Miller v. Railroad

38 S.E. 29, 128 N.C. 26
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedMarch 12, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 38 S.E. 29 (Miller v. Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. Railroad, 38 S.E. 29, 128 N.C. 26 (N.C. 1901).

Opinion

Cook, J.

After introduction of plaintiff’s evidence, tbe defendant moved for judgment as in case of nonsuit under tbe statute, Acts 1891, cbap. 109, as amended by Acts 1899, chap. 131; motion refused and defendant excepted. Tben defendant introduced its evidence, and after all tbe evidence was in renewed its- motion, wbicb was again refused and defendant again excepted. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed.

Tbe contention of plaintiff is. that be was injured by tbe negligence of defendant in its reckless and careless handling of its engine and train of oars, at or near tbe town of Windsor, in that defendant unnecessarily obstructed tbe public *27 highway, crossing defendant’s track, for an unreasonable length of time by allowing its train to remain thereon, and carelessly allowing-steam to escape, causing such mois.es as frightened his horse and unreasonably interfered with the rights of the plaintiff and general public, by reason of which his horse became frightened and ran away with him, throwing him from his buggy and' doing him serious injury, causing him much pain to his great damage, eta

The defendant denies the same, and avers that the injury,, if any, was caused by negligence in the careless- driving of a wild horse by the plaintiff himself, and that it was not-responsible for the same.

It appears from, all the evidence (there being no material discrepancy in the testimony of the witnesses) that the first question presented for the decision of the Court is as to the negligence of the defendant; so that if the Court shall be of the opinion that the injury was caused other than by the defendant’s negligence, then it will be unnecessary to- consider the defendant’s other exceptions.

“When the facts are agreed upon, or otherwise appear,. what is ordinary care is a question of law for the Court; when the facts are in dispute, it is the duty of the trial Judge to explain what would be ordinary care under certain hypotheses as to facts, and leave the jury to apply the law to the facts as it may find them. In the case at bar the undisputed facts appear in the evidence, so- that what constitutes negligence or contributory negligence is a question of law to be decided by the Court, and should not be left to the jury.” Smith v. Railroad, 64 N. C., 258; Wallace v. Railroad, 98 N. C., 494.

In Pleasants v. Railroad, 95 N. C., 195, Merrimon, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, s’ays: “The counsel for the appellant on the argument insisted that the Court ought to have submitted to the jury the question whether 'or not the *28 plaintiff used due diligence, on, to state it mere definitely and appropriately, whether what the plaintiff did or failed to do was material, as shown by the evidence, constitute negligence or contributory negligence on his part. We think the Court ought not to have submitted such a question. It is not the province of the jury to decide such question. In this State, what constitutes negligence or reasonable diligence is a question of law to be decided by the Court. The facts appearing, tire Court decides that there is or is not negligence or there was or was not due diligence.” Herring v. Railroad, 32 N. C., 402; Beles v. Holmes, 33 N. C., 16; Heathcock v. Pennington, Ibid, 640; Avery v. Sexton, 35 N. C., 247; Smith v. Railroad, 64 N. C., 238; Anderson v. Steamboat Co., Ibid, 397.”

Upon the close of plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant admitted it to be true'and moved for judgment as of nonsuit; and then, after defendant’s evidence was concluded, the motion was renewed. The evidence offered by defendants does not contradict the plaintiff’s in any material particular. So the question is one of law. Talcing all the evidence of the plaintiff to be true, does it amount, to negligence upon the part- of the defendant ? Or taking all the evidence submitted, does it establish negligence? The evidence bearing upon the question is as follows:

Oscar Speller said—

“This year, in winter, time, was date of alleged injury. It was near the depot. I was at the blacksmith shop in' front of the depot of the defendant company. The engine was standing about three oar four steps from the sidewalk. The ditch is next to the street on the edge of the sidewalk. Measuring that in feet it would be nine or twelve feet. The sidewalk is about three or four steps wide. From the inner edge of the sidewalk to the engine was about eight steps. That is, from Turner’s shop to the engine was about eight steps. *29 The entire street from Turner’s shop across to the fence is twenty-four steps. There is a sidewalk on one side next to Turner’s shop, none the other side. The engine blocked up eight steps of the road. I think about one-third of the road w'as blocked up. That left the balance for a passway.

“There is grass néxt to the fence on the side away from the engine, where people don’t drive. Between the engine and grass' there were three or four steps. One would have to- pass very close to the pilot cow-catcher to get by, as near as the distance of a little more than a step, not quite two steps (a step is a yard). I saw plaintiff coming by. I saw him coming down the hill. I had heard of his mare being a trotter. The plaintiff came on and as she got in about two steps of the track, she made a spring and jumped nearly •across both the tracks, the side-track anld the main line. At the first jump the plaintiff pulled on the reins, and the girth broke, and that pulled the buggy up on her, and she continued to run, and when he turned the corner, he fell out, or jumped out, I don’t know which, and the wheel struck him, and knocked him down, and he stayed down. The engine was standing on the side-track on the switch. The engine could have been placed back from tho road, could have placed it back as far as they wanted to. I do not know how long the engine had been there. I had been there about half an hour. From the -time engine got there until the plaintiff came was ten or fifteen minutes. The engine was standing there when I got there. The engine was - making no more noise than usual. The steam was escaping from the safety valve and cylinder cocks. There was not much smoke. The escape of steam from safety.valves is a sort of stewing noise like it usually does when steam is up. I do not know what frightened the horse, but from my judgment she got scared of the engine.”

*30 CrOSS-ExAMINATION.

“There was plenty of room, to pass. A gentle horse, not being afraid of the engine, there was plenty of room for him to pass. She wias trotting al'ong a slow gait. There were about four steps clear of the grass. He could have driven out on the grass. Two buggies could have passed, by one driving in the ditch. There were twenty-four steps from ■one sidewalk to the other. Take eight stops from twenty-four leaves sixteen steps.

“When plaintiff came along he could see the engine as well ais I could. I don’t 'think -there would have been any trouble if the girth had not broken. I don’t know which track the • engine was. on. It was the freight train.

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Bluebook (online)
38 S.E. 29, 128 N.C. 26, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-railroad-nc-1901.