Miller v. Lake Car Sales, Inc.

2026 IL App (2d) 250116

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: 2-25-0116
• Status: Published

Opinion

2026 IL App (2d) 250116 No. 2-25-0116 Opinion filed January 13, 2026 ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________

MERRILL MILLER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lake County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 23-AR-401 ) LAKE CAR SALES, INC., ) d/b/a Car Castle, ) Honorable ) Joseph V. Salvi, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices McLaren and Hutchinson concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiff, Merrill Miller, filed a six-count complaint against defendant, Lake Car Sales, Inc.,

doing business as Car Castle. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of plaintiff on

count III, which alleged a breach of an express written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss

Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Act) (15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (2018)), a

consumer protection statute that provides for recovery of attorney fees. The court denied plaintiff’s

oral motion to file a fee petition and awarded plaintiff $600 in attorney fees and $394 in costs.

Because the court abused its discretion in awarding fees and costs, we vacate that award and

remand for the court to allow plaintiff to file a fee petition. 2026 IL App (2d) 250116

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 On August 25, 2022, plaintiff purchased a used 2005 Toyota Sequoia (vehicle) from

defendant. On May 15, 2023, plaintiff filed a six-count complaint against defendant. As relevant

here, count III alleged a breach of an express written warranty under the Act, based on defendant’s

written promise that defendant would replace the brakes on the vehicle following the purchase.

The complaint alleged that, because plaintiff was unable to contact defendant regarding the repair,

plaintiff paid to have the brakes replaced elsewhere. Plaintiff sought relief through compensatory

damages, as well as attorney fees and costs.

¶4 Before trial, plaintiff dismissed counts II, IV, V, and VI. Counts I and III proceeded to a

bench trial on February 24, 2025. According to the certified bystander’s report, dated May 15,

2025 (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017)), plaintiff testified that he entered into an

agreement with defendant on August 25, 2022. Plaintiff purchased the vehicle for the asking price

and paid in cash. Defendant promised in writing to provide a free oil change and to replace the

brakes on the vehicle. Twice on the day of the purchase, and again the next day, plaintiff

telephoned defendant to schedule an appointment to replace the brakes. Plaintiff left a voicemail

each time he called. Defendant never responded, so plaintiff paid to have the brakes replaced

elsewhere, at a cost of $979.03. Plaintiff also testified to incidental and consequential damages.

¶5 At the close of plaintiff’s case, the trial court entered a directed finding for defendant on

count I. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found for plaintiff on count III. The court awarded

compensatory damages of $979.03. As explained by the bystander’s report,

“[t]he [c]ourt then asked [p]laintiff’s counsel for the amount of their attorney’s fees and

costs. When [p]laintiff’s counsel attempted to explain that attorney’s fees and costs are

normally decided post-trial, by a written fee petition, the [c]ourt indicated that this would

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unduly prolong the matter and awarded [p]laintiff $600 in attorney fees. Plaintiff’s counsel

then made an oral motion for leave to file a fee petition, which motion the [c]ourt denied.”

In an order dated February 26, 2025, the court awarded plaintiff $979.03 in compensatory

damages, $600 in attorney fees, and $394 in costs. Plaintiff timely appeals.

¶6 II. ANALYSIS

¶7 On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff’s

motion to file a petition for attorney fees and costs and instead awarding $600 in fees and $394 in

costs. Defendant did not file an appellee’s brief. Nonetheless, we proceed to the merits because

“the record is simple and the claimed error[ ] [is] such that [we] may easily decide the issue[ ]”

without the aid of an appellee’s brief. See McHenry Township v. County of McHenry, 2022 IL

127258, ¶ 48. We agree with plaintiff that the trial court abused its discretion.

¶8 Plaintiff succeeded on a claim based on the Act, a federal statute with a fee-shifting

provision. Section 2310(d)(1)(A), (B) of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)(A), (B) (2018)) provides:

“(1) Subject to [provisions not applicable here], a consumer who is damaged by the

failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under

this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring

suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief—

(A) in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State or the District of

Columbia; or

(B) in an appropriate district court of the United States, subject to paragraph

(3) of this subsection.”

An award of attorney fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff is authorized under section 2310(d)(2)

of the Act (id. § 2310(d)(2)), which provides:

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“(2) If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought under paragraph (1) of this

subsection, he may be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal

to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys’ fees based on actual

time expended) determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff

for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action, unless the

court in its discretion shall determine that such an award of attorneys’ fees would be

inappropriate.” (Emphasis added.)

¶9 “The plain language of section 2310(d)(2) of the [Act] provides that an award of attorney

fees to a prevailing plaintiff is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed

on review absent an abuse of discretion.” Cannon v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d

674, 685 (2003). “A court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would take its view.”

City of McHenry v. Suvada, 2011 IL App (2d) 100534, ¶ 17. When a trial court rules on an attorney

fee request over which it has discretion, the court abuses its discretion “when a material factor

deserving significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper

and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing them.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Robinson v. Point One Toyota, Evanston, 2017 IL App (1st)

152114, ¶ 24. And “[b]ecause the abuse of discretion standard presupposes a reasoned exercise of

discretion, the lack of an explanation for a [determination] of fees often is sufficient to constitute

an abuse of discretion when the reasons for an unexplained decision are not apparent from the

record.” In re Marriage of Hyman, 2024 IL App (2d) 230352, ¶ 10; see Mitchell/Roberts

Partnership v. Williamson Energy, LLC, 2025 IL App (5th) 240354, ¶ 136 (“[A] trial court’s

failure to exercise its discretion when it is required by law to do so may itself constitute an abuse

of discretion, precluding deferential consideration on appeal.”).

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¶ 10 For that reason,

“ ‘[i]t is essential that the judge provide a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of

a fee determination ***.’ [Citation.] While the explanation need not be painstaking, ‘the

order awarding fees, read against the backdrop of the record as a whole, must expose the

[trial] court’s thought process and show the method and manner underlying its decisional

calculus.’ [Citation.] This principle is especially important in cases where the court

substantially reduced the documented time. [Citation.] Otherwise, the reviewing court will

be unable to conduct an adequate review and remand for further findings will be required.”

Robinson, 2017 IL App (1st) 152114, ¶ 25.

¶ 11 Here, the actual time expended by plaintiff’s attorney is a particularly significant factor for

the trial court to consider. As explained by the First District, the Act

“specifically refers to attorney fees ‘based on actual time expended.’ In addressing this

phrase, Congress has explained that ‘an attorney’s fee is to be based upon actual time

expended rather than being tied to any percentage of the recovery. This requirement is

designed to make the pursuit of consumers rights involving inexpensive consumer products

economically feasible.’ [Citation.] Thus, the award of attorney fees does not depend upon

a plaintiff’s recovery of substantial monetary damages nor does it need to be proportionate

to an award of money damages. [Citation.] It is for the trial court to determine a reasonable

fee, if any, in light of the particular facts and circumstances of each case.” Cannon, 341 Ill.

App. 3d at 686.

¶ 12 Here, when the trial court awarded attorney fees and costs without allowing plaintiff’s fee

petition, the court did not merely ignore material factors deserving significant weight—it

altogether barred plaintiff from presenting any such factors, which was itself an abuse of

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discretion. In fact, it appears from the record that the court failed to apply any standard in its

determination of fees and costs. See Carefree Foliage, Inc. v. American Tours, Inc., 153 Ill. App.

3d 190, 198 (1987) (at evidentiary hearing on fee petition, the trial court erred in summarily

denying fees without “comment[ing] on the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the

witnesses or the documents presented”; the court abused its discretion because it “failed to apply

any standard to measure the reasonableness of attorney fees and costs”). Therefore, we vacate the

award of attorney fees and costs in the February 26, 2025, order and remand this cause for the trial

court to (1) receive plaintiff’s petition for attorney fees and costs and (2) rule appropriately on the

petition by stating its reasons for the fees and costs awarded. See In re Marriage of Kane, 2016 IL

App (2d) 150774-U, ¶¶ 8, 16 (when a trial court awards less than the amount requested in a fee

petition, the court’s ruling should include the reasons justifying a particular reduction).

¶ 13 Plaintiff’s petition may include a request for fees and costs incurred in this appeal.

Although “[t]he Act does not clearly mandate appellate attorney fees,” “[a]llowing a plaintiff to

petition for appellate attorney fees and costs furthers the Act’s goal of providing consumers with

legal assistance to enable them to pursue a remedy for injury or loss.” Melton v. Frigidaire, 346

Ill. App. 3d 331, 340-41 (2004); see Troutman v. Pierce, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 920, 925 (N.D. 1987)

(“We do not believe that a prevailing consumer’s attorney-fee award under [the Act] at the trial

level should be dissipated by uncompensated costs, expenses and attorney fees in successfully

defending a judgment on appeal.”). “Typically, where a party that prevails in the trial court is

required to defend that victory on appeal, courts award attorney fees to that party for their work on

the appeal, too, provided they prevail on appeal as they did at trial.” Trutin v. Adam, 2016 IL App

(1st) 142853, ¶ 35; see Chesrow v. Du Page Auto Brokers, Inc., 200 Ill. App. 3d 72, 76 (1990)

(construing the fee-shifting provision of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices

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Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 121½, ¶ 270a(c)) to include costs and fees

incurred on appeal because “ ‘the intent of [the] provision [was] to compensate a prevailing party

for all fees and costs reasonably incurred in connection with the claim brought pursuant to its

terms’ ” (emphasis in original) (quoting Warren v. LeMay, 142 Ill. App. 3d 550, 583 (1986))). The

foregoing principles apply, even though, in this appeal, plaintiff is not defending the underlying

judgment as such but instead is seeking an appropriate award of fees and costs incurred below in

securing that judgment. See Casey v. Rides Unlimited Chicago, Inc., 2022 IL App (3d) 210404,

¶¶ 1, 31 (allowing the plaintiff who prevailed under the Consumer Fraud Act and appealed the trial

court’s reduced fee award to petition for fees incurred on appeal).

¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 15 For the reasons stated, we vacate the circuit court of Lake County’s award of attorney fees

and costs and remand the cause for plaintiff to file a fee petition and for the trial court to rule

appropriately on the petition.

¶ 16 Vacated and remanded with directions.

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Miller v. Lake Car Sales, Inc., 2026 IL App (2d) 250116

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 23-AR-401; the Hon. Joseph V. Salvi, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Dmitry N. Feofanov, of ChicagoLemonLaw.com, P.C., of for Lyndon, and Francis R. Greene, of Greene Consumer Law, of Appellant: Highland Park, for appellant.

Attorneys No brief filed for appellee. for Appellee:

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