Miller v. Nesbitt

212 N.W. 733, 204 Iowa 771
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedMarch 15, 1927
StatusPublished

This text of 212 N.W. 733 (Miller v. Nesbitt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. Nesbitt, 212 N.W. 733, 204 Iowa 771 (iowa 1927).

Opinion

Albert, J.

This action was against R. R. Nesbitt and his wife, Faye Nesbitt. After the plaintiff rested her case, the court, on motion, dismissed the action against the wife. This-ruling was correct, because there was no evidence whatever in the record that would warrant a decree against the wife, Faye Nesbitt.

To us,this case is an anomaly. Some facts are conceded, among which are: That, from the year 1917, R. R. Nesbitt and C. N. Johnston were lawyers engaged in the practice of law in the city of Des Moines; that appellant, Jane McF. Miller, and her husband, Charles B. Miller, were interested in the estate of Abby A. Miller; deceased, and this firm of attorneys was employed by appellant and her husband to look after their interest in the estate. Appellant herein had a claim against that estate, which the attorneys succeeded in having allowed, in the sum o£ $3,200. On July 1, 1918, this money was turned over to the Millers. Miller and his wife kept their funds in a common account in a bank, and about two years later, $2,000 of this common bank account passed from the Millers to Johnston, a member of the above firm. It was invested in 80 shares of stock of the Bond & Mortgage Company of Iowa, and a joint note was made to the Millers for this amount, signed in the individual names of Johnston and Nesbitt. Nesbitt denies that he ever signed or authorized his name to be signed to that note. Later, on July 12, 1921,- this $2,000 note was taken up, and Nesbitt and Johnston-each gave to the Millers his individual note for $1,000. It is Nesbitt’s claim that this deal with the Millers was carried on between the Millers and Johnston, his- partner, without his (Nesbitt’s) knowledge. When the 80 shares of stock in the Bond & Mortgage Company were bought, 40 of them were taken over by Nesbitt, and he says that it is because of this that he issued his individual note for $1,000 above referred to. This *773 note not being paid, action was commenced, in May, 1925, against Nesbitt. The petition filed alleges, in substance, the foregoing facts. It alleges that there was a confidential relation between the Millers and this firm of attorneys, and also a family relationship between the Millers and Nesbitt (it appears that a niece of the Millers’ was married to Nesbitt’s brother); that Nesbitt and Johnston applied to appellant to let them have her money to invest in the Bond & Mortgage Company, saying that they would guarantee a return of 8 per cent thereon, and would see to it that it ivas safely invested; that the Bond & Mortgage Company and Nesbitt and Johnston were all then and theie insolvent, and that said representations were made solely for the purpose of defrauding the appellant; that appellant and her husband let the defendant Nesbitt and his associate Johnston have $1,000 each; that they were told by Johnston and Nesbitt that the money was safely invested in good safe first mortgages, and that they would look after said investment; that all of said propositions and representations were false; that the money was wrongfully, embezzled and appropriated and converted by Nesbitt to his own use; that the said note was renewed, and appellant now surrenders into court and tenders back said note, and demands of the appellees the return of her money, in the sum of $1,000, with interest, and damages; that said note is now worthless, and she now surrenders it into court for cancellation. Appellant offered to rescind, and all things to do equity. She prays that appellees be held to be trustees, holding the money of appellant in trust, and that they be required to account therefor; that the court decree that said money was secured by Nesbitt through ■wrong and fraud; and that title did not pass, and to impress the same upon any and all property held by him, to the extent of $1,800. She prays that an accounting be taken of the money due her, and that the same be ordered returned forthwith, and for damages sufficient to cover attorney’s fees.

. By an amendment, she adds an alternative prayer, in which she asks for an accounting of the amount of stock purchased in the Bond & Mortgage Company and the income therefrom, and that the court impress a lien of the trust thereon in the hands of Nesbitt; and, in lieu of the promissory note, that she have judgment for $1,000; and that Nesbitt be ordered to surrender *774 and account for the income on said stock, together with such 40 shares of stock in said Bond & Mortgage Company; and that the same be sold, and the proceeds, together with such income, applied upon said judgment.

Appellees answered in three divisions: First, a general denial; second, that appellees accepted the tender back of the promissory note referred to in appellant’s petition, and accepted the surrender and cancellation of the same; third, that the cause of action, if any, set out in appellant’s petition, is barred by the statute of limitations.

At this point, it might be well to stop and consider just what the status of these parties is. ' It is apparent that the thought of appellant in her petition was that she would waive any rights she had under the note, and turn the same in for cancellation, and would seek to hold Nesbitt for the full $2,000 claim. When appellant sought to recover on the original transaction, and tendered the thousand-dollar note into court, this amounted to an offer of rescission; and appellees cannot accept said note and then defend against a claim based on the original transaction. In other words, if appellees elected to receive the note and cancel it, they must take it under the circumstances and conditions under which it is offered, and the status quo must be restored. This was not done in the case at bar, because, by accepting the return of the note, appellees cannot expect to both defeat rescission and to escape all liability. The appellees must accept the tendered rescission in tofo or reject it, and if they accept it, they accept all the conditions attached to it, and are liable on rescission for the money received by them, with interest. But more of this question anon.

We have stated the high points in the petition, and, if we are able to read it aright, appellant claims that this $2,000 was a trust fund in the hands of Nesbitt & Johnston, and the prayer is that they now be called into court to account, as trustees. This leads us to the real question in dispute here, on which this case must turn: that is, under what circumstances, conditions, and agreements did this fund pass from the hands of the Millers? The appellant, Jane McF. Miller, had little to do with the transaction. She left the matter wholly in the hands of her husband, Charles B. Miller, who forwarded the money to this firm; and at this point .the trouble arises. Nesbitt claims that *775 it was a loan, pure and simple. The Millers claim that the money was turned over to Nesbitt & Johnston, as their agents, to invest for them, under an understanding that whatever investments were made, Nesbitt & Johnston would guarantee the same to the Millers. The Millers left Des Moines for the state of Washington, before this transaction, and whatever agreements were made were by correspondence. Unfortunately, the letters which outline the circumstances under which this money was sent were lost, at the time of the trial.

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212 N.W. 733, 204 Iowa 771, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-nesbitt-iowa-1927.