Miller v. State

124 S.E. 195, 158 Ga. 697, 1924 Ga. LEXIS 329
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedSeptember 4, 1924
DocketNo. 4126
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 124 S.E. 195 (Miller v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. State, 124 S.E. 195, 158 Ga. 697, 1924 Ga. LEXIS 329 (Ga. 1924).

Opinions

Atkinson, J.

1. Where the accused was upon trial under an indictment charging him with the murder of his wife, the jury having authority, in case of a conviction, to find him guilty without a recommendation to mercy, or to recommend him to life imprisonment (Penal Code (1910), §63), it was competent to introduce evidence tending to show that at the time of the homicide the woman was in an advanced and apparent state of pregnancy, as bearing upon the enormity of the offense and furnishing ground for the consideration of the jury in determining whether or not a recommendation to life imprisonment would [698]*698be proper. Withrow v. State, 136 Ga. 337 (4) (71 S. E. 139); Hart v. State, 141 Ga. 672 (81 S. E. 1108).

2. At the trial, in October, 1923, of a defendant for murder of his wife, under an indictment alleging that the homicide was committed on May 11, 1923, by striking the victim “with a certain gun, pistol, and heavy blunt instrument to the grand jury unknown,” the homicide was proved by uncontradicted evidence, but the identity of the person who committed the crime was a question for determination which depended entirely on circumstantial evidence. A brother of the deceased testified, as a witness for the State, that “about five or six years ago he talked with the defendant “after a row they [defendant and his wife] had.” Witness asked defendant “what made him treat my sister so,” to which defendant replied that “at times he would get fretted;” whereupon witness said, “There is no use of that; some time ago you broke her arm, and Dr. Riley treated her.” The witness did not testify that the defendant stood mute, or-that he did not deny the charge that he had broken his wife’s arm. Held: (a) The language of the witness should not be construed as testimony that the defendant in fact broke his wife’s arm, or as testimony of an admission by the defendant that he broke his wife’s arm. Before testimony of the character mentioned could be treated as testimony of an admission by the defendant, it would be incumbent on the State, offering it as an admission, to show affirmatively that at the time the defendant was so charged -by the witness, he stood mute or failed to deny the charge, (b) The language of the witness amounted to testimony that at an undesignated time prior to “five or six years” before the trial, the defendant and his wife had “a row.”

3. Another witness (a physician) was asked, on direct examination: “Did you ever attend her before for anything she had received from her husband?” The witness answered: “Two years ago her father brought her up to me; there was a wound under her arm caused by a lick from some instrument; if there were any other scars on her they were some old sears — in my opinion as a physician caused by a lick.” On cross-examination the witness testified: “I don’t have any idea how these wounds were caused, of my own knowledge.” Held, that the language of this witness should not be construed as testimony that the defendant inflicted the wound that was examined by the witness, or caused any old sears on the person of the woman.

4. There was no other evidence tending to show that the defendant inflicted the wound or scars as referred to in the preceding note. In these circumstances the testimony to which reference was made did not tend to show ill-treatment of the woman by the defendant.

5. Other testimony was to the effect that on the night of the homicide the wife, being in an advanced stage of pregnancy, was left with her small children at home by the defendant, who went off to a party, and that before leaving they had “a fuss” — “some words” about his going. In the case of Horton v. State, 110 Ga. 739 (35 S. E. 659), this court ruled: “It is not, in a trial for murder, competent to prove that, years before the homicide, there had been a difficulty or quarrel between the accused and the deceased, without showing that in consequence thereof the former had continuously entertained hostile feelings towards the [699]*699latter, or that the old grudge had something to do with the homicide; and, as a rule, the connecting evidence should begin with 1 the killing and travel backwards to the original difficulty.” See also Scrutchens v. State, 146 Ga. 189 (3) (91 S. E. 25). Held:

No. 4126. September 4, 1924. Indictment for murder. Before Judge Park. Jones superior court. December 1, 1923. Andrew Miller, upon wholly circumstantial evidence, was convicted of the murder of his wife, Leah Miller, and recommended by the jury to the mercy of the court. His motion for new trial, based on the usual general grounds, and three amended grounds which related to rulings of the court on the admission of evidence offered by the State, was denied, and he excepted. The evidence, together with the prisoner’s statement before the jury, was substantially as follows: On the night of May 10, 1923, there was a party or “barbecue” at the residence of Willie Adams, which was about a mile from the residence of the defendant. The defendant left his home between 9 and 10 o’clock and attended the party. Among others who were present was a man called Karsted Anderson, who lived at the home of the defendant’s father, which was between the residence of defendant and the place where the party was held, being about three fourths of a mile from defendant’s residence. The party lasted until 12 or 1 o’clock, after which Karsted and defendant left for their respective homes together. Karsted left defendant at defendant’s father’s home, and the defendant went to his own home. In his statement before the jury the defendant explained what he there saw and did, in the following language: “And I went back to my house; going in the house the house was dark, and I struck a match, and just as I readied the door to her room I saw my wife lying across the foot of the bed with the pistol in her hand, and I went and tried to wake my children to find out what was the matter, and the oldest boy got about half wake; and I found out he didn’t know nothing, and I went to my father and asked him for some advice, and I went to Mr. Bivins and then to Mr. Andrews; and Karsted went with me.” Mr. Bivins the person referred to in the prisoner’s statement, being sworn as a witness for the State, testified, that the next morning “just about light” he was in bed and was called by Karsted, who said Andrew Miller wanted to get some information about what to do with his wife, saying that she was dead. Andrew Miller, who was also present, stated to witness that he left his wife about 9 o’clock and went to the barbecue, and that when he returned home about 1:30 o’clock he found her lying on the bed. Witness asked if she killed herself, to which defendant replied that he “didn’t know, she must have shot herself, there was a pistol lying there by her; and he said he left the pistol in the dresser-drawer.” Witness advised him to call the coroner and hold an inquest; there was nothing said about burying his wife up to that time. He went on to Mr. Andrews (the justice of the peace), and in about an hour’s time returned at 4:30 or 5 o’clock and told witness what Mr. Andrews said. Defendant then said he wanted to go to witness’s store and buy some shoes for his children to wear to the funeral. He also asked if witness knew where he could get a hearse to carry his wife to the cemetery.

[699]*699(а)

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
124 S.E. 195, 158 Ga. 697, 1924 Ga. LEXIS 329, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-state-ga-1924.