Miller v. Mercer County State Bank

W.D. Pennsylvania

Miller v. Mercer County State Bank

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

DecidedMarch 30, 2020

Docket18-01009

StatusUnknown

This text of Miller v. Mercer County State Bank (Miller v. Mercer County State Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Miller v. Mercer County State Bank, (Pa. 2020).

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Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA IN RE: ) ) JOHN F. MILLER, ) Bankruptcy No. 17-11015-TPA ) Debtor. ) Chapter 13 __________________________________ X ) JOHN F. MILLER, ) Adversary No. 18-01009-JAD ) Plaintiff, ) Related to ECF #70 ) - v - ) ) MERCER COUNTY STATE ) BANK and DANIEL EICHER, ) ) Defendants. ) ___________________________________ X MEMORANDUM OPINION It is this Court’s practice to direct the Clerk to place on the public docket all communications concerning or relating to cases or proceedings before it. On March 6, 2020, the Court received a letter dated March 5, 2020 from Andrew S. Brenc, Esquire, who served as counsel to co-defendant Mr. Daniel Eicher. Counsel sent this letter despite the fact that it was not invited by the Court, and Rule 9003 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure precludes ex parte communications by attorneys concerning particular cases or proceedings. See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9003(a). The Court is perplexed as to the purpose of this unsolicited communication because the above-captioned adversary proceeding has long been closed. Indeed, this adversary proceeding was administratively closed by text entry on the docket dated August 23, 2019. Moreover, this Court’s involvement in the adversary proceeding terminated on December 20, 2018, which is over a year ago, when the United States District

Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania withdrew the reference because the parties were ready to proceed with a jury trial regarding Mr. Miller’s lawsuit against Mr. Eicher (the essence of which was breach of construction contract and similar claims). See 1:18-cv-00108-SPB, ECF #6. The record further reflects that by order dated January 29, 2019, the action

was dismissed with prejudice upon motion made by the Plaintiff (Mr. Miller) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. See id. at ECF ## 9 and 10. Given the current posture of the case, the Court is perplexed by the purpose of counsel’s letter. According to the first page of the letter, its purpose appears to be both unsolicited “career advice” and to “pass along some information” which “may or may not be of use” to the Court. The letter also states counsel’s hope that

the letter “does some good.” Within the letter, counsel describes the nature of the causes of action asserted against Mr. Eicher, the nature of the construction work performed by Mr. Eicher at the request of Mr. Miller, and that the case involved about “$18,000 in dispute, maximum, but more than likely $11,000)[.]”

Counsel’s letter also discusses the location of Mr. Miller’s home, describing -2- it as being located in “po dunk.” He also describes Mr. Miller as a person who “stiffed” Mr. Eicher “without repercussion.” Counsel’s letter also states, in pertinent part, the following: During [the final pre-trial conference] you asked the attorneys why such a small case had proceeded to the pre-trial hearing stage. After the other lawyer offered his obfuscated version of events, I bluntly said that the case was meritless, and that the only reason it had been filed was because the debtor and his attorney were looking to fund the Chapter 13 plan. Your response to me was something along the lines of, “well, counselor, no summary judgment motions have been filed, and in my experience, those get filed when the case is meritless.” I did not respond then because it would have served no purpose and it is not my wont to be contentious with Judges. The letter also describes the fact that, after the reference was withdrawn so that a jury trial may proceed, Mr. Miller voluntarily dismissed the action with prejudice. The stated reason for the voluntary dismissal by Mr. Miller was the fact that “the costs were prohibitive and the chances of getting paid were low.” Counsel’s letter then recites the standard for summary judgment in federal proceedings, and states that this adversary proceeding was nothing but a “shake down, and the man suing him– the debtor– was protected by the rules of that system.” Counsel’s letter makes these accusations, despite the fact that counsel acknowledges that there was a factual dispute between the parties, thus necessitating Mr. Eicher’s demand for a jury trial. The letter also avers that Mr. Miller’s attorney was protected by “the system” -3- as well, thus implying that counsel should have been sanctioned for bringing this lawsuit (which, as set forth above, was voluntarily dismissed). Ultimately, the letter concludes by counsel stating that “I hope this has been useful to you.” A generous reading of the letter is that counsel seeks to inform the Court

of the outcome of the litigation. After all, this Court’s involvement was limited. That is, the record reflects that another judge in this district was assigned to the case, but recused himself. Thereafter, the matter was reassigned to the undersigned judge, who simply approved a few uncontested motions to extend the discovery period and presided over the final pre-trial conference before the

reference was withdrawn by the District Court thereby moving the case along to the jury trial phase. Logic, however, dictates that the purpose of counsel’s letter is not to inform this Court of the outcome of the lawsuit because those matters are of public record. In these circumstances, are there other reasons for the letter? For example, is the purpose of the letter to belatedly castigate and insult Mr. Miller or

his counsel? Also, why does counsel describe Mr. Miller’s home as being in the “middle of po dunk?” Why is such statement necessary or appropriate? According to Merriam-Webster, the definition of “podunk” is a “small, unimportant, and isolated town.” It is true that Mr. Miller resides in Conneautville, Pennsylvania, which is a relatively small town in terms of

population. But, Mr. Miller’s home is hardly one that the Court considers isolated -4- or unimportant. In fact, Conneautville, Pennsylvania is located southwest of Erie, Pennsylvania and its citizens are equally as important to the Court along with all of the other litigants, including Mr. Eicher, who have cases and proceedings here. Perhaps the purpose of the letter is to suggest, albeit after-the-fact, that Mr.

Miller or his counsel should have been sanctioned1 for commencing a lawsuit that they ultimately withdrew with prejudice before a jury could be empaneled. In this regard, the letter complains without support that the rules of the bankruptcy system protected Mr. Miller and his attorney from any consequences of the alleged “shake down.”

The letter filed by counsel conveniently ignores that applicable rules of bankruptcy procedure offer litigants a myriad of protections against abusive litigation. One such rule is Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is incorporated into bankruptcy proceedings by operation of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011. This rule subjects attorneys to sanctions when he or she submits a petition,

pleading, written motion, or other paper to the Court that falls into one of four categories: (1) the document was submitted for an improper purpose (i.e., to harass or drive up the cost of litigation);

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