Milk House Cheese Corp. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad

73 N.W.2d 679, 161 Neb. 451, 1955 Neb. LEXIS 140
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 16, 1955
Docket33783
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 73 N.W.2d 679 (Milk House Cheese Corp. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Milk House Cheese Corp. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, 73 N.W.2d 679, 161 Neb. 451, 1955 Neb. LEXIS 140 (Neb. 1955).

Opinion

Messmore, J.

This is an action at law brought by the Milk House Cheese Corporation, plaintiff, against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, a corporation, defendant, in the district court for Richardson County to recover damages to plaintiff’s 1951 International L-200 tractor and a 1950 Trailmobile trailer hereinafter referred to as plaintiff’s truck, or truck, or trailer, as occasion requires, in a collision between such truck and a train owned and operated by defendant. The case proceeded to trial before a jury. At the conclusion of all of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict for the reason that the evidence was insufficient on which to base a cause of action against the defendant, and for the further reason that the evidence showed plaintiff’s driver to be guilty of contributory negligence such as to bar any recovery against the defendant as a *453 matter of law. The trial court sustained the motion. From the overruling of the motion for new trial filed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff appeals.

Insofar as necessary to consider here, the plaintiff’s petition alleged damages to plaintiff’s truck proximately resulting from negligence on the part of the defendant. We summarize the charges of negligence as follows: The defendant was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, to see plaintiff’s truck, to stop the train, slacken its speed, or otherwise avoid the collision; in failing to have its locomotive under reasonable control; in running the train at a greater speed than was reasonable and proper under the existing conditions; in failing to ring a bell or sound a whistle between a point 80 rods from the crossing to the crossing as a warning of an approaching train; in failing to have the headlight on the locomotive operating; and in failing to have the automatic signals and gates at the crossing constructed and operating so as to give warning of the approach of the train on the passing track.

The defendant’s answer denied the allegations of negligence set forth in the plaintiff’s petition, and alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence of the driver of plaintiff’s truck who could and should have seen the approaching train in time to have avoided the collision with it, but who failed to properly look and listen for approaching trains, failed to see and hear the train, failed to have his truck under proper control, and failed to stop the truck or avoid a collision, but drove the truck onto the track immediately in front of the train; and that the negligence of the plaintiff was more than-slight in comparison with any negligence on the part of the defendant.

The defendant filed a cross-petition which was dismissed. •

The plaintiff’s reply to defendant’s answer in effect denied the affirmative allegations of negligence contained in the defendant’s answer.

*454 The established rule is that: “A motion for a directed verdict must for the purpose of decision thereon be treated as an admission of the truth of all material and relevant evidence submitted on behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed. Such party is entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in his favor, and to have the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced from the evidence.” McIntosh v. Union P. R. R. Co., 146 Neb. 844, 22 N. W. 2d 179. See, also, Loudy v. Union P. R. R. Co., 146 Neb. 676, 21 N. W. 2d 431.

In addition to the foregoing rule, it is necessary to bear in mind that: “Where the facts adduced to sustain an issue are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it is the duty of the court to decide the question, as a matter of law, rather than submit it to a jury for determination.” Loudy v. Union P. R. R. Co., supra.

The record shows that U. S. Highway No. 75 runs north and south across the defendant’s railroad tracks through Dawson, Nebraska. It is paved with concrete, 21 feet in width, and is practically level from some distance north of the defendant’s railroad crossing and across the same. The defendant’s tracks run east and west through Dawson. The main line track is the north track. The track about 10 feet south of the main line track is the passing track. The third track, approximately 40 feet south of the south rail of the passing track, is the industry track. The east end of the depot is 80 feet west of the west edge of Highway No. 75, and there is an outhouse 180 feet west of the west edge of the highway. There is a yellow railroad crossing sign on the highway approximately 400 feet north of the north rail of the main line.

The defendant, with the approval of the Department of Roads, and Irrigation and the Bureau of Public Roads of the federal government,- constructed a crossing signal at Dawson consisting of automatic gates and lights, *455 that is, a flashing-light signal with a short arm gate for southbound traffic on the north side of the main line about 15 feet west of the highway and about the same distance north of the north rail of the main line. There is also the same type of signal 15 feet south of the industry track and about the same distance east of the east edge of the pavement of the highway. When a train is on the main line approaching the crossing it operates the signal circuit of the crossing equipment. These approach circuits on the main line are governed by the speed of the train so as to operate the signals at a sufficient time in advance of the arrival of a train at the crossing, and continue to operate until the train reaches or is at the opposite side of the crossing when the signal automatically shuts off. The distance at which a train on the main line actuates the signals is about 1,810 feet. On the passing track, siding, or industry track a center section only is placed at such points as Dawson, and the same type of signal is used throughout the defendant’s railroad system. The reason for this is because there are considerable switching movements, trains are broken up on these tracks, and they sit for long periods of time and at various times, which is not the case on the main line. Movements on switch tracks are slow. If there was an approach section on the passing track at Dawson the gates would be down all the time that trains were switching.

The plaintiff owned and operated a 1951 model L-200 International tractor and a 1950 Trailmobile trailer. At the time of the collision, at about 2 p. m., on March 7, 1952, this unit was driven by its employee James H. Moore. The truck was in first-class condition. The length of the tractor and trailer was 44 feet 10 inches. There were six wheels on the tractor and eight on the trailer. The weight of the tractor was about 9,500 to 10,000 pounds. The trailer weighed 11,000 pounds. The gross weight of the cargo of cheese was 33,800 pounds.

The locomotive was silver in color, trimmed in red, and *456 approximately 70 feet in length. The total length of the engine and five cars attached thereto was approximately 400 feet, or a little more.

The crossing signals met all the rules and regulations that govern the same, and there was no change in this respect at the time of the collision on March 7, 1952, nor was the signal equipment out of repair.

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Bluebook (online)
73 N.W.2d 679, 161 Neb. 451, 1955 Neb. LEXIS 140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/milk-house-cheese-corp-v-chicago-burlington-quincy-railroad-neb-1955.