Miller v. Conway, et al.

2003 DNH 063

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: May 22, 2003
• Docket: CV-01-103-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Miller v . Conway, et a l . CV-01-103-M 05/22/03 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

William Dexter Miller, Jr., Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 01-103-M Opinion N o . 2003 DNH 063 Richard Conway, et a l . , Defendants

O R D E R

In March of 2001, pro se plaintiff filed this action against

twenty-three state and local political, law enforcement, and

judicial officers. He also named as a defendant the Strafford

County Correctional Facility. Although the precise legal basis

for many of his claims was never entirely clear, plaintiff

described this litigation as an effort to recover compensatory

and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory

relief, for what he said was a “Campaign of Mixed War -

Administrative Abuse, Harassment, False Arrest, Deprivation of

Rights, Criminal Trespass, Assault, Battery, Unlawful Search and

Seizure, Slander, [and] Racial Abuse.” Complaint at 1 . At this stage of the litigation, nearly all defendants have

been dismissed for various reasons. See Miller v . Conway, 219 F.

Supp. 2d 183 (D.N.H. 2002); Miller v . Conway, 2002 DNH 125

(D.N.H. June 2 5 , 2002). The remaining defendants - law

enforcement officers from the Barrington and Rochester Police

Departments - move for summary judgment as to all claims against

them.

Discussion

Although plaintiff has submitted a response to defendants’

motion, he does not object to the entry of summary judgment in

their favor. Plaintiff’s Response (document n o . 58) at 8 (“I am

not averse to the notion of a summary judgement [sic] being

rendered in this matter, since my family and I have been held

captive by these matters for so long, and since I have lost all

faith and confidence that justice can be obtained within the

courts of this land.”). And, because plaintiff has not submitted

any affidavits or deposition testimony along with his response,

the court will accept as true and uncontested the material facts

alleged by defendants in their memorandum. Based upon that

2 record, it is plain that all remaining defendants are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

First, plaintiff’s claims against the Barrington Police

Department and its officers (arising out of his 1996 arrest) are

barred by the pertinent statute of limitations. See, e.g.,

Calero-Colon v . Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1 , 2 (1st Cir. 1995)

(“The limitation period governing personal injury actions under

the law of the forum state is borrowed for application to section

1983 claims.”). See also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 508:4 I

(establishing a three-year limitations period for personal injury

actions in New Hampshire).

As to the claims against the Rochester Police Department and

its officers (arising out of plaintiff’s arrest in 2000), the

uncontested material facts (including accounts of the relevant

events from plaintiff’s deposition) demonstrate that plaintiff’s

arrest was supported by probable cause.1 Moreover, even in the

1 Plaintiff concedes (or, at a minimum, does not contest) that he was driving after sunset with a non-functioning headlight; his license to operate had been suspended; there was an outstanding bench warrant for his arrest; and he fled the scene after he was told he was under arrest, resulting in a brief chase involving at least two police cruisers.

3 unlikely event that one could reasonably conclude that probable

cause was lacking, defendants would be entitled to qualified

immunity, since a reasonable police officer faced with the

circumstances that preceded plaintiff’s arrest could have

believed that probable cause existed to effectuate that arrest.

See generally Hunter v . Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991); Rivera v .

Murphy, 979 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1992). Finally, the record also

reveals that, as a matter of law, defendants did not use

excessive force while taking plaintiff into custody.

Conclusion

Largely for the reasons set forth in defendants’ memorandum,

and for the reasons discussed briefly above, and because

plaintiff does not object to the entry of summary judgment in

favor of all remaining defendants, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (document n o . 57) is granted.

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with

this order and close the case.

4 SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

May 2 2 , 2003

cc: William G. Scott, Esq. William D. Miller, J r .