOGVWLOOKDYHSOHGJXLOW\0LOOHUZDV After Chief Judge Roberson ordered that Miller and Haynes H[SUHVVO\LQIRUPHGDWKLVVHQWHQFLQJKHDULQJRQ)HEUXDU\ be sentenced as juveniles, the prosecutor appealed each WKDWWKHSURVHFXWLRQLQWHQGHGWRDSSHDOKLVVHQWHQFHDV sentence. The state court of appeals reversed on each DMXYHQLOH0LOOHUDQGKLVDWWRUQH\QRWLFHGDQGGLVFXVVHGWKH defendant and remanded for imposition of the adult sentence: SURVHFXWLRQ¶V FODLP WKDW LW FRXOG DSSHDO EXW IHOW WKDW WKH mandatory life imprisonment without parole on the first SURVHFXWLRQZRXOGEHXQVXFFHVVIXORQDSSHDODMXGJPHQWWKDW degree murder charge. People v. Miller, 503 N.W.2d 89 ZDVQRWREYLRXVO\XQUHDVRQDEOHJLYHQWKHVWDWHRIWKHODZDW (Mich. App. 1993); People v. Haynes, 502 N.W.2d 758 WKDWWLPH0LOOHUGLGQRWDWWHPSWWRZLWKGUDZKLVJXLOW\SOHD (Mich. App. 1993). The state supreme court denied the DVRIWKHVHQWHQFLQJKHDULQJ+D\QHVGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWKLV defendants’ applications for leave to appeal those results. FRGHIHQGDQW KDG EHHQ ZDUQHG RI WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI SURVHFXWRULDO DSSHDO DV RI )HEUXDU\  GLG QRW PRYH WR On remand before Chief Judge Roberson, the defendants ZLWKGUDZ KLV SOHD GXULQJ WKH ILYH PRQWKV EHIRUH KLV RZQ moved to withdraw their guilty pleas and for evidentiary VHQWHQFLQJRQ$XJXVW1HLWKHUSHWLWLRQHUDWWHPSWHG hearings on those motions. Haynes and Miller each alleged WR ZLWKGUDZ KLV JXLOW\ SOHD DIWHU WKH SURVHFXWLRQ DFWXDOO\ that their guilty pleas had been involuntary due to ineffective DSSHDOHGUDWKHUWKH\DUJXHGWKHLUFDVHRQWKHPHULWVEHIRUH assistance of trial counsel. They asserted, among other WKH &RXUW RI $SSHDOV  7KLV PDNHV VHQVH HYHQ ZLWK WKH things, that their attorneys’ failure to inform them that the SRVVLELOLW\RISURVHFXWRULDODSSHDOWKHFKDQFHWREHVHQWHQFHG prosecutor could appeal the imposition of a juvenile sentence DVDMXYHQLOHZDVWKHLURQO\RSWLRQVKRUWRIWULDO3HWLWLRQHUV constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court ZDQWHG D MXYHQLOH VHQWHQFH QRW D QHZ WULDO  3HWLWLRQHUV granted the motions for evidentiary hearings. WKURXJK FRXQVHO JDPHG WKH V\VWHP DQG DWWHPSWHG WR ZLWKGUDZWKHLUJXLOW\SOHDVRQO\DIWHUWKHLUMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHV The prosecutor applied to the state court of appeals for ZHUHUHMHFWHGE\WKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOV7KLVSRVWFRQYLFWLRQ leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the orders granting VWUDWHJ\JDYHSHWLWLRQHUVWZRELWHVDWWKHDSSOHWKDWWKH\QRZ evidentiary hearings. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied DUJXHWKH\ZRXOGKDYHJLYHQXSWKHLUILUVWDQGH[DQWHPRUH the application. The Michigan Supreme Court, in lieu of OLNHO\ELWHEHFDXVHRIWKHSRVVLELOLW\RISURVHFXWRULDODSSHDO granting leave to appeal, vacated the trial court’s orders GHILHVFUHGHQFH granting the evidentiary hearings and directed that Haynes and Miller be sentenced "forthwith" as adults "without 3HWLWLRQHUVZHUHYHU\DZDUHRIWKHSRVVLEOHFRQVHTXHQFHV prejudice to subsequent consideration of the motion[s] to RISOHDGLQJ JXLOW\WRILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHU-XGJH5REHUVRQ withdraw the plea[s] of guilty." People v. Miller, 527 WROG WKHP EHIRUH WKH\ SOHG WKDW WKH\ FRXOG SRVVLEO\ EH N.W.2d 513 (Mich. 1994); People v. Haynes, 527 N.W.2d VHQWHQFHGDVDGXOWVDQGWKHUHIRUHEHVXEMHFWWRDPDQGDWRU\ 512-13 (Mich. 1994). OLIHVHQWHQFHDVDUHVXOWRIWKHLUJXLOW\SOHDV7KDWLVH[DFWO\ ZKDW KDSSHQHG DIWHU WKH SURVHFXWRULDO DSSHDO  3HWLWLRQHUV NQHZWKHULVNDQGWRRNWKHLUFKDQFHV7KHIDFWWKDWWKH\GLG QRW FRUUHFWO\ DVVHVV ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKH\ DFWXDOO\ ZRXOG EH VHQWHQFHGDVDGXOWVLVZKROO\LUUHOHYDQW7KHSOHDZDVPDGH  7KH SURVHFXWRU DSSHDOHG +D\QHV¶ VHQWHQFH E\ ULJKW 7KH DSSHDO LQ YROXQWDULO\ DQG ZLWK IXOO NQRZOHGJH RI WKH SRVVLEOH 0LOOHU¶V FDVH ZDV QRW DV D PDWWHU RI ULJKW EHFDXVH WKH SURVHFXWRU GLG QRW

FRQVHTXHQFHV WLPHO\ ILOH WKH DSSHDO +RZHYHU WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV JUDQWHG WKH SURVHFXWRU¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ IRU OHDYH WR DSSHDO  0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

On December 19, 1994, Chief Judge Roberson imposed BBBBBBBBBBBBB sentences of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The court subsequently held separate evidentiary hearings on ',66(17 Miller’s and Haynes’ motions to withdraw their guilty pleas. BBBBBBBBBBBBB Haynes was the only witness at his evidentiary hearing. %2**6 &LUFXLW -XGJH GLVVHQWLQJ  , GLVDJUHH ZLWK WKH +D\QHVWHVWLILHGWKDWKHWDONHGZLWKKLVFRXQVHO:LOIUHG5LFH PDMRULW\¶V DQDO\VLV DQG ZRXOG UHYHUVH WKH JUDQW RI KDEHDV WZLFHLQWKHWKUHHZHHNVEHIRUHKLVJXLOW\SOHD(DFKYLVLW FRUSXV,WKHUHIRUHUHVSHFWIXOO\GLVVHQW7KH0LFKLJDQ&RXUW ODVWHGOHVVWKDQWKLUW\PLQXWHVDQGHDFKFHQWHUHGRQ5LFH¶V RI $SSHDOV GHFLGHG WKDW LQ WKLV FDVH D IDLOXUH WR LQIRUP D DGYLFHWKDW+D\QHVSOHDGJXLOW\EHIRUH&KLHI-XGJH5REHUVRQ FULPLQDOGHIHQGDQWEHIRUHDJXLOW\SOHDWKDWWKHSURVHFXWLRQ +D\QHVWHVWLILHGWKDWKHZDVKHVLWDQWWRSOHDGJXLOW\EXWWKDW PD\KDYHDULJKWWRDSSHDOKLVEHLQJVHQWHQFHGDVDMXYHQLOH 5LFHUHSHDWHGO\WROGKLPWKDW it was in his interest to plead GRHV QRW FRQVWLWXWH LQHIIHFWLYH DVVLVWDQFH RI FRXQVHO  7R before Chief Judge Roberson, where he would "have great VXFFHHGRQDFODLPRILQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHOWKH chances of being sentenced as a juvenile." SHWLWLRQHU PXVW VKRZ  GHILFLHQW SHUIRUPDQFH E\ WKH DWWRUQH\DQGSUHMXGLFH6WULFNODQGY:DVKLQJWRQ Haynes testified that Rice never told him that, even if Chief 86    /HJLWLPDWH WULDO WDFWLFV DUH H[SUHVVO\ Judge Roberson sentenced him as a juvenile, the prosecutor H[FOXGHGIURPWKHGHILQLWLRQRIGHILFLHQWSHUIRUPDQFH%HOO could still appeal that sentence and an appellate court could Y&RQH6&W7RHVWDEOLVKSUHMXGLFH impose an adult sentence of life without parole. Haynes DIWHUKDYLQJSOHGJXLOW\WKHSOHDGHUPXVWVKRZDUHDVRQDEOH stated that he would not have pled guilty had he known this. SUREDELOLW\ WKDW KH ZRXOG QRW KDYH SOHG KDG KH UHFHLYHG FRPSHWHQWDGYLFH+LOOY/RFNKDUW86,Q Q So what is your understanding if you plead WKLV FDVH SHWLWLRQHUV KDYH HVWDEOLVKHG QHLWKHU HOHPHQW RI guilty and you made it through the sentencing 6WULFNODQG hearing and you could convince the judge to sentence you as a juvenile, did you think $W WULDO SHWLWLRQHUV IDFHG QHDUFHUWDLQ FRQYLFWLRQ  7KH there was anything after that? GHIHQVHV WKDW WKH\ ZRXOG KDYH DVVHUWHG DW WULDO ZHUH LQ HVVHQFH YDJXH KRSHV IRU MXU\ QXOOLILFDWLRQ  7KHLU GHIHQVH [Haynes] No. Besides the fact that I’d be going to [a FRXQVHONQHZKRZHYHUWKDWWKHUHZDVDYHU\UHDOKRSHWKDW juvenile facility]. WKH\ FRXOG EH VHQWHQFHG DV  MXYHQLOHV LI WKH\ SOHG JXLOW\ EHFDXVHRIWKHVHQWHQFLQJKDELWVRIWKHSDUWLFXODUMXGJHLQWKH .... FDVH&RXQVHOV¶SHUIRUPDQFHZDVQRWGHILFLHQWLQGHHGWKH LGHDIRUWKHJDPEOHVSUDQJIURPGHIHQVHFRXQVHOV¶VXSHULRU Q Did you have any idea that the prosection DQG LQWLPDWH NQRZOHGJH RI WKH FRXUW  7KHLU DWWRUQH\V [sic] had any other option besides that H[SODLQHGWKHUDPLILFDWLRQVRIWKHGHFLVLRQWRSHWLWLRQHUVYHU\ hearing that they had in front of the Judge? FDUHIXOO\  3HWLWLRQHUV¶ SDUHQWV ZHUH LQYROYHG LQ WKH GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ SURFHVV  7KH GHFLVLRQ WR SOHDG ZDV FDOFXODWHGYROXQWDU\DQGLQIRUPHGWKLVLVSUHFLVHO\WKHVRUW RI FRPSHWHQW UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ WKDW LV H[FOXGHG IURP WKH  6WULFNODQGGHILQLWLRQRIGHILFLHQWSHUIRUPDQFH6WULFNODQG +D\QHV¶ WULDO FRXQVHO :LOIUHG 5LFH GLHG EHIRUH +D\QHV PRYHG WR 86DW&RQH6&WDW ZLWKGUDZ KLV SOHD  0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

WKDW EXW IRU FRXQVHO¶V HUURUV KH ZRXOG QRW KDYH SOHDGHG [Haynes] No. JXLOW\DQGZRXOGKDYHLQVLVWHGRQJRLQJWRWULDO´6WULFNODQG 86DW³$UHDVRQDEOHSUREDELOLW\LVDSUREDELOLW\ Haynes J.A. at 176-77. VXIILFLHQWWRXQGHUPLQHFRQILGHQFHLQWKHRXWFRPH´ Haynes also stated that he was innocent of first degree murder because he did not intend to harm anyone. Contrary to his testimony at the original plea hearing, Haynes denied shooting at the car. He claimed that at the plea hearing he was "under advisement" of his attorney to say that he shot at the car. We turn to Miller’s further proceedings. At the evidentiary hearing on Miller’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Miller’s trial counsel, Charles Lusby, testified. He stated that he only did trial work and never handled appeals. Lusby testified that he considered abandonment to be a possible defense for Miller because when Miller gave the gun to Haynes he was deferring to the older boys in the group. He testified that Miller "practically totally rel[ied]" on his advice, and that he convinced Miller’s parents, who also relied on him, that pleading guilty was in Miller’s best interest. Lusby stated that Miller was "reluctant" to plead guilty, but that he "prevailed upon him," by telling him he likely would be sentenced as a juvenile. Lusby testified that, based upon his familiarity with the juvenile sentencing process, he believed Chief Judge Roberson would sentence Miller as a juvenile. Lusby considered his advice that Miller plead guilty to first degree murder to be "extraordinary." Lusby admitted that his considerations in formulating this advice did not include any factor beyond what the trial court would do. Q In formulating your advice to Mr. Miller, did you take into account the fact [that] the prosecutor had since I believe 1988 the right to appeal a sentence? [Lusby] No, I did not.  0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

Q Did you stop to consider that, did it occur to GLVVHQWXQGHUHVWLPDWHVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIDSRVVLEOHDSSHDOLQ you? DQ\ FDOFXODWLRQ WKDW WKH SHWLWLRQHUV RU WKHLU FRXQVHO PDGH 0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVPLJKWKDYHEHOLHYHGWKDWWKH\KDGVD\DQ [Lusby] That didn’t occur to me at all. FKDQFHRIEHLQJVHQWHQFHGDVMXYHQLOHVE\WKHSDUWLFXODU WULDOMXGJHEHIRUHZKRPWKH\SOHGJXLOW\,IWKH\KDGEHHQ Q Did you discuss that possible risk with Mr. DGYLVHGWKDWWKHVWDWHFRXOGDSSHDOKRZHYHUWKH\PLJKWKDYH Miller? HYDOXDWHGWKHRGGVRIWKHWULDOMXGJH¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQVEHLQJ VXVWDLQHG RQ DSSHDO DV RQO\   7KH ULVN RI WKH WULDO [Lusby] I discussed a lot of things with him, but that MXGJH¶VVHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQVEHLQJUHYHUVHGRQDSSHDOZRXOG was not one of them. It didn’t occur to me LQWKLVH[DPSOHUHGXFHWKHXOWLPDWHOLNHOLKRRGRI0LOOHUDQG that the prosecutor would do it, nor that the +D\QHVEHLQJVHQWHQFHGDVMXYHQLOHVIURPWRRQO\ appellate court would reverse that decision. :HDUHXQDEOHRIFRXUVHWRGHWHUPLQHWKHH[DFWRGGVWKDW Miller J.A. at 254-55. 0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVEHOLHYHGWKDWWKH\IDFHGSULRUWRSOHDGLQJ JXLOW\EXWWKHDERYHH[DPSOHLOOXVWUDWHVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI Lusby also testified that he recalled the prosecutor stating IDLOLQJWRFRQVLGHUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIWKHVWDWHDSSHDOLQJ7KH in his closing argument at the sentencing hearing that he IDFW WKDW 0LOOHU DQG +D\QHV ZHUH DZDUH RI WKH PD[LPXP would appeal if Miller received a juvenile sentence. Lusby SHQDOW\ WKDW WKH\ IDFHG GRHV QRW WKHUHIRUH QHJDWH WKH explained that Miller "was struck" by the prosecutor’s VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW QHLWKHU WKH\ QRU WKHLU statement, but "I think I told him I didn’t think [the FRXQVHOFRQVLGHUHG3HUKDSV0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVZRXOGKDYH prosecutor] would be successful." SOHG JXLOW\ HYHQ LI WKH\ KDG NQRZQ WKDW WKH WULDO MXGJH¶V VHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQVZHUHQRWWKHRQO\KXUGOHWKDWWKH\KDGWR Miller also testified. He stated that when Lusby advised RYHUFRPH LQ RUGHU WR EH VHQWHQFHG DV MXYHQLOHV  %XW WKH\ him to plead guilty, Lusby did not tell him that the prosecutor ZHUH HQWLWOHG WR EH DGYLVHG RI DOO WKH ULVNV WKDW WKH\ IDFHG could appeal and that the court of appeals had the authority to EHIRUHFKRRVLQJWRSOHDGJXLOW\DQGIRUHJRLQJWKHLUULJKWVWR overturn Chief Judge Roberson’s decision. Miller stated that, MXU\WULDOV had he known, he would not have pled guilty. %HFDXVH,DPQRWFRQILGHQWWKDW0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVZRXOG Regarding the factual basis for his plea, Miller stated that KDYH SOHG JXLOW\ LI WKHLU FRXQVHO KDG LQIRUPHG WKDW WKHLU the version of the facts he gave at the plea hearing was VHQWHQFHVFRXOGEHDSSHDOHG,FRQFXUZLWKWKHOHDGRSLQLRQ inaccurate: "I was speaking upon the elements that my lawyer LQ FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW WKH GHFLVLRQ RI WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI told me to speak on as far as first degree murder." Miller $SSHDOVZDVDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRI6WULFNODQG stated that when Gravel was killed he was seventy-five yards 86&†G SURYLGLQJWKDWDZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXVLV from the car and running away. Contrary to the statements he DYDLODEOH IRU D SHUVRQ LQ VWDWH FXVWRG\ LI WKH VWDWH FRXUW¶V made at his plea hearing, Miller stated that there had been no DGMXGLFDWLRQRIWKHSHWLWLRQHU¶VFODLP³UHVXOWHGLQDGHFLVLRQ plan to take a car and that he did not know what Haynes was WKDWLQYROYHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRIFOHDUO\ planning to do when he gave him the gun. He did not intend HVWDEOLVKHG)HGHUDOODZDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW to take part in a robbery. RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´ +LOO Y /RFNKDUW  86   ³>,@QRUGHUWRVDWLVI\WKHµSUHMXGLFH¶UHTXLUHPHQWWKH GHIHQGDQWPXVWVKRZWKDWWKHUHLVDUHDVRQDEOHSUREDELOLW\  0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

³SUHMXGLFH´SURQJZHDUHQRWERXQGE\$('3$¶VGHIHUHQWLDO In October, 1995, the trial court determined that Miller’s VWDQGDUGRIUHYLHZEHFDXVHWKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOV and Haynes’ guilty pleas had not been voluntary, knowing, QHYHUUHDFKHGWKHLVVXHRISUHMXGLFHZKHQLWGHWHUPLQHGWKDW and intelligent due to ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The FRXQVHOV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH ZDV QRW GHILFLHQW  6HH *RQ]DOHV Y court granted each his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 0F.XQH  )G   WK &LU  The Michigan Court of Appeals granted leave to the H[SODLQLQJWKDWEHFDXVHWKHVWDWHFRXUWFRQVLGHUHGRQO\WZR prosecutor to appeal those orders. RI WKUHH UHTXLUHPHQWV QHFHVVDU\ WR HVWDEOLVK D YLRODWLRQ RI %UDG\Y0DU\ODQG86DGHQRYRVWDQGDUG In a consolidated decision addressing Miller’s and Haynes’ RIUHYLHZDSSOLHGWRWKHWKLUGHOHPHQW,WKHUHIRUHEHOLHYH cases along with another similarly situated appellant, WKDW WKH GLVVHQW¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ RI $('3$¶V ³REMHFWLYHO\ Dashawn Lyons,the appeals court reversed the trial court. XQUHDVRQDEOH´WHVWWRWKHSUHMXGLFHFRPSRQHQWRI6WULFNODQG People v. Haynes (After Remand), 562 N.W.2d 241 (Mich. LV QRW DSSURSULDWH  :LOOLDPV Y 7D\ORU  86   App. 1997). The court determined that the record showed  FODULI\LQJ WKH PHDQLQJ RI DQ ³XQUHDVRQDEOH Miller and Haynes were aware at the time they pled guilty DSSOLFDWLRQ´RIODZXQGHU86&†G   that they might be sentenced as adults to mandatory terms of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. In addition, 7KHGLVVHQWFRQFOXGHVWKDW0LOOHU¶VDQG+D\QHV¶VHIIRUWVWR Miller knew from the prosecutor’s closing argument at his ZLWKGUDZ WKHLU JXLOW\ SOHDV FRQVWLWXWHG DWWHPSWV WR JHW ³D final sentencing disposition hearing that the prosecution could VHFRQGELWHDWWKHDSSOH´DQGWKDWWKHSHWLWLRQHUVHQWHUHGWKHLU appeal if Miller received a juvenile sentence from the trial JXLOW\ SOHDV YROXQWDULO\ DQG ZLWK IXOO NQRZOHGJH RI WKH court. Despite the knowledge each had, Miller and Haynes SRVVLEOHVHQWHQFHVWKDWWKH\IDFHG,UHVSHFWIXOO\GLVDJUHH pled guilty and did not move to withdraw their pleas until $OWKRXJK0LOOHUKHDUGWKHSURVHFXWRULQIRUPWKHWULDOMXGJH after the conclusion of the appeal regarding their sentences. WKDW WKH VWDWH ZRXOG DSSHDO LI 0LOOHU ZHUH VHQWHQFHG DV D Therefore, the court concluded, Miller and Haynes understood MXYHQLOHWKLVVWDWHPHQWFDPHHOHYHQPRQWKVDIWHUKLVJXLOW\ the consequences of their pleas, and the pleas were SOHDDQGZDVLPPHGLDWHO\QHXWUDOL]HGE\KLVFRXQVHOWHOOLQJ knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily made. Haynes KLPQRWWRZRUU\DERXWDQ\DSSHDO7KLVDGYLFHRQFHPRUH (After Remand), 562 N.W.2d at 246, 248. The Michigan GLVJXLVHGWKHDGGLWLRQDOULVNRIDQDSSHDOWKDW0LOOHUIDFHG Supreme Court denied Miller and Haynes leave to appeal. 0RUHRYHU WKH UHFRUG VXSSRUWV D ILQGLQJ WKDW 0LOOHU¶V DQG +D\QHV¶VFRXQVHOQRWWKHSHWLWLRQHUVPDGHWKHGHFLVLRQVWR Miller and Haynes petitioned the federal district court for SXUVXHWKHDSSHDOVIRUWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHFOLHQWV7KHUHLVQR writs of habeas corpus. The court granted the writs, ordering LQGLFDWLRQ WKDW DQ\RQH LQIRUPHG 0LOOHU RU +D\QHV RI WKH that Miller and Haynes be released unless they were given SRVVLELOLW\ RI ZLWKGUDZLQJ WKHLU JXLOW\ SOHDV SULRU WR trials. The district court concluded that Miller’s and Haynes’ VHQWHQFLQJRUGXULQJWKHVWDWH¶VDSSHDORIWKHLUVHQWHQFHV,GR trial counsel were ineffective in failing to advise them of the QRWEHOLHYHWKDW0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVVKRXOGEHSHQDOL]HGIRU ZKDWDSSHDUVWREHWKHGHFLVLRQVRIWKHLUFRXQVHOWRSXUVXHWKH VWDWHFRXUWDSSHDOV7KXVWKHGLVVHQW¶VLQIHUHQFHWKDW0LOOHU DQG +D\QHV ZHUH ³JDPLQJ WKH V\VWHP´ LV LQ P\ RSLQLRQ XQZDUUDQWHGXQGHUWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHV  /\RQV DOVR SHWLWLRQHG IRU D ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV LQ IHGHUDO GLVWULFW :LWKUHVSHFWWRZKHWKHU0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVHQWHUHGWKHLU FRXUW ,Q DQ RSLQLRQ ILOHG FRQWHPSRUDQHRXVO\ ZLWK WKLV RSLQLRQ ZH KDYH JXLOW\ SOHDV NQRZLQJO\ DQG LQWHOOLJHQWO\ , EHOLHYH WKDW WKH DIILUPHG WKH JUDQW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV UHOLHI WR /\RQV E\ WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW 6HH /\RQV Y -DFNVRQ BBB )G BBB WK &LU   0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

prosecutor’s right to appeal. As a result, Miller and Haynes DQG IDFWV UHOHYDQW WR SODXVLEOH RSWLRQV DUH YLUWXDOO\ had not pled guilty voluntarily or knowingly. The wardens XQFKDOOHQJHDEOHDQGVWUDWHJLFFKRLFHVPDGHDIWHUOHVVWKDQ appealed to this court. FRPSOHWHLQYHVWLJDWLRQDUHUHDVRQDEOHSUHFLVHO\WRWKHH[WHQW WKDWUHDVRQDEOHSURIHVVLRQDOMXGJPHQWVVXSSRUWWKHOLPLWDWLRQV ,,',6&866,21 RQLQYHVWLJDWLRQ´$VWKHOHDGRSLQLRQQRWHVDUHDVRQDEOH DWWRUQH\ZRXOGKDYHFRQVLGHUHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDQDSSHDO $ +DEHDV&RUSXV5HYLHZ EHIRUHDGYLVLQJ0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVWRSOHDGJXLOW\XQGHUWKH FLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHSUHVHQWFDVH Provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) govern our )LQDOO\ , EHOLHYH WKDW WKH GLVVHQW¶V FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH reviewRIWKHVWDWHFRXUWGHFLVLRQVLQWKLVKDEHDVFRUSXVFDVH VWUHQJWKRIWKHVWDWH¶VFDVHDJDLQVWWKHSHWLWLRQHUVLQDVVHVVLQJ ZKHWKHUFRXQVHOSURYLGHGFRPSHWHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQFOXGLQJ G $Q DSSOLFDWLRQ IRU D ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV RQ WKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHLURQO\DYDLODEOHGHIHQVHZDVDKRSHIRU EHKDOIRIDSHUVRQLQFXVWRG\SXUVXDQWWRWKHMXGJPHQWRI MXU\ QXOOLILFDWLRQ IRFXVHV RQ WKH ZURQJ LVVXH  7KH D 6WDWH FRXUW VKDOO QRW EH JUDQWHG ZLWK UHVSHFW WR DQ\ SHWLWLRQHUVLQP\RSLQLRQZHUHHQWLWOHGWREHDGYLVHGRIWKH FODLPWKDWZDVDGMXGLFDWHGRQWKHPHULWVLQ6WDWHFRXUW SRVVLELOLW\ RI DQ DSSHDO EHIRUH GHFLGLQJ ZKHWKHU WR SOHDG SURFHHGLQJVXQOHVVWKHDGMXGLFDWLRQRIWKHFODLP² JXLOW\EHFDXVHZLWKRXWWKDWNQRZOHGJHWKHLUGHFLVLRQVZHUH  UHVXOWHG LQ D GHFLVLRQ that was contrary to, or QRW EDVHG XSRQ DOO RI WKH UHOHYDQW IDFWV  $OWKRXJK WKH involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVKHOGWKDWWKH6L[WK$PHQGPHQWGRHVQRW established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme UHTXLUH D FRUUHFW DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH ULVNV DQG EHQHILWV RI Court of the United States[.] SOHDGLQJJXLOW\DVRSSRVHGWRSURFHHGLQJWRWULDOLWUHFRJQL]HV WKDWFRXQVHOPXVWDWOHDVWEHDZDUHRIVXFKULVNVHVSHFLDOO\ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). ZKHUHWKHODFNRIDZDUHQHVVGLUHFWO\LPSDFWVWKHUHDVRQLQJ EHKLQG ZKDWHYHU DGYLFH LV SURYLGHG  6HH 0F0DQQ Y The federal district court considered Miller’s and Haynes’ 5LFKDUGVRQ86³4XHVWLRQVOLNHWKHVH petitions for habeas corpus under the "unreasonable >UHODWLQJ WR WKH ULVNV RI WULDO@ FDQQRW EH DQVZHUHG ZLWK application" prong of this statute. None of the parties argue FHUWLWXGH\HWDGHFLVLRQWRSOHDGJXLOW\PXVWQHFHVVDULO\UHVW that the federal district court should have inquired whether XSRQFRXQVHO¶VDQVZHUVXQFHUWDLQDVWKH\PD\EH´8QLWHG the Michigan Court of Appeals decision was "contrary to" 6WDWHV Y +DQOH\  )G   WK &LU  clearly established federal law. We proceed, therefore, under UHFRJQL]LQJWKDW³DUHYHUVDOIRULQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHZRXOG the "unreasonable application" prong of 28 U.S.C. EHLQRUGHU´LIWKHGHIHQGDQWKDGSOHGJXLOW\VROHO\LQUHOLDQFH § 2254(d)(1). XSRQ KLV FRXQVHO¶V HUURQHRXV DGYLFH ³WKDW KH ZRXOG EH HOLJLEOH IRU SDUROH LQ RQHWKLUG WKH WLPH KH UHFHLYHG IRU VHQWHQFH´ , DOVR DJUHH ZLWK WKH OHDG RSLQLRQ WKDW LI FRXQVHO KDG  LQIRUPHG0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVWKDWWKHVWDWHFRXOGDSSHDOWKH ,Q IHGHUDO GLVWULFW FRXUW +D\QHV DOOHJHG RWKHU JURXQGV IRU LQHIIHFWLYHQHVV RI FRXQVHO 7KDW FRXUW KDYLQJ JUDQWHG UHOLHI EDVHG RQ WULDO MXGJH¶V VHQWHQFLQJ GHFLVLRQV D UHDVRQDEOH SUREDELOLW\ +D\QHV¶ FRXQVHO¶V IDLOXUH WR DGYLVH KLP RI WKH SURVHFXWRU¶V ULJKW WR H[LVWV WKDW ERWK SHWLWLRQHUV ZRXOG KDYH SURFHHGHG WR WULDO DSSHDO GLG QRW DGGUHVV WKRVH FODLPV +D\QHV Y %XUNH  )6XSSG UDWKHU WKDQ SOHDG JXLOW\  ,Q FRQVLGHULQJ 6WULFNODQG¶V   (' 0LFK   0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court elucidated the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). First, &21&855(1&( the Court explained that "clearly established Federal law, as BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB determined by the Supreme Court" refers to the Court’s holdings, as opposed to dicta, at the time of the relevant state 521$/'/((*,/0$1&LUFXLW-XGJHFRQFXUULQJ,IXOO\ court decision. Id. at 412. Second, the Court explained that FRQFXUZLWKWKHOHDGRSLQLRQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDW0LOOHU¶VDQG a state court decision unreasonably applies Supreme Court +D\QHV¶VFRXQVHOZHUHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\LQHIIHFWLYHEHFDXVHRI precedent by either: (1) identifying the correct governing WKHLUODZ\HUV¶IDLOXUHWRLQIRUPWKHSHWLWLRQHUVWKDWWKHVWDWH legal rule from Supreme Court precedent but unreasonably FRXOGDSSHDOWKHGHFLVLRQRIWKHWULDOMXGJHWRVHQWHQFHWKHP applying it to the facts; or (2) unreasonably extending a legal DVMXYHQLOHV0\UHDVRQIRUZULWLQJVHSDUDWHO\LVWRH[SODLQ principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context LQZKDW,UHJDUGDVDQH[WUHPHO\FORVHFDVHZK\,ILQGWKH where it should not apply or unreasonably refusing to extend ZHOOZULWWHQGLVVHQWLQJRSLQLRQOHVVSHUVXDVLYHWKDQWKHOHDG that principle to a new context where it should apply. Id. at RSLQLRQ 407. Finally, the Court declared that the application of law must be objectively unreasonable, id. at 409, and not merely /LNHWKHOHDGRSLQLRQ,EHOLHYHWKDWWKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI incorrect or erroneous. Id. at 411. $SSHDOV¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDW0LOOHU¶VDQG+D\QHV¶VFRXQVHO SHUIRUPHGFRPSHWHQWO\ZDVDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRI 6WULFNODQGY:DVKLQJWRQ867KHGLVVHQW LQFRQWUDVWILQGVFRXQVHOV¶SHUIRUPDQFHWREHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\ FRPSHWHQW D FRQFOXVLRQ ZLWK ZKLFK , GLVDJUHH IRU VHYHUDO UHDVRQV  7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW LQ DFNQRZOHGJHG WKH GLIILFXOW\ LQ GHILQLQJ WKH WHUP ³XQUHDVRQDEOH´ EXW H[SODLQHG WKDW ³LW LV D FRPPRQ WHUP :LOOLDPV

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B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel III. CONCLUSION In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) and Strickland v. We conclude that Miller and Haynes each received Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court set out constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. We further the law applicable to an ineffective assistance of counsel conclude that decisions to the contrary on the facts of each claim such as that made by Miller and Haynes. Both Hill and case are unreasonable applications of clearly established Strickland were clearly established federal law as determined federal law. We WKHUHIRUH $)),50 WKH IHGHUDO GLVWULFW by the Supreme Court at the time of the final Michigan Court FRXUW¶V FRQGLWLRQDO JUDQW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV VHSDUDWHO\ IRU of Appeals decision in 1997. 6HH:LOOLDPV86DW 0LOOHUDQG+D\QHV UHIHUULQJWR6WULFNODQGDV³FOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHGSUHFHGHQW´ DWWKHWLPHRID9LUJLQLDVWDWHFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ Under Strickland, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice to the defendant resulting from that deficient performance. 466 U.S. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88; Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59. In Hill, which applied Strickland to the guilty plea context, the Court explained that a defendant shows prejudice by demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 59. Although the Michigan Court of Appeals did not mention either Hill or Strickland by name, it did apply the law of those cases. Thus, we must examine whether that court applied Hill and Strickland unreasonably.

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Miller puts forth additional evidence that, with competent We emphasize that Hill and Strickland state the relevant assistance, he would have pled not guilty. Lusby testified that law in this case. Relying on a string of circuit court cases, the Miller pled guilty only reluctantly. The fact that Lusby had wardens argue that defense counsels’ failure to inform Miller to prevail upon Miller to plead guilty tends to corroborate and Haynes of the prosecution's right to appeal the imposition Miller’s testimony that he would have pled not guilty had he of a juvenile sentence does not comprise ineffective known of the prosecutor’s right to appeal. Lusby convinced assistance because the prosecutor’s right of appeal represents Miller to plead, but did so without advising him of the full a collateral, as opposed to a direct, consequence of the plea. risk he faced of receiving a life sentence. This evidence We reject this argument on two grounds. shows that Miller would have been less likely to plead guilty had he been competently advised of all the risks. First, the wardens’ reliance on circuit court cases is improper. The AEDPA prohibits use of lower court decisions Warden Straub argues that Miller actually knew before he in determining whether the state court decision is contrary to, was sentenced that the prosecutor could appeal. The or is an unreasonable application of, clearly established prosecutor did state in his closing argument at Miller’s final federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (defining "clearly sentencing hearing that he would appeal if Miller was established law as determined by the Supreme Court" to mean sentenced as a juvenile. However, tKHGLHKDGDOUHDG\EHHQ holdings of Supreme Court decisions); Harris, 212 F.3d at FDVW0LOOHU¶VILQDOVHQWHQFLQJKHDULQJFDPHHOHYHQPRQWKV 944 (holding district court erred in "rely[ing] on authority DIWHU KLV SOHD KDG EHHQ DFFHSWHG DQG /XVE\ GLVPLVVHG WKH other than that of the Supreme Court of the United States in FRQFHUQV 0LOOHU H[SUHVVHG WR KLP DERXW WKH SURVHFXWRU V its analysis under § 2254(d)"). VWDWHPHQWEHFDXVH/XVE\FRQVLGHUHGWKHSURVHFXWRUXQOLNHO\ WRVXFFHHG0LOOHU¶VIDLOXUHVXGGHQO\WRUHMHFWKLVFRXQVHO¶V Second, the wardens’ argument is incompatible with DGYLFHXSRQZKLFKKHUHOLHGKHDYLO\DQGSUHVVWRZLWKGUDZ Supreme Court case law. The Court does not use a KLVJXLOW\SOHDD\HDUDIWHUKHPDGHLWGRHVQRWVKRZ0LOOHU direct/collateral consequence categorization scheme to decide ZDVXQSUHMXGLFHGE\/XVE\¶VLQFRPSHWHQFH ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Indeed, in Hill, the Supreme Court reviewed an Eighth Circuit decision holding We conclude that Miller’s and Lusby’s testimony, along that parole eligibility was not a "direct consequence" of a with reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances guilty plea. See Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568, 570-73 (8th of this case, are sufficient to demonstrate not only a Cir. 1984). The Court noted this holding, but eschewed any reasonable probability that Miller would have decided to such characterization in favor of directly applying Strickland plead not guilty but also that a contrary conclusion is to the plea context. Hill, 474 U.S. at 55, 57-60. As the Court objectively unreasonable. stated in Williams: "the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of- The untimely death of Haynes’ trial counsel prevents him counsel claims." 529 U.S. at 391. from offering any corroborative testimony that Haynes would have pled not guilty. In these special circumstances, we C. Analysis conclude that Haynes’ claim and the absence of any evidence or tenable argument to the contrary is sufficient to establish The federal district court concluded that the Michigan not only a reasonable likelihood that he would have pled not Court of Appeals decision was an unreasonable application of guilty, but also that any contrary conclusion is objectively Hill and Strickland. We review de novo a district court’s unreasonable. legal conclusions in a habeas corpus proceeding. Miller v.  0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 2001). Where, as here, [Miller and Haynes] might not have been told that the the district court’s factual findings are based on a transcript prosecution could appeal [the juvenile] sentence [they were] from the state court proceedings and the district court makes never assured of receiving in the first place should be of no no credibility determination, we also review those findings de consequence." novo. Id. We must determine whether it is an unreasonable application of Hill and Strickland to hold either: (1) that the The wardens maintain that if a defendant is aware of the petitioners’ trial counsel provided them with objectively maximum possible sentence he cannot be prejudiced by his reasonable assistance; or (2) that even if the petitioners had counsel's failure to inform him of the prosecutor's right to been reasonably advised, they stillZRXOGKDYHSOHGJXLOW\ appeal. We decline to adopt the wardens’ argument. An awareness of the sentencing range available to the trial judge  3HUIRUPDQFHRI&RXQVHO is not the same as an informed understanding that a sentencing judge's decision is subject to reversal. The rule The proper measure of attorney performance is whether suggested by the warden would preclude courts from finding counsel’s assistance was reasonable "under prevailing prejudice in any situation where the defendant knew the range professional norms" and "considering all the circumstances." of penalties to which he was subject. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. We make a case-by-case examination of the evidence, Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, and Furthermore, the circumstances of these cases illustrate the "indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls failings of the wardens’ argument. Miller and Haynes pled within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." guilty in hopes of avoiding life imprisonment without parole. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A reduced likelihood of being sentenced as an adult was the sole benefit of their guilty pleas before Chief Judge Roberson. The professional norms that guide us rest upon defense In reality, the risk of being sentenced as an adult came in two counsel’s fundamental duties "to bring to bear such skill and parts: (1) being sentenced as an adult by Chief Judge knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing Roberson; and (2) having received a juvenile sentence from process" and "to consult with the defendant on important Chief Judge Roberson, being subject to a successful appeal by decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important the prosecutor. Miller and Haynes, however, each received developments in the course of the prosecution." Id. at 688. from his attorney information of only the first risk. Defense counsel's failure to assess all the risks and inform Miller and The federal district court articulated the circumstances Haynes left each of them to make the most important decision relevant to the performance inquiry in this case: of his life without essential information. Presented with all the risks, Haynes and Miller might well have decided to plead [T]rial counsel’s performance was deficient within the not guilty and to take their chances at trial. To meet the meaning of the Strickland standard where he failed to prejudice requirement under Hill and Strickland, Haynes and advise petitioner that the prosecutor could appeal a Miller need only show a reasonable probability that they juvenile sentence to a Michigan appellate court with the would have pled not guilty had their attorneys competently very real possibility that a higher court would order advised them. petitioner resentenced as an adult. Because of petitioner’s young age, petitioner was particularly reliant on his attorney’s advice to plead guilty to the offenses in this case. In light of what amounted to extraordinary WHVWLILHG WKDW KLV DSSHOODWH FRXQVHO DGYLVHG KLP WKHUH ZHUH RWKHU VWHSV WR EH WDNHQ EHIRUH WKH\ VKRXOG FRQVLGHU ZLWKGUDZLQJ WKH SOHD  0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV 1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 

2. Prejudice advice by counsel that petitioner plead guilty to an offense which carried a mandatory sentence of life To determine whether the petitioners were prejudiced by imprisonment without parole, counsel had a duty both to their attorneys’ deficient performance, we ask whether there consider and to advise petitioner of the prosecutor’s right is a reasonable probability that, had they been advised of the to appeal any sentence to the Michigan appellate courts, prosecutor’s right of appeal, they would have pled not guilty. with the possibility that petitioner’s juvenile sentence A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to would be overturned on appeal and he would then have undermine confidence in the outcome; it is less than a to serve a nonparolable life sentence. preponderance of the evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Haynes v. Burke, 115 F.Supp.2d 813, 819 (E.D. Mich. Both Miller and Haynes testified similarly at the 2000). evidentiary hearings on their plea withdrawal motions that each was initially hesitant to plead guilty, and that each would 0LOOHU¶VWULDOFRXQVHO/XVE\EURXJKWWREHDURQWKLVFDVH have pled not guilty had each known the prosecutor could KLVNQRZOHGJHRIWKHMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFLQJSURFHVVDQG&KLHI appeal. This testimony, though self-serving, may be enough -XGJH5REHUVRQ VVHQWHQFLQJSUDFWLFHV7KHUHLVQRGRXEWWKDW by itself to satisfy the prejudice prong under the LQWKLVUHJDUG0LOOHULQLWLDOO\EHQHILWWHGIURP/XVE\ VDGYLFH circumstances here. See Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, )XUWKHUPRUH/XVE\DGHTXDWHO\LQIRUPHG0LOOHUUHJDUGLQJWKH 547 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that, unlike the Seventh and ULVN UHODWHG WR &KLHI -XGJH 5REHUVRQ¶V VHQWHQFLQJ Second Circuits, this Circuit has not explicitly adopted a GHWHUPLQDWLRQ0LOOHUunderstood that if he pled guilty &KLHI requirement that in order to establish prejudice a defendant -XGJH 5REHUVRQ FRXOG RSW WR LPSRVH HLWKHU D VHYHUH DGXOW must come forward with objective evidence in addition to his VHQWHQFHRIOLIHLPSULVRQPHQWRUDOHQLHQWMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFH post-conviction claim that he would have changed his mind about pleading guilty). The circumstances of these cases do +RZHYHU/XVE\DFWHGLQFRPSHWHQWO\LQIDLOLQJWRFRQVLGHU not require that we resolve this issue today. WKHOLNHOLKRRGWKDWWKHSURVHFXWRUZRXOGH[HUFLVHKLVULJKWWR DSSHDOWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW VLPSRVLWLRQRIDMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFH The wardens argue that Miller and Haynes could not have $Q\MXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHLPSRVHGRQ0LOOHUZRXOGEHOHVVWKDQ been prejudiced by any deficiency on the part of their trial VL[\HDUVLQDMXYHQLOHIDFLOLW\*LYHQVXFKDOHQLHQWVHQWHQFH counsel because they acknowledged at their March 1990 plea IRUILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHULWZDVXQUHDVRQDEOHIRU/XVE\QRWWR hearings that they could be sentenced to life imprisonment KDYH FRQVLGHUHG WKDW WKH SURVHFXWRU FRXOG DSSHDO DQG WKH without parole.$FFRUGLQJWRWKHZDUGHQV"the fact that MXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHFRXOGEHUHYHUVHG

prosecutor could appeal and that the juvenile sentence could Miller’s age and his heavy reliance on Lusby, a reliance be reversed, and, if so, Miller would serve a life sentence Lusby acknowledged was "practically total[]," enhanced without possibility of parole. Lusby’s duty to make certain that Miller understood all the risks associated with his guilty plea. Miller was fifteen years Lusby should have considered these possibilities, informed old and a year behind in school. His parents, according to Miller about them, and incorporated them into his risk Lusby, were themselves reliant on Lusby for advice. This assessment when he advised Miller about pleading guilty. He case epitomizes the criminal defendant's need for what the failed to do so. Rather, he advised Miller to plead guilty Supreme Court has called the "guiding hand of counsel at based solely upon his assessment of the relative risks in going every step in the proceeding against him." Powell v. to trial versus pleading guilty before Chief Judge Roberson. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). As a result, Lusby misinformed Miller regarding the likelihood he would receive an adult sentence. Miller was not We conclude that Miller’s trial counsel was incompetent. fully apprised of the risks he faced. It is an objectively unreasonable application of Hill and Strickland for the Michigan Court of Appeals to hold The duty of defense counsel to consult is paramount when otherwise. a client has to decide whether or not to waive a constitutional right, such as the right to trial. Because the decision whether Haynes testified that his trial counsel, Rice, similarly failed or not to plead guilty ultimately rests with the client, see to inform him of the prosecutor’s right to appeal the trial Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("the accused has court’s imposition of a juvenile sentence. Due to Rice’s the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions death, Haynes was unable to offer any testimony which might regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, corroborate this assertion. TKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOV testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal"); DVVXPHGWKDW+D\QHV¶GHIHQVHFRXQVHOGLGQRWLQIRUPKLPWKDW Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, WKH SURVHFXWRU FRXOG DSSHDO WKH WULDO FRXUW¶V VHQWHQFLQJ C.J., concurring) ("[o]nly such basic decisions as whether to GHFLVLRQ+D\QHV$IWHU5HPDQG1:GDWQ plead guilty, waive a jury, or testify in one's own behalf are 7KHIHGHUDOGLVWULFWFRXUWDFFHSWHGWKDWDVVXPSWLRQHaynes ultimately for the accused to make"), counsel must ensure that v. Burke, 115 F.Supp.2d at 818. ,QKHUDSSHDOWRWKLVFRXUW the client's decision is as informed as possible. Failing even :DUGHQ%XUNHGRHVQRWFKDOOHQJHWKHIDFWWKDW5LFHGLGQRW to consider, let alone notify the client of, a factor that could LQIRUP +D\QHV RI WKH SURVHFXWRU¶V ULJKW WR DSSHDO  7KHUH negate the entire benefit of the guilty plea is not within the EHLQJQRWKLQJLQWKHUHFRUGWRFRQWUDGLFWWKH0LFKLJDQFRXUW¶V range of professional norms. DVVXPSWLRQZHDGRSWLW With this assumption made, the reasoning from Miller’s case applies. Like Miller, Haynes should have been fully PRUH VHYHUH VHQWHQFH apprised of the risks he faced, but was not. We conclude that  Haynes’ trial counsel was incompetent and that it is an &LWLQJ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V UHFHQW GHFLVLRQ LQ %HOO Y &RQH  6&W   WKH GLVVHQW VWDWHV WKDW DQ DWWRUQH\¶V OHJLWLPDWH WULDO objectively unreasonable application of Hill and Strickland WDFWLFV GR QRW FRQVWLWXWH GHILFLHQW SHUIRUPDQFH $ GHIHQVH FRXQVHO¶V for the Michigan Court of Appeals to hold otherwise. IDLOXUH WR FRQVLGHU D SURVHFXWRU¶V ULJKW WR DSSHDO LV QRW D WDFWLF RU VWUDWHJ\ $ GHIHQVH FRXQVHO¶V IDLOXUH WR LQIRUP RU DGYLVH WKH GHIHQGDQW UHJDUGLQJ WKH VWDWH¶V ULJKW RI DSSHDO DQG WKH DWWHQGDQW FKDQFHV RI UHYHUVDO LV QRW D WDFWLF RU VWUDWHJ\ 6XFK RPLVVLRQV RI OHJDO SUDFWLFH DQG OHJDO FRXQVHOLQJ FDQ QHYHU EH D OHJLWLPDWH GHIHQVH WDFWLF RU VWUDWHJ\