Miller v. Railroad Commission of Texas

185 S.W.2d 223, 1945 Tex. App. LEXIS 617
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 17, 1945
DocketNo. 9466.
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 185 S.W.2d 223 (Miller v. Railroad Commission of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 185 S.W.2d 223, 1945 Tex. App. LEXIS 617 (Tex. Ct. App. 1945).

Opinion

BAUGH, Justice.

A Rule 37 case. Appellant applied to the Commission for permits for well No. 2 on a .81-acre tract, and for wells 9 and 10 on a 4.18-acre tract, both tracts situated within the city limits of Kilgore, Texas. Both applications were denied, separate suits filed thereon in the District Court of Travis County, which suits were consolidated, tried without a jury, and the action of the Commission upheld; hence this appeal.

The sole contention made by appellant is that the courts and the Commission in determining whether drainage and confiscation exist as to a given tract of land, the underground conditions being uniform, have adopted as a rule of comparison, the density of drilling in the eight times area surrounding such given tract; and that to deny the appellant the opportunity to drill his leaseholds to such overall average density, and thus put his production on a parity with adjacent leases, would be discriminatory against him and amount to confiscation of his property.

The underground conditions in the areas involved were admittedly uniform and the per well allowables were the same. Nor is it contended that the wells applied for were needed to prevent waste.

At the outset it is contended by appellees that appellant did not show ownership in all of the surface area delineated in his application to the Commission. This for the reason that as to the .81-acre tract the map accompanying his application shows merely surface area but no streets; whereas the map of the City of Kilgore, introduced in evidence, and the testimony, shows, that said tract is divided into lots which abut upon streets along the southwest, the southeast, and perhaps the northeast; and that it was not shown whether in computing the .81-acre area appellant had included therein the area extending to the center of such streets, as he did in computing the area of the 4.18-acre tract. Obviously, if one-half of the width of streets on two, or perhaps three, sides of such tract were included in computing an area aggregating only .81 of an acre, the exclusion of such street surfaces would materially reduce the size of such tract as a basis for comparison with the eight times surrounding area. As to the 4.18-acre tract, treated by appellant as a single tract, the record affirmatively shows that it is in reality composed of two separate tracts. The one to the southeast consisting of a city block, subdivided into eight lots, which block is bounded by four streets, — those on the southwest, southeast and northeast being SO feet wide; and that on the northwest, which separates this tract from the other portion of the 4.18 acres, being 60 feet wide. In computing the area of the two combined tracts, considered by appellant as one tract of 4.18 acres, appellant included therein one-half of the area of the three streets to the southwest, southeast, and northeast of the city block, all of the 60-foot street to the northwest thereof, and one-half of the street to the southwest of such other tract. Obviously if the surface areas of these streets be excluded the size of the so-called 4.18-acre tract would also be materially reduced, an important factor in comparing it with the eight times surrounding area in determining relative density.

If the City of Kilgore did not own title to its streets, but only an easement *225 over the properties traversed, then the title to the abutting properties extended to the center of such streets, subject only to such easement. 39 Tex.Jur., § 51,, p. 584. If, on the other hand, the city had acquired, either by purchase or condemnation, title in fee to its streets, then the abutting property owners had no interest therein other than that of the general public. Town of Refugio v. Strauch, Tex.Com. App., 29 S.W.2d 1041; 39 Tex.Jur., § 53, p. 588. There was no proof offered in the instant case as to such ownership, one way or the other.

However, in view of the general rule announced in 39 Tex.Jur., § 51, that unless otherwise declared in the grant, title-to property abutting on a street extends to the center thereof, we will assume for the purposes of this opinion that appellant’s leasehold included the lands within the boundaries laid out by him.

The spacings provided in Rule 37 at the time appellant’s applications were denied by the Commission were 467 ft. from property lines and 933 ft. between wells, or one well to 20 acres. The circular eight times area — 33.44 acres — surrounding the 4.18-acre tract, excluding said tract and the eight wells already thereon, contained 89 wells, or a density of .38-acre per well; as against a density on said 4.18-acre tract of .52-acre per well. The two wells applied for would give said 4.18-acre a density of approximately .42-acre per well, still less than the adjacent eight times area. The .81-acre tract had only one well, as against 15 on the circular eight times surrounding area of 6.48 acres, or an average density thereon of .52-acre per well. The additional well on this .81-acre tract would give it a density of .40-acre per. well thereon, greater than the average density for that eight times area.

Other than stipulations and documentary evidence only one witness testified, a petroleum engineer called by the appellant. His testimony shows that the Kilgore townsite, because of the diversity of ownership of numerous small tracts, had been drilled to a far greater density than the rest of the East Texas field, in one section of the townsite there being 400 wells on a contiguous 100 acres, and in one locality a density of as much as 20 wells to one acre. The water table pressure is from the west, which, combined with the excessive withdrawals on the townsite area and consequent low pressure there created, caused an excessive migration of oil eastward, prematurely drowning out wells to the westward. There was no local uncompensated net drainage as between appellant’s tracts and the other tracts in the surrounding eight times area. At the time the permits here involved were denied all of said tracts, due to migration of the oil from west to east, had as much oil beneath them as was originally in place thereunder, and will continue to have as much until the oil in the sands in that section is replaced by the approaching water table; a period estimated, if present conditions continue,, to be from 25 to 30 years. Said witness also testified that appellant had already recovered approximately twice as much oil as was originally in place beneath each of said tracts; and that if present conditions continue he will, without additional wells, recover within the next 20 years approximately six times the amount of oil originally in place beneath the 4.18-acre tract; and approximately five times the amount originally under the .81-acre tract. Also that had the Kilgore townsite been drilled to the average density of the area to the west (approximately one well to 3 acres) the migration of oil eastward would have been much retarded and appellant would ultimately by virtue of such migration have recovered only 1½ to 2 times the amount of oil originally in place beneath his leases.

The average density of the eight times surrounding area, as compared to a given area, has never been accepted as a conclusive criterion on the issue of drainage and confiscation. It is at most but evidentiary and can give no vested right in a given producer to drill a given tract to such density. Its value as evidence on a confiscation issue is necessarily dependent upon at least three factors: 1.

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Bluebook (online)
185 S.W.2d 223, 1945 Tex. App. LEXIS 617, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-railroad-commission-of-texas-texapp-1945.