FRIEDMAN, Judge.
Mill Service, Inc. (MILL), the operator of an industrial waste treatment, storage and disposal facility in Westmoreland County, filed this interlocutory appeal
from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County. This order, which denied MILL’S motion to dismiss an action brought against it by the Concerned Residents of Yough, Inc. and certain individual members of CRY, Inc. (collectively, CRY), determined that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) was an indispensable party to the
action,
and granted CRY leave to amend its complaint to join DER as an indispensable party while retaining jurisdiction in the Court of Common Pleas. We hold that DER is not an indispensable party and reverse on that issue.
In May 1990, CRY filed suit against MILL in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County alleging various statutory and common law violations by MILL at its Yukon facility in Westmoreland County.
The case was removed to federal court; the federal count was dropped, and the case was remanded to the Court of Common Pleas.
Subsequently MILL filed preliminary objections to the Amended Complaint which included a request to dismiss the Complaint for failure to join an indispensable party, namely DER. The trial court sustained some of the preliminary objections and denied others. Regarding the joinder of DER, the trial court found that CRY’s complaint sought relief which would necessarily involve DER and that DER was an indispensable party to the suit. However, the trial court retained jurisdiction on the theory that inclusion of DER would not deprive the Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction in a citizen suit.
CRY then joined DER as an involuntary plaintiff, and
this appeal followed.
MILL argues that DER should have been joined as an indispensable party defendant rather than as an involuntary plaintiff and that this action must be transferred to Commonwealth Court.
MILL contends that the trial court has attempted to usurp the legitimate exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court over actions against Commonwealth governmental agencies by permitting joinder of DER as an involuntary plaintiff and retaining jurisdiction. On the other hand, CRY and DER argue that DER is not an indispensable party to this action. We agree that DER is not an indispensable party.
Our scope of review of a trial court decision is limited to a determination of whether constitutional rights have been violated or whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Jackson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,
129 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 596, 566 A.2d 638 (1989)
appeal denied,
527 Pa. 656, 593 A.2d 426 (1990).
The trial court relied on
Action Coalition of Elders v. Allegheny County Institution District,
493 Pa. 302, 426 A.2d
560 (1981), and held that DER must be considered an indispensable party.
Action Coalition
attempted to reformulate the traditional indispensable party rule and apply a test balancing the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, the absentee and society.
Action Coalition
was a plurality decision of our Supreme Court which reflected shared concern over the indispensable party rule but lacked precedential value.
Pennsylvania Dental Association v. Insurance Department,
126 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 628, 560 A.2d 870 (1989);
Pennsylvania State Education Association v. Department of Education,
101 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 497, 516 A.2d 1308 (1986). Subsequent to
Action Coalition
we stated that
the joinder of the Commonwealth where it is only tangentially involved is improper.
Scherbick v. Community College of Allegheny County,
479 Pa. 216, 387 A.2d 1301 (1978). Moreover, a Commonwealth agency should not be declared an indispensable party unless meaningful relief cannot conceivably be afforded without the sovereign itself becoming involved.
Springdale Township v. Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment,
78 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 100, 467 A.2d 74 (1983).
Pennsylvania State Education Association,
101 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 501, 516 A.2d at 1310.
In
Royal Indemnity Company v. Department of Environmental Resources,
39 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 322, 395 A.2d 641 (1978), the surety on a bond sought relief from this court over what it perceived to be conflicting demands of DER and a trial court. We held that jurisdiction was properly in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County because DER’s interest did not rise to the level of an indispensable party since meaningful relief could be granted without joining DER.
Id.
In
Royal Indemnity,
DER’s interest was in seeing that the removal of a sanitary sewer line did not violate The Clean Streams Law,
and we held that the trial court’s removal order could not be interpreted as compelling any violation of The Clean Streams Law.
In the case
sub judice,
the trial court looked to whether proceeding without DER would result in duplication of the requirement to defend or whether there would be an incomplete disposition of the matters. In addition, the trial court considered the impact of the relief sought on DER. The trial court concluded that “the
potential
exists for a decision that would require duplication of defenses [and] ... an incomplete and confusing disposition
could
result” (trial court op. at 8) (emphases added) and that some of the relief sought would require the involvement of DER. CRY and DER, on the other hand, argue that
the substantive relief requested is all directed toward Mill Service. What the Plaintiffs primarily want is to have Mill Service remediate any contamination to more stringent levels, to have Mill Service cease operation of the Yukon facility, and to have Mill Service compensate the residents for personal injuries and property damages. In order for the Court to grant this relief, it is not necessary for the Department to be a party to this lawsuit.
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FRIEDMAN, Judge.
Mill Service, Inc. (MILL), the operator of an industrial waste treatment, storage and disposal facility in Westmoreland County, filed this interlocutory appeal
from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County. This order, which denied MILL’S motion to dismiss an action brought against it by the Concerned Residents of Yough, Inc. and certain individual members of CRY, Inc. (collectively, CRY), determined that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) was an indispensable party to the
action,
and granted CRY leave to amend its complaint to join DER as an indispensable party while retaining jurisdiction in the Court of Common Pleas. We hold that DER is not an indispensable party and reverse on that issue.
In May 1990, CRY filed suit against MILL in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County alleging various statutory and common law violations by MILL at its Yukon facility in Westmoreland County.
The case was removed to federal court; the federal count was dropped, and the case was remanded to the Court of Common Pleas.
Subsequently MILL filed preliminary objections to the Amended Complaint which included a request to dismiss the Complaint for failure to join an indispensable party, namely DER. The trial court sustained some of the preliminary objections and denied others. Regarding the joinder of DER, the trial court found that CRY’s complaint sought relief which would necessarily involve DER and that DER was an indispensable party to the suit. However, the trial court retained jurisdiction on the theory that inclusion of DER would not deprive the Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction in a citizen suit.
CRY then joined DER as an involuntary plaintiff, and
this appeal followed.
MILL argues that DER should have been joined as an indispensable party defendant rather than as an involuntary plaintiff and that this action must be transferred to Commonwealth Court.
MILL contends that the trial court has attempted to usurp the legitimate exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court over actions against Commonwealth governmental agencies by permitting joinder of DER as an involuntary plaintiff and retaining jurisdiction. On the other hand, CRY and DER argue that DER is not an indispensable party to this action. We agree that DER is not an indispensable party.
Our scope of review of a trial court decision is limited to a determination of whether constitutional rights have been violated or whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Jackson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,
129 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 596, 566 A.2d 638 (1989)
appeal denied,
527 Pa. 656, 593 A.2d 426 (1990).
The trial court relied on
Action Coalition of Elders v. Allegheny County Institution District,
493 Pa. 302, 426 A.2d
560 (1981), and held that DER must be considered an indispensable party.
Action Coalition
attempted to reformulate the traditional indispensable party rule and apply a test balancing the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, the absentee and society.
Action Coalition
was a plurality decision of our Supreme Court which reflected shared concern over the indispensable party rule but lacked precedential value.
Pennsylvania Dental Association v. Insurance Department,
126 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 628, 560 A.2d 870 (1989);
Pennsylvania State Education Association v. Department of Education,
101 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 497, 516 A.2d 1308 (1986). Subsequent to
Action Coalition
we stated that
the joinder of the Commonwealth where it is only tangentially involved is improper.
Scherbick v. Community College of Allegheny County,
479 Pa. 216, 387 A.2d 1301 (1978). Moreover, a Commonwealth agency should not be declared an indispensable party unless meaningful relief cannot conceivably be afforded without the sovereign itself becoming involved.
Springdale Township v. Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment,
78 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 100, 467 A.2d 74 (1983).
Pennsylvania State Education Association,
101 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 501, 516 A.2d at 1310.
In
Royal Indemnity Company v. Department of Environmental Resources,
39 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 322, 395 A.2d 641 (1978), the surety on a bond sought relief from this court over what it perceived to be conflicting demands of DER and a trial court. We held that jurisdiction was properly in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County because DER’s interest did not rise to the level of an indispensable party since meaningful relief could be granted without joining DER.
Id.
In
Royal Indemnity,
DER’s interest was in seeing that the removal of a sanitary sewer line did not violate The Clean Streams Law,
and we held that the trial court’s removal order could not be interpreted as compelling any violation of The Clean Streams Law.
In the case
sub judice,
the trial court looked to whether proceeding without DER would result in duplication of the requirement to defend or whether there would be an incomplete disposition of the matters. In addition, the trial court considered the impact of the relief sought on DER. The trial court concluded that “the
potential
exists for a decision that would require duplication of defenses [and] ... an incomplete and confusing disposition
could
result” (trial court op. at 8) (emphases added) and that some of the relief sought would require the involvement of DER. CRY and DER, on the other hand, argue that
the substantive relief requested is all directed toward Mill Service. What the Plaintiffs primarily want is to have Mill Service remediate any contamination to more stringent levels, to have Mill Service cease operation of the Yukon facility, and to have Mill Service compensate the residents for personal injuries and property damages. In order for the Court to grant this relief, it is not necessary for the Department to be a party to this lawsuit. To borrow the language of the
Elders
court, relief can be given without the presence of the sovereign.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources, footnote 4, at 8.
See also
Brief of Appellees Concerned Residents of the Yough, Inc. (Cry, Inc.) et al., at 16, 17.
We conclude that the trial court based its determination on an undesirable amount of speculation. As a plurality decision,
Action Coalition
is not binding precedent; therefore, the trial court should not have felt compelled to apply
Action Coalition’s
balancing test, but instead should have referred to the standard which we have enunciated that an indispensable party’s rights must be so closely connected to those of the litigants that an order or decree cannot be made without impairing those rights.
Pennsylvania Dental Association,
126 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 635, 560 A.2d at 873. In this vein we have stated, “a Commonwealth agency should not be declared an indispensable party unless meaningful relief can
not conceivably be afforded without the sovereign itself becoming involved.”
Pennsylvania State Education Association,
101 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 501, 516 A.2d at 1310.
DER is only tangentially involved in this lawsuit; it is neither necessary nor indispensable to a fair and complete resolution of the parties’ rights and responsibilities. The Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County is capable of granting meaningful relief and has jurisdiction over this matter.
Accordingly, we hold that DER is not an indispensable party and reverse the trial court’s order directing the plaintiffs to join the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources as an indispensable party.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 30th day of October, 1992, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources be joined as an indispensable party is hereby reversed.
PALLADINO and PELLEGRINI, JJ., concur in the result only.
KELLEY, J., did not participate in the decision in this case.