Miller v. Rondeau

436 N.W.2d 393, 174 Mich. App. 483
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 10, 1988
DocketDocket 99882
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 436 N.W.2d 393 (Miller v. Rondeau) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. Rondeau, 436 N.W.2d 393, 174 Mich. App. 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

Defendants, Martin Timothy Rondeau and Cheryl Ann Rondeau, appeal from an April 13, 1987, order of the Bay Circuit Court denying their motion to set aside a default entered on January 27, 1987, in favor of plaintiffs, Clarence Miller and Diane Christine Miller. On appeal, defendants argue that the default entered against them should be set aside and the case should be remanded for trial because the trial court erred in refusing to exercise its discretion when considering the motion to set aside the default, in finding that defendants had not filed an affidavit in support of their motion, as is required under MCR 2.603(D)(1), and in concluding that defendants had *485 not presented a meritorious defense, as is required under MCR 2.603(D)(1). We affirm.

MCR 2.603(D)(1), regarding motions to set aside an entry of default or judgment of default, provides:

A motion to set aside a default or a default judgment, except when grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, shall be granted only if good cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed.

A trial court’s decision concerning whether good cause has been shown or a meritorious defense has been presented will be affirmed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Cramer v Metropolitan Savings Ass’n (Amended Opinion), 136 Mich App 387, 398; 357 NW2d 51 (1984).

The record reveals that defendants sold plaintiffs a mobile home on September 27, 1986, for $13,800. Under the terms of the sales contract, which was drafted by defendants, plaintiffs were required to pay $1,250 down and the balance "in non-interest bearing monthly installments of one hundred ninety three and 90/100 ($193.90) Dollars.” In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they were assured by defendants that "they owned the mobile home, free and clear, and were legally able to transfer title,” but that, in fact, the mobile home was subject to a mortgage interest held by Tower Federal Savings Bank. Accordingly, plaintiffs requested, among other things, that defendants be ordered to pay off the mortgage in full..

Defendants were served with a copy of the complaint on December 29, 1986, and failed to file a timely answer. On January 29, 1987, a default was entered against them. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for entry of a default judgment. On February *486 9, 1987, a hearing was conducted on plaintiffs’ motion, at which defendant Martin Rondeau appeared. The court expressed its intention to grant plaintiffs’ motion, but required the parties to return to court for a determination of damages. On March 23, 1987, after conducting a hearing on a motion filed by defendants to set aside the entry of default, the court determined plaintiffs’ damages to be $9,504.34. An order denying defendants’ motion to set aside the entry of default was entered on April 13, 1987, and a default judgment ordering defendants to pay $9,504.34 was entered on March 23, 1987.

On appeal, defendants, citing Diversified Equipment Leasing Corp v Booth, 67 Mich App 206, 212; 240 NW2d 482 (1976), argue that "the trial court erred in refusing to exercise its discretion when considering [the] motion to set aside the default.” In Diversiñed Equipment, the trial court expressed a belief that it had no authority or discretion to set aside a default judgment. In the present case, however, our perusal of the hearing transcripts reveals that the trial court was well aware that it had the authority and discretion to set aside the default entered on January 29, 1987. At the hearing on March 23, 1987, defendants’ attorney specifically informed the court that "we address this [issue] to your discretion, that you identify this as being sufficient just cause to allow us our day in court,” and the court itself, in deciding to deny defendants’ motion, emphasized that a decision to grant or deny a motion to set aside an entry of default is a discretionary one. The judge stated that fulfillment of the requirements of the court rule would necessitate the granting of a motion to set aside an entry of default, and that "I can set certain conditions, and these conditions are within my discretion.”

*487 Second, defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding that defendants had not filed an affidavit in support of their motion, as is required under MCR 2.603(D)(1). Defendants concede that they did not file a separate document entitled "affidavit” in which facts showing a meritorious defense were set forth. They reason, however, in their one-page discussion of this issue — a discussion which includes not one citation to case law— that the verified pleadings they filed prior to the court’s denial of their motion to set aside the entry of default were sufficient to "satisf[y] the 'affidavit’ requirements of MCR 2.603(D)(1).” In light of the information in their late-filed answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaim, which declare that the statements made therein are true "to the best of their information, knowledge, and belief,” the filing of an affidavit of facts, defendants suggest, would merely have been a superfluous act. As noted by the trial court, however, the requirements regarding the form of verification for a pleading and the form of an affidavit are significantly different. For example, a pleading may be verified merely by the declaration that the statements in the pleading are true and accurate to the best of the signer’s information, knowledge and belief, MCR 2.114(A)(1)(b), whereas an affidavit filed in support of a motion must be made on personal knowledge, stating with particularity facts admissible as evidence establishing the grounds stated in the motion and showing affirmatively that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify competently to the facts stated in the affidavit, MCR 2.119(B)(1). The verified pleadings relied upon by defendants in this case contain no statements sufficient to satisfy the criteria applicable to affidavits filed in support of a motion.

Even if we were to accept defendant’s argument *488 that the verification of their pleadings was sufficient to fulfill the affidavit requirement in MCR 2.603(D)(1), we would not find it necessary to reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to set aside the entry of default because the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendants were unsuccessful in presenting a meritorious defense, as is required under MCR 2.603(D)(1). Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that defendants never revealed that the mobile home was held subject to a mortgage. Although in the verified documents filed by defendants prior to the hearing on their motion to set aside the entry of default they conclusorily state that plaintiffs knew that the mobile home was being sold subject to a mortgage, such statement is declared without benefit of adequate supporting facts and details. The mere denial of a plaintiffs allegations, without the recitation of facts indicating the existence of a meritorious defense, is insufficient to cause this Court to reverse a trial court’s decision denying a motion to set aside a default. Poling v Secretary of State, 142 Mich App 54, 61-62; 369 NW2d 261 (1985); Novi Construction, Inc v Triangle Excavating Co,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
436 N.W.2d 393, 174 Mich. App. 483, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-rondeau-michctapp-1988.