Millard v. Comm'r

2005 T.C. Memo. 192, 90 T.C.M. 136, 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 192
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedAugust 8, 2005
DocketNo. 3713-04
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2005 T.C. Memo. 192 (Millard v. Comm'r) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Millard v. Comm'r, 2005 T.C. Memo. 192, 90 T.C.M. 136, 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 192 (tax 2005).

Opinion

ARTHUR F. MILLARD, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Millard v. Comm'r
No. 3713-04
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 2005-192; 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 192; 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 136;
August 8, 2005, Filed
*192 Arthur F. Millard, pro se.
Travis T. Vance III, for respondent.
Wells, Thomas B.

THOMAS B. WELLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WELLS, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $ 2,764 in petitioner's Federal income tax for 2001. The issue to be decided is whether petitioner's 2001 gross income includes the amount of a check petitioner received but did not cash in 2001. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code), as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Background

The parties submitted the instant case, fully stipulated, without trial, pursuant to Rule 122. The parties' stipulations of fact are hereby incorporated by this reference and are found as facts in the instant case.

At the time of filing the petition, petitioner resided in Doraville, Georgia. During 2001, petitioner owned an individual retirement account (IRA) with SouthTrust Bank. On May 10, 2001, SouthTrust Bank issued to petitioner a check in the amount of $ 10,841.06 (the original check). SouthTrust Bank debited petitioner's IRA account by $ 10,841.06 and recorded the transaction as a premature distribution. Subsequently, SouthTrust Bank*193 submitted to respondent a 2001 Form 1099-R, reporting a taxable distribution of $ 10,841.06. The records of SouthTrust Bank indicated a zero balance in petitioner's IRA account as of January 15, 2002.

On March 21, 2003, petitioner presented the original check to SouthTrust Bank for payment. SouthTrust Bank canceled the original check but issued petitioner a second check in the amount of $ 10,841.06 (the replacement check), which reflected the current date.

On December 1, 2003, respondent mailed to petitioner's last known address a statutory notice of deficiency with respect to petitioner's 2001 tax year. Respondent determined that a deficiency resulted from petitioner's failure to include the amount of the check in gross income for 2001. In addition to the regular tax liability, respondent determined that a 10-percent additional tax applied to the amount of the check pursuant to section 72(t). Petitioner timely filed a petition with this Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.

Discussion

Respondent contends that the distribution of the original check by SouthTrust Bank constituted an IRA distribution and, consequently, the amount of the original check must be included in*194 petitioner's gross income in the year of receipt. Petitioner concedes that he initiated closure of the IRA account and received the original check from SouthTrust Bank in 2001. However, petitioner contends that, because he did not endorse or negotiate the original check, the account remained open throughout 2001. Relying on articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted by Georgia and related caselaw, petitioner contends that the original check and the underlying funds remained the property of SouthTrust Bank during the year in issue, and, consequently, the receipt of the original check did not constitute the receipt of taxable income by petitioner. The statutes petitioner cites include Ga. Code Ann. secs. 11-3-101 and 11-4-101 (1981). Citing A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Paulk, 25 Bankr. 913 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982), petitioner contends that a check is not a financial statement or money but is evidence of debt. Petitioner also cites United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1979), as illustrative of the proposition of negotiable instruments law that the drawer of a check retains ownership of the check.

Section 61(a)*195 provides that gross income includes all income from whatever source derived, subject only to the exclusions otherwise provided.1 In section 61(a), Congress intended "to exert 'the full measure of its taxing power' and to bring within the definition of income any 'accession to wealth.'" United States v. Burke,504 U.S. 229, 233, 119 L. Ed. 2d 34, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) (citations omitted). Consequently, the definition of gross income has a broad scope, and exclusions are construed narrowly.

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Related

Commissioner v. Jacobson
336 U.S. 28 (Supreme Court, 1949)
United States v. Burke
504 U.S. 229 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Commissioner v. Schleier
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United States v. Joseph Forcellati
610 F.2d 25 (First Circuit, 1979)
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Furstenberg v. Commissioner
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Bluebook (online)
2005 T.C. Memo. 192, 90 T.C.M. 136, 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/millard-v-commr-tax-2005.