Miller v. PNK

76 So. 3d 122, 11 La.App. 3 Cir. 216, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 1158, 2011 WL 4578588
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 5, 2011
Docket11-216
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 76 So. 3d 122 (Miller v. PNK) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. PNK, 76 So. 3d 122, 11 La.App. 3 Cir. 216, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 1158, 2011 WL 4578588 (La. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

GREMILLION, Judge.

| jThe plaintiff, Ed Geaslin, appeals the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendant, PNK, d/b/a L’Auberge Du Lac Hotel and Casino. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 2007, Geaslin and his companion at the time (who later became his wife), Debra Miller, were gambling at a poker table at L’Auberge. A L’Auberge employee approached Miller, pulled her aside, and informed her that she needed to discontinue drinking alcoholic beverages for a period of eight hours. She was further instructed to gather her chips so that she could redeem them and, thereafter, leave the casino. After cashing out, Miller and Geaslin began arguing with L’Auberge personnel. Geaslin claims that when he attempted to intervene between a security guard who was trying to remove Miller’s cell phone, he was attacked and “tackled ... to the floor with brute force.” Geaslin claimed in his petition that the security guards “began placing their knees in the back of his leg and punching him in the face. A security guard was jumping up and down with his knee on the back of [his] leg.” Geaslin filed suit against L’Au-berge in September 2007 for personal injuries.

Following a four-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict finding that L’Auberge was not at fault in any of the causes of action alleged by Geaslin. Geaslin filed a motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV), which was denied by the trial court. Geaslin now appeals and assigns as error:

1. The jury legally erred by ignoring the instruction of law by the trial court and ruling in favor of the Defendants and against Plaintiff and,
2. The trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for JNOV.

| .DISCUSSION

A court of appeal may not set aside a jury’s finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).

The appellate review of fact is not completed by reading only so much of the record as will reveal a reasonable factual basis for the finding in the trial court, but if the trial court or jury findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.

Id. at 844.

Though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the factfinder’s, reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Id. “[W]here two permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Stobart v. State Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 883 (La.1993). “[T]he issue to be *125 resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one.” Id. At 882.

Geaslin reviews the manifest error standard in this assignment of error but argues that the “legal error of the jury was in failing to follow the clear instructions of the court.” Therefore, he argues, we should discard the manifest error standard and conduct a de novo review. Geaslin never states which instructions the jury failed to follow or provides any other argument in this regard other than the quoted claim above. This argument lacks merit and we, therefore, limit ourselves to a manifest error review of the jury’s finding.

The jury was called upon to decide if L’Auberge exercised reasonable care in removing Geaslin from the casino and if the force used was excessive. In 3Saucier v. Players Lake Charles, LLC, 99-1196, p. 7-8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/22/99), 751 So.2d 312, 317, we stated:

A determination of excessive or unnecessary force is a finding of fact which may not be disturbed unless: (1) the record evidence does furnish a sufficient basis for the finding; or (2) that finding is clearly wrong. See Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978)....
In Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969 (La.1977), the supreme court sets forth several factors to consider in making a determination of whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances. The factors include: (1) the known character of the arrestee; (2) the risks and dangers faced by the officer; (3) the nature of the offense or behavior involved; (4) the chance of escape if the particular means are not employed; (5) the existence of alternative methods of arrest or subduing the arrestee; (6) the physical size, strength and weaponry of the officers as compared to that of the arrestee; and (7) the exigencies of the moment. See Picou v. Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office, 343 So.2d 306 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 345 So.2d 506 (La.1977).

Having reviewed the evidence, we find that reasonable people could conclude that L’Auberge exercised reasonable care and did not use excessive force in removing Geaslin from the casino. The following testimony was elicited at trial.

Debra Miller testified that, she was fifty-four years old at the time of the incident. She testified that she had been to the L’Auberge many time before. She said that she and Geaslin gambled at L’Au-berge starting the night before the incident. She admitted that she and Geaslin brought two large insulated “Big Gulp” beverage containers with them to gamble the night before the incident. She said that no one asked them to remove them until the night of the incident. Miller testified that she was not drunk, but had had three, four, or five alcoholic drinks. However, on cross-examination she recalled stating that she had at least five alcoholic beverages that night.

Miller reviewed the videotape, noting that a lady approached her while she was seated at a table in the casino playing “three card poker” and asked if she 14could speak to her. Miller said that the lady informed her that she could not drink any more alcohol for eight hours. Miller said that she was informed that she was unable to gamble if she was not drinking so she had to leave. Miller said she told Geaslin that she needed to leave, collected her chips that remained on the table, and proceeded to the “cashier’s cage” to cash in her chips. Miller was accompanied by Geaslin. Miller stated that she was confused as to why she was being asked to leave and requested to see a manager to *126 clarify to her satisfaction why she was being asked to leave. Miller then said that she requested a wheelchair because her back was hurting.

Miller described the recorded events noting that Geaslin referred to one of the employees as a “lying bitch” because the employee stated that she and Geaslin had been drinking all day. Miller testified that she and Geaslin had new cell phones and she was not sure how to operate hers, but that she was attempting to take a picture of the situation.

Miller said that Geaslin had his back to her and that he saw security officer, David Shelton, reach around her to retrieve the phone.

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76 So. 3d 122, 11 La.App. 3 Cir. 216, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 1158, 2011 WL 4578588, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-pnk-lactapp-2011.