Miller v. Advantage Credit Counseling Service (In Re Miller)

336 B.R. 232, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 5, 2006 WL 27217
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 5, 2006
Docket05-50127-JAD
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 336 B.R. 232 (Miller v. Advantage Credit Counseling Service (In Re Miller)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. Advantage Credit Counseling Service (In Re Miller), 336 B.R. 232, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 5, 2006 WL 27217 (Pa. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION RELATING TO DEBTOR’S “CERTIFICATION” OF COMPLETION OF “BRIEFING” REQUIRED PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(H) AND 521(b)

JEFFERY A. DELLER, Bankruptcy Judge.

I. Introduction

The matter that is before the Court concerns the debtor’s efforts to comply with the credit counseling “briefing” provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“2005 Act”). Specifically, the issue before the Court is whether the debtor has satisfied the “certification” requirements set forth in the credit counseling briefing provisions of this statute. For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that the debtor in this case has not adequately satisfied the “certification” requirements of the 2005 Act. The Court will therefore enter an order scheduling further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

II. Facts 1

The debtor, Anna M. Miller, is a retired widow whose sole source of income consists of social security benefits provided by the United States Social Security Administration. (Document No. 12—Schedule I). The debtor commenced this case by filing a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on November 4, 2005. (Document No. 1—Voluntary Petition).

The circumstances surrounding the debtor’s bankruptcy filing are not uncommon. The debtor was forced to seek bankruptcy protection because her residence was scheduled for a sheriffs sale due to mortgage foreclosure on November 7, 2005. (Document No. 2—Certificate of Exigent Circumstances). The debtor has represented to the Court that her financial difficulties are not the result of excessive spending or inappropriate use of credit cards. (Ibid). Rather, the debtor has represented to the Court that except for mortgage obligations on her principal resi *235 dence, the liabilities of the debtor are predominantly medically related debts incurred by the debtor as a result of a prolonged and expensive illness suffered by her late husband (who unfortunately passed away as a result of such illness prior to the petition date). (Id.); (Document No. 12—Schedules D, E, and F).

Shortly after the filing of the debtor’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, the debtor timely complied with the Court’s orders with respect to the filing of schedules, statements and other documents as required by 11 U.S.C. § 109, 11 U.S.C. § 521 and Fed.R.Bankr.1007, with one notable exception. (Document Nos. 8—Motion to Extend Time to File Schedules and Statements; Document No. 10—Order Granting Motion to Extend Time to File Schedules and Statements; Document No. 12— Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs; Document No. 13—Chapter 13 Plan; Document No. 18—Motion to Extend Time for Credit Counseling; Document No. 21— Order Granting Motion to Extend Time for Credit Counseling Briefing). This exception is the debtor’s efforts under 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) to obtain and receive from an approved, non-profit budget and credit counseling agency a “certification” stating that the debtor has completed a “briefing” from such agency that both outlined the opportunities available to the debtor for credit counseling and assisted the debtor in performing a related budget analysis.

The emergency nature of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing (i.e., to stay the Sheriffs sale and enjoin the foreclosure of the debt- or’s equity of redemption) precluded the debtor from obtaining the requisite pre-petition “briefing” as required by 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1). Therefore, on the petition date, the debtor timely filed with the Court a Certification of Exigent Circumstances which, in a manner satisfactory to the Court, set forth the reasons why this debtor could not obtain the pre-petition “briefing” required by the 2005 Act. (Document No. 2—Certificate of Exigent Circumstances).

After filing her Certificate of Exigent Circumstances, the debtor also filed with the Court on December 5, 2005 a Motion for Extension of Time for Filing of Certificate of Credit Counseling. Pursuant to this motion for extension, the debtor sought what amounted to a 60 day extension of time (measured from the petition date) to obtain the briefing required by the 2005 Act. (Document No. 18—Motion to Extend Time for Credit Counseling Briefing). By Order of the Court dated December 15, 2005, the Court granted the debt- or’s motion to extend time. The Court’s order authorized the extension only until December 19, 2005 because the 2005 Act, at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(B), contains a statutory time limit of no more than 45 days measured from the petition date. (Document No. 21—Order Granting Motion to Extend Time for Credit Counseling Briefing).

On December 9, 2005, and well within the time periods set forth in the Court’s Order and the 2005 Act, the Debtor apparently sought and obtained a briefing from Advantage Credit Counseling Service, which is an approved, non-profit budget and credit counseling agency. (Document No. 29—alleged Certification Relating to briefing by Credit Counseling Agency). On December 19, 2005, counsel to the debtor electronically filed with the Court a copy of a facsimile which appears to be on Advantage Credit Counseling Service letterhead. The copy of the facsimile filed on the debtor’s behalf contains the following handwritten statement:

Anna [Miller] was counseled by our agency on 12/9/05 but has not sent in her money order for the $50 fee[.] We left *236 her a message to see if she mailed it in but she won’t be home until this Wed. We are not able to fax the certificate until payment is rec’d. Sorry for the confusion. Thanks! We will fax the certificate to you once she has paid.

(Ibid.). The facsimile is then signed “Robin”, with no last name or title of the person purportedly transmitting the facsimile to counsel to the debtor. (Id.).

When the facsimile was electronically filed on the debtor’s behalf, counsel for the debtor identified it as follows: “Certificate of Credit Counseling (verification from Advantage Credit Counseling Service that counseling had been completed.).” (Id.). The language of the facsimile, however, indicates that Advantage Credit Counseling Service did not intend the facsimile to constitute a “certification” of completion of the briefing required by the 2005 Act (and instead advised the debtor that Advantage Credit Counseling Service would not be “able to fax the certificate until payment is rec’d”).

Under these circumstances, the Court is therefore called upon to determine whether the facsimile filed by the debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
336 B.R. 232, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 5, 2006 WL 27217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-advantage-credit-counseling-service-in-re-miller-pawb-2006.