Military Leaves of Absence

12 Pa. D. & C.2d 413
CourtPennsylvania Department of Justice
DecidedSeptember 5, 1957
StatusPublished

This text of 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 413 (Military Leaves of Absence) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Department of Justice primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Military Leaves of Absence, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 413 (Pa. 1957).

Opinion

Thomas D. McBride, Attorney General, and Jerome H. Gerber, Deputy Attorney General,

You have requested an opinion as to the proper interpretation of the Veterans Preference Act of July 8, 1957, P. L. 557. You inquire specifically as to whom the words “regularly employed” apply and more particularly if hourly and per diem employes, employed for less than 750 hours or 100 days per annum are eligible for military, leaves of absence, and whether hourly or per diem ernplóyes employed for greater periods per annum are similarly eligible.

[414]*414The Statutory Construction Aqt.of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, art. Ill, sec. 33, 46 PS §533, states that words and phrases shall be construed according to their common and approved usage, but technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined in the act, shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning. Of course, the troublesome word is “regularly”. In Webster’s New International Dictionary, second edition, page 2099, the word “regularly” is defined as: “In a regular, orderly, lawful, or methodical way; ...”

On this same page we find the word “regular” defined as follows: “3. Steady or uniform in course, practice, or occurrence; not subject to unexplained or irrational variation; returning or recurring at stated or fixed times or uniform intervals; ...”

This particular definition has been approved by several courts: Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of New York v. Blackwell, 260 Ala. 463, 71 S. 2d 267, 270 (1954) ; Ellis v. Stokes, 207 Ga. 423, 61 S. E. 2d 806, 809 (1950). In addition, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Zulich v. Bowman, 42 Pa. 83, 87 (1862), relied upon Webster’s Dictionary to determine the meaning of the adverb “regularly”.

In Miller v. Farmers National Bank, 152 Pa. Superior Ct. 405, 33 A. 2d 646 (1943), the court was called upon to.define “regular employe”, in connection with a workmen’s compensation claim. The facts indicated that decedent was a paperhanger and painter and was directed by the bank to repaint the walls and ceilings of parts of the building. Decedent was to be paid for services at. an hourly rate. The contemplated work would require from 8 to 10 weeks for completion. Some work of a like nature was done in the building, each year in accordance with a definite [415]*415maintenance program and for a number of.years.decedent was employed to do all of this class of work. The court found that decedent,, though his services were intermittent, was a regular employe of the bank. Judge Hirt stated, at page 410:

“. . . One may be a regular employee if he performs all of the work of a class which the employer can supply; full time employment is not essential to take the work out of the class of casual employment. In Cochrane v. William Penn Hotel, supra [339 Pa. 549, 16 A. 2d 43], Mr. Justice Stern said: ‘. . . even though an employment is not continuous, but only for the performance of occasional jobs, it is not to be considered as casual if the need for the work recurs with a fair degree of frequency and regularity, and, it being thus anticipated, there is an understanding that the employee is to perform such work as the necessity for it may from time.to time arise. Even if there be but a single or special job involved, this does not conclusively stamp the employment as casual. If the work is not of an emergency or incidental nature but represents a planned project, and the tenure of the service necessary to complete it and for which the employment is to continue is of fairly long duration, the employment is not casual, and it is immaterial that the accident to the employee for which compensation is sought may occur within a very short period after his entry upon the work.’ . . . Tenure of service may persist throughout the year though the work provided is not continuous. . . .” .

The case of Cochrane v. William Penn Hotel, 339 Pa. 549, 16 A. 2d 43 (1940), was.cited by the court in Gardner Application, 6 D. & C. 2d 742. Here the court was called upon to determine whether the applicant for .a detective license.had been regularly employed as . a detective. The court was willing to-.assume that because the applicant worked about 300 [416]*416hours a year on an hourly basis over a period of three to five years that this constituted regular employment. However, because there' were only sporadic instances of true investigative work connected with the applicant’s work, the court was unable to conclude that he was regularly employed as a detective.

In addition, there are interpretations of the term “regularly employed” as this was used in the Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 600, 65 PS §111, a predecessor of the Veterans Preference Act of July 8-, 1957, P. L. 557, 51 PS §493.1 et seq. For example, a person employed as an extra stenographer was ruled not to be a regular employe: 1917-1918 Op. Atty. Gen. 299, 300. Similarly, a substitute called to perform the duties of one in military service was not considered to be regularly employed, for his tenure was dependent upon the return of the person whose place he was taking: 1917-1918 Op. Atty. Gen. 503. We also note that the Act of June 14, 1947, P. L. 609, amending section 222 of The Administrative Code of April 9, 1929, P. L. 177, granted leave privileges to hourly and per diem employes at a rate of one day for each 200 hours of employment. There was no statutory requirement for a minimum number of hours or days per annum to qualify such employes for this benefit.

From the authorities above cited it is clear that no hard and fast rule can be set forth in defining the term “regularly employed”. However, guide posts are set within which determinations in particular cases are to be made. The answer lies not in the quantum of work involved but in the steadiness and uniformity of recurrence of the employment.

In reaching this conclusion we have not overlooked the provisions of the Act of June 27, 1923, P. L. 858, as amended, 71 PS §1731, which, for the purposes of State employes’ retirement benefits, states:

[417]*417“The term ‘State employe’ 'Shall- also include officers and employes regularly employed on a per diem or hourly basis, or partly at a fixed annual Or monthly salary and partly on a per diem or hourly basis. Regular employment shall not be cpnstrued to include employment of less than one hundred days or seven hundred fifty hours in any year. In all cases of doubt the retirement board shall determine whether any person is a State employe as defined in-this paragraph, and its decision shall be final.”

It is well established that a word or group of words may be given different interpretations in different statutes. The final interpretation depends on the context in which the word is used and, even more significantly, the purpose of the statute. In rejecting the limited definition of regular employment, quoted above, in favor of the more commonly accepted meaning, it should be borne in mind that the Veterans Preference Act of 1957 has two definite purposes. The first and predominant of these is to guarantee reemployment to persons leaving State positions for duty in the military service. In this respect the act is designed to replace the Act of June 7, 1917, supra. Under this latter act the term “regular employment” had received an interpretation in keeping with the common usage of the words.

The second purpose of the present act is to preserve retirement rights of'persons who were called upon to perform military service.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ellis v. Stokes
61 S.E.2d 806 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1950)
Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of New York v. Blackwell
71 So. 2d 267 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1954)
Cochrane v. William Penn Hotel
16 A.2d 43 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1940)
Miller v. Farmers National Bank
33 A.2d 646 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1943)
Zulich v. Bowman
42 Pa. 83 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1862)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 Pa. D. & C.2d 413, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/military-leaves-of-absence-padeptjust-1957.