Miletak v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

District Court, N.D. California·Decided September 2, 2025·No. 5:25-cv-03931·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 NICK MILETAK, Case No. 5:25-cv-03931-PCP

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTIONS v. 9 Re: Dkt. Nos. 25, 26, 27 10 NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 Before the Court are plaintiff Nick Miletak’s motions to (1) strike the Court’s judicial 13 notice of his prior litigation history in its July 11, 2025 order, Dkt. No. 27; (2) disqualify the 14 undersigned judge, Dkt. No. 26; (3) and alter or amend the Court’s prior order denying his 15 motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment, Dkt. No. 25. For the following 16 reasons, each of the motions is denied.1 17 I. Miletak’s motion to disqualify the undersigned judge is denied. 18 Miletak moves to disqualify the undersigned judge from the above-captioned matter 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(1). 20 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United 21 States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 22 questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) provides that a judge should disqualify himself “[w]here he 23 has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary 24 facts concerning the proceeding.” 25 Miletak argues that the Court’s reference to his litigation history in its July 11, 2025 order 26

27 1 Defendants filed a motion to strike Miletak’s declaration in support of his motion for 1 both reflects judicial bias and creates an appearance of prejudgment of his claims. He believes the 2 Court drew improper judgments about his character based on his litigation history. That is 3 incorrect. As explained below, the Court’s judicial notice of the public fact of Miletak’s 4 participation in litigation was proper. The Court adjudicated Miletak’s motions on their merits. 5 Any “reasonable person … who is [not] hypersensitive or unduly suspicious, but rather is a well- 6 informed, thoughtful observer” would not question the undersigned judge’s impartiality based on 7 the Court’s prior order. United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, 8 Miletak’s motion for disqualification is denied. 9 II. Miletak’s motion to strike is denied. 10 Miletak moves to strike the Court’s judicial notice of his prior litigation history in its July 11 11, 2025 order denying his motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment. He 12 argues that the Court made improper inferences about his character, credibility, and legal capacity 13 based on that litigation history. 14 As the Court explained in its prior order, Miletak’s litigation history is judicially noticeable 15 pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 because it “can be accurately and readily determined 16 from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned” and it is “not subject to reasonable 17 dispute.” Pursuant to Rule 201, the Court may take judicial notice of “matters of public record” as 18 long as those matters are undisputed. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689–90 (9th Cir. 19 2001). In its prior order, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that Miletak represented himself 20 in various prior lawsuits. That fact is not in dispute. The Court cited Miletak’s prior experience as 21 a pro se litigant to illustrate its explanation that inability to pay for counsel does not equate to 22 inability to participate in litigation. The Court did not draw any conclusions about Miletak’s 23 character or the merits of his claims based on his litigation history. 24 Because the Court’s judicial notice was proper, Miletak’s motion to strike is denied. 25 III. Miletak’s motion for reconsideration is denied. 26 Miletak moves for reconsideration of the Court’s prior order denying his motion for a 27 preliminary injunction and summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). 1 days after the entry of judgment.” “[T]here are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion 2 may be granted: (1) … to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) 3 ... to present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) ... to prevent manifest 4 injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an intervening change in controlling law.” Allstate 5 Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). Reconsideration is an “extraordinary 6 remedy, to be used sparingly in the interest of finality and conservation of judicial resources …. 7 Indeed, a motion for reconsideration should not be granted absent highly unusual circumstances.” 8 Kona Enters. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Litvinova v. City & 9 Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 18-CV-01494-RS, 2022 WL 4181006 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2022) 10 (“Plaintiffs must satisfy a high bar to prevail on [a] motion for reconsideration, regardless of 11 whether they rely on Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b).”). The party moving to set aside judgment 12 bears the “burden to establish a basis for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) or 60(b).” Yould v. 13 Barnard, 2018 WL 4300523, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2018). 14 Miletak makes several different arguments as to why the Court should reconsider its prior 15 order. Most of these arguments simply restate the points he made in his motions for a preliminary 16 injunction and summary judgment, which the Court rejected. Disagreement with the Court’s 17 decision is not a ground for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Miletak raises three additional 18 arguments: (1) the Court improperly inferred legal capacity from his litigation history; (2) the 19 Court took improper judicial notice of his litigation history; and (3) the Court misapplied 20 California law by requiring a formal insurance claim to trigger insurer’s duty to investigate. For 21 the reasons stated above, the Court rejects the first two arguments. Miletak’s third argument is that 22 his phone call to the defendants on February 4, 2022 was sufficient to put them on notice of his 23 claim and that the Court erred in not recognizing it as such. But, as the Court explained in its prior 24 order, “even if that call were sufficient to constitute notice, it did not occur until more than a year 25 and a half after the commencement of the malicious prosecution lawsuit against Miletak.” That 26 delay caused prejudice to defendants, for the reasons discussed in the Court’s prior order. 27 Miletak has not shown any grounds to justify the “extraordinary remedy” of 1 denied. 2 || IV. Conclusion 3 For the foregoing reasons, Miletak’s motions are denied. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: September 2, 2025 Ay ben~ 7 © P. Casey Fitts 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12

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