MILEAGE REALTY CO., INC. v. Miami Parking Garage, Inc.

146 So. 2d 403
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedNovember 13, 1962
Docket62-38
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 146 So. 2d 403 (MILEAGE REALTY CO., INC. v. Miami Parking Garage, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MILEAGE REALTY CO., INC. v. Miami Parking Garage, Inc., 146 So. 2d 403 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962).

Opinion

146 So.2d 403 (1962)

MILEAGE REALTY CO., INC., a New York Corporation Authorized to Do Business in the State of Florida, Appellant,
v.
MIAMI PARKING GARAGE, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee.

No. 62-38.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

November 13, 1962.
Rehearing Denied December 3, 1962.

Meyer, Weiss, Rosen & Rose, Miami Beach, and Sam Daniels, Miami, for appellant.

Sibley, Grusmark, Giblin, King & Levenson, Miami Beach, for appellee.

Before HORTON, CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.

HORTON, Judge.

This was an action for declaratory decree and specific performance of a net profits rental lease. The appellant, plaintiff below, seeks review of an adverse final decree which (1) found that the lease was clear and unambiguous and did not permit the deduction of ground rent and taxes from gross profits in arriving at net profit; (2) found that the appellant was in default and not entitled to the return of its $100,000 security deposit; and (3) awarded the appellee a money judgment of $57,153.34 as the net profit rental due under the terms of the lease. We reverse.

The appellant leased the property in question for a term of ten years, assuming the terms of a prior ground lease including the obligation to pay yearly some $25,000 in rent and $15,000 in taxes.[1] A security deposit *404 of $100,000 was placed with the appellee to secure the payment of rent and guarantee the appellant's performance of the other covenants and conditions contained *405 in the lease. By the terms of the lease the appellant was to pay, as a "further rental," 50% of the "net profits" received and derived from the operation of any and all business conducted on the premises, to be computed according to a formula contained in a paragraph entitled "net profits." The appellant was required to render semi-annual reports or accountings of net profits and grant the appellee access to its books and records to verify the correctness of these reports. The lease further provided that if the appellant was not in default of any of the terms and conditions on January 1, 1961, the appellee was to return the $100,000 security deposit.

Accounting reports for four years of operation from 1957 to 1961 were duly submitted by the appellant under the terms of the lease. All of these reports disclosed a net loss and no payment of "further rental" was made. The total loss over the four-year period was approximately $65,000. In each of these reports the appellant deducted property taxes and yearly ground rent in computing net profit. Appellee accepted these reports without voicing any objections to their validity or correctness.

On January 1, 1961, the appellant requested return of its $100,000 security deposit and when it was not forthcoming, instituted this action. The appellee answered and counterclaimed alleging (1) that the appellant was in default under the terms of the lease by failing to account for profits; (2) that appellant had negligently and improvidently conducted the business on the leased premises resulting in a loss whereas otherwise it would have shown a profit. The chancellor appointed an accountant and directed him to conduct an independent audit of the appellant's books in accordance with the formula contained in paragraph two of the lease, and render a report reflecting either the net profit or loss for the years 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960. The audit disclosed a net profit of $114,000 and based thereon the chancellor entered the decree appealed.

*406 The appellant contends that the language of the lease and the applicable principles of law relative to the construction of written instruments point up the chancellor's error in construing the lease as disallowing the deduction of ground rent and taxes in computing net profit, and that the terms of the lease are not so clear and unambiguous as to preclude the use of extrinsic aids in construing them to reach a fair and just settlement between the parties. The appellee contends that the terms of the lease are clear and unambiguous and were properly enforced by the chancellor in accordance with their plain meaning, and that any attempt to construe them differently must necessarily result in an improper modification and rewriting of the agreement between the parties.

In Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 119 Fla. 159, 161 So. 284, 295, the Supreme Court of Florida said:

"This court is committed to the doctrine that where the terms of a written contract are in any respect uncertain or doubtful and the parties thereto have by their conduct placed a construction upon the contract which is reasonable, such construction will be adopted by the court upon the principle that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the principles of correct legal interpretation of the terms of the contract."

See also Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, Fla.App. 1961, 131 So.2d 509, 513; Sawyer v. Hime, Fla.App. 1959, 109 So.2d 193, 194; Lalow v. Codomo, Fla. 1958, 101 So.2d 390, 393; Bennett v. Williams, 149 Fla. 4, 5 So.2d 51. We hold that the chancellor erred in failing to apply this rule of practical construction to the case at bar. While it is true that the formula contained in paragraph two of the lease does not specifically refer to the deduction of ground rent and taxes in computing net profits, the tenor of the lease agreement, when read as a whole, does not exclude such deductions although it does exclude certain specified items. This coupled with the fact that the appellee failed to object to the annual accounting reports which on their face clearly showed the questioned deductions, leads us to conclude that the parties by their conduct placed a construction upon the lease which was not shown to be unreasonable or wholly at variance with the principles of correct legal interpretation of the terms of the lease.[2] Any other construction, we feel, might, under the circumstances of this case, ultimately result in an unwarranted and unjust loss of the security deposit.

Accordingly, the decree appealed is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter a decree for the appellant not inconsistent with the views expressed herein.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

NOTES

[1] The pertinent portions of this lease are as follows:

"[Rental] 1. The Lessee herein hereby assumes and agrees to pay to A.J. Henderson, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns, Lessor under said lease of the 3rd day of July, 1948, the sums specified in said lease and said amendment thereto to be paid on January 1, 1957 and on each succeeding July 1st and January 1st thereafter, to and including July 1, 1966, and to pay all taxes as provided in paragraph 3 of said lease under `COVENANTS OF LESSEE', and to carry all insurance as provided by said lease, all of which amounts are hereby agreed to be a part of the rental of said premises, and (for the ten (10) year term of this Lease), to perform all terms and conditions of said lease stipulated therein to be performed by Lessee herein.

"The Lessee will pay to Lessor as further rental, fifty per cent (50%) of the net profits received and derived from the operation of any and all business conducted on said premises by Lessee, its successors or assigns, said net profits to be computed and determined and payable to Lessor as hereinafter provided.

"[Net Profits] 2. Net profits from operation of the business and on the demised premises aforesaid

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146 So. 2d 403, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mileage-realty-co-inc-v-miami-parking-garage-inc-fladistctapp-1962.