Miller v. Adamski

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Miller v. Adamski

54 A.D.3d 1011, 863 N.Y.S.2d 922

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 30, 2008

StatusPublished

This text of 54 A.D.3d 1011 (Miller v. Adamski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Miller v. Adamski, 54 A.D.3d 1011, 863 N.Y.S.2d 922 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2008).

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Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to quiet title to real property pursuant to RPAPL article 15, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Bellantoni, J.), dated September 27, 2007, which denied, as premature, their motion for summary judgment declaring that they are the owners of the subject property.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the motion was premature since discovery had not yet taken place (see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 506 [1993]; Rengifo v City of New York, 7 AD3d 773 [2004]; Lantigua v Mallick, 263 AD2d 467, 468 [1999]).

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions have been rendered academic in light of our determination. Spolzino, J.E, Ritter, Dillon and Dickerson, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, to quiet title to real property pursuant to RPAPL article 15, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Bellantoni, J.), dated September 27, 2007, which denied, as premature, their motion for summary judgment declaring that they are the owners of the subject property.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the motion was premature since discovery had not yet taken place (see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 506 [1993]; Rengifo v City of New York, 7 AD3d 773 [2004]; Lantigua v Mallick, 263 AD2d 467, 468 [1999]).

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions have been rendered academic in light of our determination. Spolzino, J.E, Ritter, Dillon and Dickerson, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

54 A.D.3d 1011, 863 N.Y.S.2d 922, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-adamski-nyappdiv-2008.

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