Miller Construction Equipment Sales, Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co.

123 F. Supp. 3d 1377, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111644, 2015 WL 5016504
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedAugust 21, 2015
DocketCase No. MC415-013
StatusPublished

This text of 123 F. Supp. 3d 1377 (Miller Construction Equipment Sales, Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller Construction Equipment Sales, Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1377, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111644, 2015 WL 5016504 (S.D. Ga. 2015).

Opinion

(Pending in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Civil Action No. 1 :15-cv-00007-HRH)

ORDER

GEORGE R. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

This case involves “The Law of the Last Day.” Some background: The caption above reflects an Alaska-bound case. JCB, Inc., initiated’ this miscellaneous action — as an “Interested Party” — so it could move to quash a Fed.R.Civ.P. 45 subpoena served upon it by defendant Clark Equipment Company, d/b/a Doosan Infracore Construction Equipment of America (“Doosan”). Doc. 1. The Court stayed the subpoena (doc. 2) and the Clerk (see his July 28, 2015 docket entry) reminded Doosan.that it must respond, per Local Rule (L.R.) 7.5’s 14-day response period, by August 10, 2015. By local rule, the “[failure to respond within the applicable time period shall indicate that there is no opposition to a motion.” L.R. 7.5. When Doosan failed to respond by August 10, 2015,1 the Court, per L.R. 7.5, granted JCB’s quash motion as unopposed. Doc. 5 (filed August 14, 2015).

On that same day, however, Doosan filed its response. Docs. 6 & 7. It now moves to vacate the Court’s denial Order. Doc. 8. Invoking Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) & (6), it points out that its response actually was due August U, 2015, as JCB served its motion by mail (which gave Doosan three more days to respond). Nevertheless it concedes that it was a day late. But it pleads excusable neglect (response-deadline miscalculations, etc.). Id at 1-4. Opposing, JCB insists, inter alia, that Doo-san “offers no explanation for why all six of [its] lawyers at three different firms failed to check the CM/ECF docket in this Court. Furthermore, the employees to whom [Doosan counsel Michael J.] Locker-by delegated the task of calculating the deadline apparently understood that the response was due on August 10, 2015 plus three days for service, but did not understand what time zone the Court is in.” Doc. 11 at 3 n. 3.

In that procrastination is no stranger to the legal profession, freshly minted lawyers necessarily must learn “The Law of the Last Day” — as in, the last day on which to do something. Missing deadlines, after all, can be fatal. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-57, 111 S.Ct. [1379]*13792546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (condemned prisoner pursuing state habeas relief waived right to federal review, and thus could be executed, after his state habeas counsel negligently missed, by three days, deadline for appealing denial of State ha-beas petition); id. at 754, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (applying Rest. Agency 2d § 242 (1958) (“[MJaster is subject to liability for harm caused by negligent conduct of servant within the scope of his employment”).

Alas, no federalism principles apply in standard commercial litigation disputes like this, _so negligent miscues are more easily forgiven. Doosan is forgiven. There is no jurisdictional or statute of limitations deadline implicated here, and in this context one day constitutes a butterfly fluff in a whirlwind. Doosan’s “relief’ motion (docs. 8 & 10) therefore is GRANTED, the Court’s August 14, 2015 Order (doc. 5) is VACATED, and Doosan’s response brief will be considered.

Some housekeeping matters remain. First, JCB says that it will file a reply brief if the Court rules for Doosan here. Doc. 11 at 2 n. 1. Supplemental briefs are permitted but typically are subject to the “sudden death” rule.2 Given the error that occurred here, however, the Court will allow JCB 14 days from the date this Order is served to file its reply.

Second, JCB remarks that Doosan “inexplicably” filed its Rule 60 motion twice. Doc. 11 at 2 n. 2. The explanation is not on the docket but is worth illuminating here for the benefit of the bar. ’After Doosan filed its motion, doc. 8, the Clerk emailed a memo to its counsel (reproduced in the margin) explaining that the motion was not in “machine readable” format and thus was incompatible with the Court’s E-filing system.3 In response, counsel properly refiled the motion in machine readable format. Doc. 10. The Court uses this opportunity to remind all litigants that they must E-file only machine readable documents.

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Related

Coleman v. Thompson
501 U.S. 722 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Podger v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.
212 F.R.D. 609 (S.D. Georgia, 2003)

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123 F. Supp. 3d 1377, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111644, 2015 WL 5016504, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-construction-equipment-sales-inc-v-clark-equipment-co-gasd-2015.