Miller v. Bingham

29 Vt. 82
CourtSupreme Court of Vermont
DecidedDecember 15, 1856
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 29 Vt. 82 (Miller v. Bingham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. Bingham, 29 Vt. 82 (Vt. 1856).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Isham, J.

The orator’s title to the mortgage and notes on which this bill of foreclosure is brought; does not rest on the fact that they were originally executed and made payable to him ; but is derived from an assignment to him by Jesse Thompson on the 5th of November, 1852. The mortgage deed and notes were executed by Luther G-. Bingham to the orator on the 25th of November, 1845, and were transferred to Hurlbut May 8th, 1851. On the 22d of December 1851, the mortgage and notes were assigned by Hurlbut to Jesse Thompson, and by Jesse Thompson, on the day above stated, to the orator. The notes were overdue at the time of the assignment from Hurlbut to Thompson. The orator, therefore, took the notes subject to all the defenses legal or equitable which could have been made to them when they were in the hands of Hurlbut. If Hurlbut could have sustained no action [86]*86to recover the notes, nor a bill to foreclose the mortgage, no such proceedings can be sustained by' the orator or by any persons claiming under him as assignee.

The important inquiry in the case arises, whether this mortgage debt was paid to Iiurlbut while he was the assignee and owner of the mortgage deed and notes. If it was so paid, it is obvious that neither he nor any one claiming under him can sustain this bill. On the assignment of this mortgage by the orator, L. G. Bingham became indebted in its amount to Hurlbut, and any payment made to Hurlbut on the mortgage, or to other persons by his directions, will operate, to the extent of that payment, as a satisfaction of the mortgage debt. In showing payment of these notes the onus of proof is cast upon the defendants. The possession of the mortgage deed and notes by the orator is prima facie evidence that the notes are due and unpaid. The same presumption arises that the notes were not paid to Hurlbut, as the securities were in his hands at the time of his assignment to Thompson, and of Thompson’s assignment to the orator. It appears from the testimony in the case, that in the spring or summer of 1851, Hurlbut became indebted to George W. Chittenden for money borrowed, in the sum of two thousand dollars, and that these notes and mortgage were transferred to him by Hurlbut as collateral security for the payment of that debt. It also appears that on the 2d of October, 1851, Luther G. Bingham paid to Mr. Chittenden the sum of one thousand four hundred and fifty dollars at the request of Mr. Hurlbut, which went for the benefit of Hurlbut on the two thousand dollar note he held against him, and that on that occasion these notes and mortgage were returned by Mr. Chittenden to Mr. Hurlbut. The payment of this money by Bingham Was virtually a payment to Hurlbut, and prima facie operates as payment to that extent of the mortgage debt which was then due from Bingham to Hurlbut. That is the legal presumption. The onus of proof is changed, and if any other application of the money is made, it is for the orator to show the existence of a claim other than the mortgage debt, and that by a mutual understanding the payment was made on that debt. The circumstances attending that payment are very strong in showing that the money was to be applied in satisfaction of the mortgage [87]*87debt, and that it was so understood by Bingham as well as by Hurlbut and Chittenden. That Bingham so understood it would seem to be a reasonable inference from the fact that the payment 'Was made the next day after the last note fell due, and was of a sum nearly equal to the amount due on the notes. The small balance remaining due on those notes may have been the reason why Bingham did not call upon Hurlbut to surrender to him the notes and cancel the mortgage deed after they had been returned to Hurlbut fey Chittenden. That Chittenden and Hurlbut regarded that mortgage debt as paid is an inference as strong as can be drawn in any case from circumstantial proof. Those notes and mortgage were turned out as collateral security on the note of two thousand dollars. After that payment was made by Bingham the notes and mortgage were given up by Chittenden to Hurlbut, and Chittenden required security ©f Hurlbut for the balance due on his note. If Chittenden had not regarded that payment as having been made on that mortgage debt he would naturally still have retained them as security fer the balance of his debt. The fact that he did surrender them, to Hurlbut and insist upon further security can he accounted for on no other hypothesis than that he considered the mortgage satisfied by that payment; so far at least as to afford no security for the remainder of his debt. The facts that the notes and mortgage were received by Hurlbut, and that hi1, made no objection to furnishing other security for the balance due. on his note are evidence that he regarded the mortgage debt as paid; otherwise he would naturally have insisted that Chittenden had ample security in his hands by having the possession of the notes and mortgage. If they were satisfactory security for the larger sum, they surely would be sufficient security after the debt had been reduced by that payment. The repeated declarations of Hurlbut as testified to by Smith Benham, William Miller, Lester Hall and Alonzo L. Bingham, that this mortgage debt was paid, are confirmations of the strongest character that the payment was to apply on that mortgage debt. Those declarations were made at various times during the spring and summer of 1851 and 1852; and it is -to be observed, that they cannot be regarded as having been made in unguarded moments, and under circumstances which did not call for them, but as understandingly and deliberately [88]*88made, and to' persons who, from their relations as sureties for Bingham, and otherwise were interested in knowing his pecuniary condition and the trae condition of his property. If the question in this case arose between Hurlbut and those witnesses, it would be the judicial sanction of a great fraud to permit this mortgage to be set up as a subsisting claim against them.' We perceive no objections to the admission of those declarations as evidence in the ease, and to regarding them in the light of original testimony? though they were made after the assignment to Jesse Thompson. In relation to that assignment, it may be observed that it was made as collateral security for signing a note as the surety of Hurlbut to Chittenden, and that this note was afterwards so far paid by Hurlbut that he was permitted to assume and control the security. 'Thompson had made no payment on that note, nor had he in any way been injured by signing that note as surety. At no time could he. have instituted proceedings to enforce the mortgage debt. During all that period Hurlbut was the general owner of those notes and mortgage. He stood in the same relation to the property after the assignment as before it, and the declarations were made after the notes were overdue. So far as the declarations of Hurl-but are concerned, we think they were competent evidence as original testimony, and may he proved by competent witnesses. 1 Greenl. 190, 191. If Hurlbut were foreclosing this mortgage, those declarations would be important testimony against him. They .are equally so against his assignees, for they stand in his shoes, have his title and none other, and hold the same subject to the same defenses. Particularly is this true in relation to the orator; for he virtually ia the direct assignee of Hurlbut. It appears from the testimony of Hurlbut, that in the fall of 1852 he paid, or nearly paid the note that Thompson signed, so that Thompson was wilding to give up the collateral. He says “

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
29 Vt. 82, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-bingham-vt-1856.