Miller v. Lamprey

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

Miller v. Lamprey

44 A. 528, 68 N.H. 376

CourtSupreme Court of New Hampshire

DecidedDecember 5, 1895

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 44 A. 528 (Miller v. Lamprey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Miller v. Lamprey, 44 A. 528, 68 N.H. 376 (N.H. 1895).

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Opinion

Per Curiam. *

Simon P. Towle left no “ heirs ” within the meaning of that word as used in the will of David. The expression, “ his heirs,” was not intended as a description of the ■estate devised to Simon P. If the testator had intended to de'vise to him a fee-simple title, oran estate that should vest in him, his heirs and assigns forever, no reason is apparent for the provi *377 sion that in case of the death of Simon P. without heirs, the estate should pass “ to his nearest akin by the name of Towle, or his nearest akin on the father’s side.” It is not to be presumed that no meaning was intended to be conveyed by these words. Sanborn v. Sanborn, 62 N. H. 631. All the competent evidence shows that the testator’s general purpose was to so dispose of the land that it should remaiu in the Towle family; and to accomplish that purpose, he in effect provided that upon the death of his nephew without lineal descendants, it should become the property of the nearest of kin to the nephew by the name of Towle or “ on the father’s side.” A construction that would allow Simon P. to dispose of the land by will would contravene the plain intention expressed by David in his will. Upon the reported facts, the plaintiffs are the owners of one fourth of the entire estate by inheritance, and under the will of David they became the owners of an additional half of it. The will of Simon P., therefore, could operate only on the remaining one fourth which he inherited from his uncle, his sister Georgianna, and the infant.

Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Wallace, J., did not sit: the others concurred.

*

In this case and others for the same term in which the opinion is Per Curiam, the ■opinions prepared by Chief J ustice Doe were after his death adopted by his surviving associates, and the judgments therein were announced by them at the adjourned law term held March 13, 1896. See, also, foot-note on page 22.

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Per Curiam. *

Simon P. Towle left no “ heirs ” within the meaning of that word as used in the will of David. The expression, “ his heirs,” was not intended as a description of the ■estate devised to Simon P. If the testator had intended to de'vise to him a fee-simple title, oran estate that should vest in him, his heirs and assigns forever, no reason is apparent for the provi *377 sion that in case of the death of Simon P. without heirs, the estate should pass “ to his nearest akin by the name of Towle, or his nearest akin on the father’s side.” It is not to be presumed that no meaning was intended to be conveyed by these words. Sanborn v. Sanborn, 62 N. H. 631. All the competent evidence shows that the testator’s general purpose was to so dispose of the land that it should remaiu in the Towle family; and to accomplish that purpose, he in effect provided that upon the death of his nephew without lineal descendants, it should become the property of the nearest of kin to the nephew by the name of Towle or “ on the father’s side.” A construction that would allow Simon P. to dispose of the land by will would contravene the plain intention expressed by David in his will. Upon the reported facts, the plaintiffs are the owners of one fourth of the entire estate by inheritance, and under the will of David they became the owners of an additional half of it. The will of Simon P., therefore, could operate only on the remaining one fourth which he inherited from his uncle, his sister Georgianna, and the infant.

Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Wallace, J., did not sit: the others concurred.

*

In this case and others for the same term in which the opinion is Per Curiam, the ■opinions prepared by Chief J ustice Doe were after his death adopted by his surviving associates, and the judgments therein were announced by them at the adjourned law term held March 13, 1896. See, also, foot-note on page 22.

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44 A. 528, 68 N.H. 376, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-lamprey-nh-1895.

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