PRESIDING JUSTICE TULLY
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Theodore Randall Miller, appeals from an order granting, pursuant to section 2 — 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1005 (now codified as 735 ILCS 5/2— 1005 (West 1992))), summary judgment in favor of defendants, National Association of Realtors (hereinafter National) and Arthur Rubloff & Company (hereinafter Arthur Rubloff). Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301 (134 Ill. 2d R. 301).
For the reasons which follow, we reverse and remand.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 10, 1986, plaintiff worked as a delivery man for a beer distributor and was making a regular delivery of beer kegs to the Billy Goat Inn, a tavern located at 430 North Michigan Avenue in Chicago, when he slipped on a piece of cardboard and seriously injured himself inside the building on a loading ramp. The loading ramp led to the delivery or industrial entrance of the building located on lower Michigan Avenue.
According to plaintiff, he made deliveries to the tavern about twice a week for the previous three months. Deliveries required plaintiff to descend the loading ramp behind a two-wheeled hand truck loaded with two 160-pound barrels of beer. In order to avoid losing control of the kegs, plaintiff would have to tip the hand truck back towards himself while descending the ramp.
An open dumpster was maintained at the top of the ramp for at least three months. The dumpster, which remained open continuously, faced the ramp and was filled with various types of debris. Plaintiff testified that people working in the building used the dumpster and there was always some type of debris or dirt present on the ramp. The ramp was the only means of ingress and egress to the building for delivery men. Plaintiff stated that he knew of other delivery men who had complained of the loading ramp area’s conditions prior to the date of his injury.
On the date in question, plaintiff entered the tavern, via the ramp, to determine the number of kegs needed, and then returned to his truck. As the lighting on the ramp was dim, plaintiff did not observe the condition of the ramp. Plaintiff then loaded the kegs onto the hand truck, proceeded three or four steps down the ramp and fell on a piece of cardboard.
Subsequently, plaintiff brought a negligence action against National. National then filed a third-party complaint against Arthur Rubloff. Defendants each moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to prove notice of the dangerous condition. The trial court granted defendants’ motions.
The instant appeal followed.
OPINION
We initially note that use of the summary judgment procedure is to be encouraged as an important tool in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit. (King v. Linemaster Switch Corporation (1992), 238 Ill. App. 3d 729, 732, 606 N.E.2d 584.) The procedure’s underlying policy is the facilitation of litigation; its benefits inure not only to the litigants in the saving of time and expense, but also to the community in avoiding congested trial calendars and the expense of unnecessary trials. (Rerack v. Lally (1992), 241 Ill. App. 3d 692, 694, 609 N.E.2d 727.) Nonetheless, the granting of summary judgment is a drastic method of disposing of a case, which should not be used unless there is no issue of material fact and it is free from doubt that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Langer v. Becker (1992), 240 Ill. App. 3d 823, 825, 608 N.E.2d 468.) "In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court must construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opposing party.” (Emphasis added.) (Rerack, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 696.) The standard of review applicable in evaluating the propriety of a trial court’s entry of summary judgment is de novo. King, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 732.
Plaintiff maintains that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment as an issue of material fact exists as to whether defendants exercised reasonable care with regard to the condition of the dumpster and the ramp. We agree.
In a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately resulting from a breach of that duty. (Grove v. City of Park Ridge (1992), 240 Ill. App. 3d 659, 608 N.E.2d 421.) Regarding the conditions of real property, the scope of a landowner’s or occupier’s duty owed to entrants upon his premises traditionally depended on the status of the entrant. Though not an insurer of his customers’ safety, the operator of a business owed his invitees a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition for use by invitees. (Ward v. K mart Corp. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 132, 554 N.E.2d 223; Perminas v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 469, 328 N.E.2d 290.) A substantially narrower duty was owed to licensees and trespassers. (Pashinian v. Hartinoff (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 377, 410 N.E.2d 21.) In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that plaintiff was a business invitee on defendants’ property at the time he was injured. In 1984, the General Assembly enacted the Premises Liability Act (hereinafter the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par. 301 et seq. (now codified as 740 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 1992))). Section 2 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
"The distinction under the common law between invitees and licensees as to the duty owed by an owner or occupier of any premises to such entrants is abolished.
The duty owed to such entrants is that of reasonable care under the circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par. 302. (now codified as 740 ILCS 130/2 (West 1992)).)
Thus, while not significantly altering the common law duty owed by an owner or occupier of premises to invitees thereon, it did retract the special but limited immunity from tort liability to licensees. Ward, 136 Ill. 2d 132, 554 N.E.2d 223.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
PRESIDING JUSTICE TULLY
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Theodore Randall Miller, appeals from an order granting, pursuant to section 2 — 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1005 (now codified as 735 ILCS 5/2— 1005 (West 1992))), summary judgment in favor of defendants, National Association of Realtors (hereinafter National) and Arthur Rubloff & Company (hereinafter Arthur Rubloff). Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301 (134 Ill. 2d R. 301).
For the reasons which follow, we reverse and remand.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 10, 1986, plaintiff worked as a delivery man for a beer distributor and was making a regular delivery of beer kegs to the Billy Goat Inn, a tavern located at 430 North Michigan Avenue in Chicago, when he slipped on a piece of cardboard and seriously injured himself inside the building on a loading ramp. The loading ramp led to the delivery or industrial entrance of the building located on lower Michigan Avenue.
According to plaintiff, he made deliveries to the tavern about twice a week for the previous three months. Deliveries required plaintiff to descend the loading ramp behind a two-wheeled hand truck loaded with two 160-pound barrels of beer. In order to avoid losing control of the kegs, plaintiff would have to tip the hand truck back towards himself while descending the ramp.
An open dumpster was maintained at the top of the ramp for at least three months. The dumpster, which remained open continuously, faced the ramp and was filled with various types of debris. Plaintiff testified that people working in the building used the dumpster and there was always some type of debris or dirt present on the ramp. The ramp was the only means of ingress and egress to the building for delivery men. Plaintiff stated that he knew of other delivery men who had complained of the loading ramp area’s conditions prior to the date of his injury.
On the date in question, plaintiff entered the tavern, via the ramp, to determine the number of kegs needed, and then returned to his truck. As the lighting on the ramp was dim, plaintiff did not observe the condition of the ramp. Plaintiff then loaded the kegs onto the hand truck, proceeded three or four steps down the ramp and fell on a piece of cardboard.
Subsequently, plaintiff brought a negligence action against National. National then filed a third-party complaint against Arthur Rubloff. Defendants each moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to prove notice of the dangerous condition. The trial court granted defendants’ motions.
The instant appeal followed.
OPINION
We initially note that use of the summary judgment procedure is to be encouraged as an important tool in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit. (King v. Linemaster Switch Corporation (1992), 238 Ill. App. 3d 729, 732, 606 N.E.2d 584.) The procedure’s underlying policy is the facilitation of litigation; its benefits inure not only to the litigants in the saving of time and expense, but also to the community in avoiding congested trial calendars and the expense of unnecessary trials. (Rerack v. Lally (1992), 241 Ill. App. 3d 692, 694, 609 N.E.2d 727.) Nonetheless, the granting of summary judgment is a drastic method of disposing of a case, which should not be used unless there is no issue of material fact and it is free from doubt that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Langer v. Becker (1992), 240 Ill. App. 3d 823, 825, 608 N.E.2d 468.) "In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court must construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opposing party.” (Emphasis added.) (Rerack, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 696.) The standard of review applicable in evaluating the propriety of a trial court’s entry of summary judgment is de novo. King, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 732.
Plaintiff maintains that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment as an issue of material fact exists as to whether defendants exercised reasonable care with regard to the condition of the dumpster and the ramp. We agree.
In a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately resulting from a breach of that duty. (Grove v. City of Park Ridge (1992), 240 Ill. App. 3d 659, 608 N.E.2d 421.) Regarding the conditions of real property, the scope of a landowner’s or occupier’s duty owed to entrants upon his premises traditionally depended on the status of the entrant. Though not an insurer of his customers’ safety, the operator of a business owed his invitees a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition for use by invitees. (Ward v. K mart Corp. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 132, 554 N.E.2d 223; Perminas v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 469, 328 N.E.2d 290.) A substantially narrower duty was owed to licensees and trespassers. (Pashinian v. Hartinoff (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 377, 410 N.E.2d 21.) In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that plaintiff was a business invitee on defendants’ property at the time he was injured. In 1984, the General Assembly enacted the Premises Liability Act (hereinafter the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par. 301 et seq. (now codified as 740 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 1992))). Section 2 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
"The distinction under the common law between invitees and licensees as to the duty owed by an owner or occupier of any premises to such entrants is abolished.
The duty owed to such entrants is that of reasonable care under the circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par. 302. (now codified as 740 ILCS 130/2 (West 1992)).)
Thus, while not significantly altering the common law duty owed by an owner or occupier of premises to invitees thereon, it did retract the special but limited immunity from tort liability to licensees. Ward, 136 Ill. 2d 132, 554 N.E.2d 223.
"Where a business invitee is injured by slipping on a foreign substance on the premises, liability may be imposed if the substance was placed there by the negligence of the proprietor or his servants, or, if the substance was on the premises through acts of third persons or there is no showing how it got there, liability may be imposed if it appears that the proprietor or his servant knew of its presence, or that the substance was there a sufficient length of time so that in the exercise of ordinary care its presence should have been discovered.” (Olinger v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 469, 474, 173 N.E.2d 443; see also Wroblewski v. Hillman’s, Inc. (1963), 43 Ill. App. 2d 246, 193 N.E.2d 470.) "Thus, where the foreign substance is on the premises due to the negligence of the proprietor or his servants, it is not necessary to establish their knowledge, actual or constructive; whereas, if the substance is on the premises through acts of third persons, the time element to establish knowledge or notice to the proprietor is a material factor.” Thompson v. Economy Super Marts, Inc. (1991), 221 Ill. App. 3d 263, 265, 581 N.E.2d 885.
In the situation where there is proof that the foreign substance was a product sold or related to the landowner’s or occupier’s operations, and the plaintiff offers some further evidence, direct or circumstantial, however slight, such as the substance’s location or the business practices of the defendant, from which it could be inferred that it was more likely that the defendant or his servants, rather than a customer, dropped the substance on the premises, the trial court should permit the negligence issue to go the jury. Donoho v. O’Connell’s, Inc. (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 113, 148 N.E.2d 434; Thompson, 221 Ill. App. 3d 263, 581 N.E.2d 885.
In the case sub judice, we believe summary judgment was incorrectly entered for two reasons. First, plaintiff in his deposition testified that for three months prior to the incident the condition of the premises was one of a constant state of dim lighting, an open dumpster, perpetual dirt, debris and slipperiness and an inherently dangerous incline. Moreover, there was a showing that other delivery men had complained of this situation. Clearly, these are facts which, if proven, would go directly to the issues of notice and due care and, ultimately, of negligence. See Maschhoff v. National Super Markets, Inc. (1992), 230 Ill. App. 3d 169, 595 N.E.2d 665.
Secondly, there was testimony that building workers used these dumpsters and, thus, it is possible for the jury to infer that the cardboard’s location on the ramp came about as a result of defendants’ business practices (e.g., negligent cleaning services, etc.).
DISPOSITION
Therefore, we find, after reviewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, that there exist disputed issues of material fact upon which a jury could find for plaintiff. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views contained herein.
Reversed and remanded.
RIZZI, J., concurs.