IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-01924-SCT
MILDRED ELAINE THOMPSON RAYNER, INDIVIDUALLY AND MICHELLE LYNN RAYNER BYNUM, AS NATURAL MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND OF BILLY JOE DAVID BYNUM, A MINOR v.
SHERIFF RONNIE PENNINGTON, FOR THE COUNTY OF RANKIN, MISSISSIPPI, MICHAEL B. McCARTY, AND JOHN DOES 1-6
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/14/2008 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: GARY LEE WILLIAMS J. EDWARD RAINER ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL JEFFREY WOLF C. ALLEN McDANIEL, III NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/07/2010 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH AND CHANDLER, JJ.
CHANDLER, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Mildred Elaine Thompson Rayner and Michelle Lynn Rayner Bynum, as natural
mother and next friend of Billy Joe David Bynum, a minor (collectively, “Rayner”) filed suit
against Rankin County Sheriff Ronnie Pennington, Deputy Michael B. McCarty, and John
Does 1-6 (Rankin County) pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for injuries stemming from a vehicular accident. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1 to 11-46-23 (Rev.
2002). The Circuit Court of Rankin County granted summary judgment to Rankin County;
Rayner appeals. This Court affirms the grant of summary judgment to Rankin County.
FACTS
¶2. Rayner filed the complaint on March 21, 2007. She alleged that, on the afternoon of
March 22, 2006, Deputy McCarty was in the course and scope of his employment with the
Rankin County Sheriff’s Department when he drove through a red light at the intersection
of Highway 468 and Highway 18 in Brandon, Mississippi, and collided with Rayner’s
oncoming vehicle. Rayner alleged that Deputy McCarty, traveling south on Highway 468,
approached the intersection at an unsafe high speed and failed to yield to oncoming cross-
traffic, which constituted gross negligence and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
others using the intersection. Rayner demanded compensatory damages, punitive damages,
costs, attorneys’ fees, and prejudgment and postjudgment interest.
¶3. Rankin County answered, asserting that it enjoyed immunity under the Mississippi
Tort Claims Act. Rankin County subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment,
asserting that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning its entitlement to
qualified immunity under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(c). That section provides:
A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:
...
(c) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-
2 being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of the injury;
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1) (Rev. 2002).
¶4. In support of the motion, Rankin County attached the accident report and excerpts of
the deposition testimony of Deputy McCarty and of Rayner, and of eyewitnesses Janet Cook
and Marsha Williams. Deputy McCarty testified that he was headed home from the Sheriff’s
Department when he heard a call over the dispatch for a disturbance at Cedar Ridge Trailer
Park, located off Highway 468. The dispatcher did not communicate the nature of the
disturbance. Deputy McCarty told the dispatcher he would be en route with another officer.
He immediately turned on his blue lights and sirens, and headed south on Highway 468 at
about fifty to fifty-five miles per hour toward the intersection of Highway 468 and Highway
18. At the intersection, he slowed and crossed into the oncoming (northbound) lane of
Highway 468, coming to a complete stop at the red light. A vehicle in the eastbound center
turn lane of Highway 18 obstructed his view of the eastbound lane of Highway 18. Deputy
McCarty said he cautiously entered the intersection. He related that he “slowly creeped
forward and stopped, creeped forward and stopped, and creeped forward and stopped,”
keeping a lookout the entire time. Deputy McCarty testified that his blue lights and sirens
were on when he entered the intersection, and that he crept forward at five miles per hour.
Nonetheless, Rayner’s minivan, traveling in the eastbound lane of Highway 18, abruptly
collided with the side of his patrol car. Deputy McCarty said that he never saw the minivan,
because his view was obstructed by the vehicle in the center turn lane of Highway 18.
Deputy McCarty suffered only a minor cut in the crash.
3 ¶5. Cook testified that she was traveling south on Highway 468 when she heard a siren
and observed a patrol car approaching behind her with its blue lights on. She stopped at the
Highway 18 intersection, and the patrol car passed her car, entered the oncoming
(northbound) lane, and stopped at the intersection. Cook observed the patrol car cautiously
enter the intersection, with blue lights flashing, and get hit by a minivan. Cook observed
Deputy McCarty looking left and right several times before the collision. Cook testified that
it appeared that the minivan had not slowed down upon approaching the intersection.
¶6. Williams testified that she was a passenger in her mother-in-law’s car traveling
eastbound on Highway 18.1 They planned to turn south onto Highway 468, but they
observed a patrol car at the intersection with its sirens on and blue lights flashing. They
pulled into the right-turn lane and waited for the patrol car to proceed through the
intersection. Williams observed that the patrol car was stopped at the intersection, and then
it proceeded slowly through the intersection and stopped in the middle. At that point, the
patrol car was struck by a minivan traveling eastbound, from the same direction Williams had
been traveling when she had observed the patrol car and her mother-in-law had pulled over.
It appeared to Williams that the minivan was traveling at the speed limit when it struck the
patrol car.2
¶7. In a response to the summary judgment motion, Rayner attached her complete
deposition; the deposition of Billy Joe Bynum, the father of Rayner’s grandson, Billy Joe
1 In her testimony, Williams confused the directional points of the intersection. For clarity, the Court has corrected the narration of Williams’s testimony to conform to the actual directional points. 2 There is no evidence that Rayner exceeded the posted speed limit.
4 Bynum, Jr.; Deputy McCarty’s deposition; and a copy of certain law enforcement policies
and procedures. Bynum, Jr., aged three, was traveling in the passenger seat of Rayner’s
minivan during the accident. Rayner testified that as she approached the intersection, she
removed her foot from the gas pedal to slow down. She observed some vehicles in the
southbound lane of Highway 468, but it was clear ahead of her. She watched the green light
as she approached the intersection. Then she saw a white flash, and her minivan struck the
patrol car. She testified that she never heard any sirens or saw any blue lights. Rayner
testified that she suffered permanent injuries in the accident. Bynum testified that Bynum,
Jr., received a bump on the head and a seat-belt bruise, from which he fully recovered.
¶8. On July 15, 2008, the trial court granted Rankin County’s motion for summary
judgment, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to how the accident
occurred, and that the evidence showed Deputy McCarty had not acted with reckless
disregard. Thus, the trial court found that Rankin County was entitled to immunity under
Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(c).
¶9. Rayner filed a motion for reconsideration and an amended motion for reconsideration.
The trial court denied the amended motion for reconsideration. Rayner has timely appealed,
arguing that summary judgment was improper.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10. “This Court reviews errors of law, which include the proper application of the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act, de novo.” Fairley v. George County, 800 So. 2d 1159, 1162
(Miss. 2001). We examine all the evidentiary matters before the trial court, including
admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. Bullock v.
5 Life Ins. Co. of Miss., 872 So. 2d 658, 660 (Miss. 2004). We view all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER RANKIN COUNTY WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND IT WAS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY UNDER THE MTCA.
¶11. Rayner argues that genuine issues of material fact were present that Deputy McCarty
acted in reckless disregard of the safety and wellbeing of her and her passenger. Due to the
inherent danger and risk of liability faced by police officers and firefighters, public policy
requires that these actors incur no liability for mere negligence, but only for reckless acts.
Maldonado v. Kelly, 768 So. 2d 906, 909 (Miss. 2000). Accordingly, this Court has held that
“reckless disregard” under Section 11-46-9(1)(c) “embraces willful and wanton conduct
which requires knowingly or intentionally doing a thing or wrongful act.” Turner v. City of
Ruleville, 735 So. 2d 226, 230 (Miss. 1999). Wantonness is a failure to exercise any care.
Maldonado, 768 So. 2d at 910. When analyzing the conduct of police officers under the
MTCA, reckless disregard is a higher standard than gross negligence. Turner, 735 So. 2d
at 230. This Court has defined “reckless disregard” as:
the voluntary doing by motorist of an improper or wrongful act, or with knowledge of existing conditions, the voluntary refraining from doing a proper or prudent act when such act or failure to act evinces an entire abandonment of any care, and heedless indifference to results which may follow and the reckless taking of chance of accident happening without intent that any occur ....
Id. at 229. “Reckless disregard usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to
consequences, amounting almost to a willingness that harm should follow.” Miss. Dep’t of
6 Pub. Safety v. Durn, 861 So. 2d 990, 995 (Miss. 2003) (quoting Maye v. Pearl River
County, 758 So. 2d 391, 394 (Miss. 1999)). Police officers are not liable for negligence,
which is a failure to exercise due care. Maldonado, 768 So. 2d at 910.
¶12. Rayner argues there was no genuine issue of material fact that Deputy McCarty acted
with reckless disregard, because he entered the intersection from an improper lane, against
the red light, and with an obstructed view of the eastbound lane of Highway 18. Rayner
contends that Deputy McCarty should have known there was a strong probability that an
intersection protected by a red light would have a high degree of oncoming traffic. Rayner
also argues that Deputy McCarty’s decision to cross an intersection against the red light in
response to a mere disturbance call contravened Mississippi statutory law and the policies
and procedures of the Rankin County Sheriff’s Department.
¶13. This Court has found on several occasions that a governmental entity waived its
immunity under the MTCA by engaging in acts evincing reckless disregard for the safety and
wellbeing of persons not engaged in criminal activity. In Turner, the Court found that the
plaintiff had stated a claim that an officer had acted with reckless disregard. Turner, 735 So.
2d at 230. The plaintiff had alleged that he was struck by a drunk driver after an officer with
the City of Ruleville Police Department pulled the drunk driver over for erratic driving, but
willfully and wantonly allowed him to continue driving despite his obvious incapacity. Id.
at 227. In City of Jackson v. Lipsey, 834 So. 2d 687, 693 (Miss. 2003), this Court affirmed
a finding of reckless disregard when an officer, responding to a burglary call, turned
suddenly into oncoming traffic without headlights, sirens, or blue lights. In City of Jackson
v. Perry, 764 So. 2d 373, 380 (Miss. 2000), the Court held that an officer, who was not
7 responding to an emergency call, acted with reckless disregard by speeding without blue
lights or sirens activated.
¶14. Rayner cites Maye for the proposition that Deputy McCarty acted in reckless
disregard by proceeding into the intersection despite an obstructed view. In Maye, a deputy
sheriff was backing out of a driveway at the county jail when he backed into another vehicle
that was pulling into the driveway. Maye, 758 So. 2d at 392. The deputy testified that,
although he had checked his mirrors, he could not see the road from the parking lot because
the jail was at a lower elevation than the road. Id. When the other motorist saw the deputy
backing toward her car, the deputy was forty feet away. Id. at 394. The motorist braked and
honked the horn, but the deputy continued backing and collided with her car. Id. at 392. The
deputy admitted he had not seen her car. Id. at 394. The motorist’s car sustained a level of
damage indicating the deputy had backed at a high rate of speed. Id. at 395. This Court held
that the deputy had acted with conscious indifference by backing out of the driveway at a
high rate of speed when he could not see what was behind him. Id. The Court concluded
that, in doing so, the deputy had acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Id.
¶15. Rayner also cites Davis v. Latch, 873 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), in
which an officer approached an intersection in response to a disturbance and struck a car that
made a sudden turn into the intersection. As the officer approached with lights and sirens,
the officer observed the car stopped at the intersection. Id. Although the car did not display
a turn signal, it turned suddenly and collided with the officer’s vehicle. Id. The Court of
Appeals determined that the officer had not acted in reckless disregard because: (1) he had
approached the intersection with his blue lights, wigwags, and sirens activated, (2) nothing
8 had obstructed the officer’s view, (3) the car had no turn signal activated, and (4) the officer
had stopped at two previous intersections because they were blind intersections, which
showed his appreciation for the risk involved in crossing an intersection in an emergency.
Id. at 1063. Rayner argues that, unlike in Davis, the fact that Deputy McCarty’s view was
obstructed proves that he acted with reckless disregard in crossing the intersection.
¶16. In response to this contention, Rankin County cites Maldonado, in which this Court
held that a deputy sheriff did not act in reckless disregard in crossing an intersection with a
partially obstructed view. Maldonado, 768 So. 2d at 911. The deputy sheriff was driving
his patrol car to a service shop for maintenance. Id. at 908. He approached an intersection
protected by a two-way stop sign and known to be a dangerous intersection. Id. The deputy
sheriff came to a complete stop, looked both ways, proceeded, and was struck by an
oncoming vehicle. Id. The deputy sheriff testified that his view of the oncoming traffic was
partially blocked by a water tower. Id. The Court held that, unlike in Maye, Turner, and
Perry, the deputy sheriff had not deliberately disregarded the risk inherent in crossing the
intersection. Id. at 911. Rather, the deputy sheriff “was aware of the nature of the
intersection and took steps to avoid the collision” by stopping and looking both ways before
proceeding. Id. The court held that, although the deputy sheriff may have been negligent
in proceeding despite his partially obstructed view, that act was negligent at most. Id.
¶17. Certain statutes apply when an emergency vehicle attempts to cross an intersection
past a red light. A statute provides that:
The driver of any authorized emergency vehicle when responding to an emergency call upon approaching a red or stop signal or any stop sign shall slow down as necessary for safety but may proceed cautiously past such red
9 or stop sign or signal. At other times drivers of authorized emergency vehicles shall stop in obedience to a stop sign or signal.
Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-315 (Rev. 2004). A complementary statute provides that: “[u]pon
the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle, when the driver is giving
audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or bell, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield
the right-of-way . . . and shall stop and remain in such position until the authorized
emergency vehicle has passed . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-809(1) (Rev. 2004).
¶18. We turn to the evidence in this case. Rayner asserts that her own testimony created
a disputed issue of material fact regarding whether Deputy McCarty had his lights and sirens
on. In Lipsey, there was conflicting testimony on this point from the officer, who testified
that he had his vehicle’s lights and sirens on when entering a road, and from the injured
motorist, who testified that the officer’s vehicle had displayed no lights or sirens. Lipsey,
834 So. 2d at 690. Here, testimony on this question from Deputy McCarty and eyewitnesses
Cook and Williams stated that Deputy McCarty had his lights and sirens on. In fact,
Williams was traveling from the same direction as Rayner, and she heard the sirens and
yielded to Deputy McCarty’s patrol car. Rayner testified that she heard no sirens and did not
see any blue lights; however, Rayner testified that she had not detected the presence of the
patrol car at all before the collision. Indeed, Rayner testified that, as she entered the
intersection, she was looking up at the green light. Because she never detected the patrol car,
Rayner could not have known whether or not it had lights and sirens on. Thus, there was no
conflicting evidence as to whether or not the deputy had initiated lights and sirens as in
Lipsey. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rayner, there is no genuine issue
10 of material fact as to whether Deputy McCarty’s lights and sirens were on, as every witness
who observed his patrol car perceived the lights and sirens.
¶19. Further, it was undisputed that, although Deputy McCarty’s view was obstructed due
to the vehicle stopped in the center turn lane, he appreciated the danger from oncoming
traffic and proceeded cautiously by keeping a lookout and slowly creeping into the
intersection. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 63-3-809(1), all drivers given an audible
signal by an emergency vehicle shall yield the right-of-way. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-809(1)
(Rev. 2004). In light of this statute, which requires other drivers to yield to an emergency
vehicle, Deputy McCarty’s precautionary measures of looking both ways and cautiously
creeping into the intersection evinces that Deputy McCarty appreciated the risk involved in
crossing the intersection. He proceeded cautiously, on the alert for oncoming traffic, but he
also relied upon his lights and sirens to alert oncoming traffic of his control of the
intersection. Indeed, these safety measures effectively alerted Williams and her mother-in-
law, who reached the intersection just ahead of Rayner, noticed the lights and sirens, and
appropriately yielded right-of-way to the patrol car. Reckless disregard is the “entire
abandonment of any care,” while negligence is the failure to exercise due care. Maldonado,
768 So. 2d at 910; Turner, 735 So. 2d at 229. Deputy McCarty’s safety measures aptly
demonstrate that he exercised care in crossing the intersection. His cautiously proceeding
across the intersection despite an obstructed view was, at most, a failure to exercise due care.
Therefore, Deputy McCarty’s conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard.
¶20. Rayner next argues that Deputy McCarty acted in reckless disregard because his
actions violated Mississippi Code Section 63-3-315 and the policies and procedures of the
11 Rankin County Sheriff’s Department. Mississippi Code Section 63-3-315 permits the driver
of an authorized emergency vehicle to cross an intersection against a red light when
responding to an emergency call. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-315 (Rev. 2004). Rayner
contends that, although Deputy McCarty was driving an authorized emergency vehicle, he
lacked authorization to cross the intersection under Mississippi Code Section 63-3-315
because he was responding to a “disturbance,” not an “emergency call.” She also cites a
portion of the policies and procedures of the Rankin County Sheriff’s Department, which
provides:
Patrol Activities:
Response to some calls may require several deputies to effectively and safely control the situation. These situations may include but are not limited to:
1. An assault on an officer;
2. On-scene arrest for a violent offender;
3. A potential or actual resistance to arrest;
4. Use of force incident;
5. A violent or potential violent crime in progress;
6. A fleeing suspect; or
7. Domestic Abuse Incidents.
8. Motor vehicle accidents.
The first responder must exercise discretion in determining the best course of action. These options range from immediate intervention to identification and reporting. The safety of deputies and innocent life will always be a prime factor when considering options.
12 Rankin County Law Enforcement Policies and Procedures, § 3.1 Patrol Functions & Tactics.
Rayner argues that Deputy McCarty acted in violation of these policies, because he was not
a first responder, and he was not responding to one of the eight listed situations. Rayner
argues that Deputy McCarty’s violation of Mississippi Code Section 63-3-315 and
departmental policies was inherently reckless.
¶21. Rankin County contends these arguments are procedurally barred because Rayner
failed to raise them before the trial court. However, in her response to the motion for
summary judgment, Rayner clearly raised these arguments and attached supporting
documentation. Therefore, these arguments are not procedurally barred.
¶22. Rayner argues that if an emergency vehicle drives past a red light in response to a
report of a “disturbance,” instead of a report specifying an “emergency call,” Mississippi
Code Section 63-3-315 is violated. Rayner argues that not every situation deemed a
“disturbance” would permit emergency driving measures under Mississippi Code Section 63-
3-315, because a “disturbance” could constitute something as innocuous as a dog barking.
There is no caselaw construing the term “emergency call” as used in Section 63-3-315. Nor
is there any evidence disclosing what the disturbance might have been in this case. The term
“disturbance” certainly could include an innocuous situation such as a dog barking. But on
the other hand, a “disturbance” could just as easily signify domestic violence or another
dangerous situation requiring a swift response. Rayner bears the burden to prove that Deputy
McCarty acted in reckless disregard. Rayner has not submitted any proof that the situation
to which Deputy McCarty was responding was of such an insignificant nature that he acted
in reckless disregard by crossing the intersection against the red light.
13 ¶23. Rayner cites no authority for her contention that Deputy McCarty’s violation of law
enforcement policies was equivalent to acting in reckless disregard. It appears that Rayner
is arguing that the existence of a police policy that prohibits the course of action taken by the
officer constitutes proof that the officer acted with reckless disregard. In City of Ellisville
v. Richardson, 913 So. 2d 973, 977-78 (Miss. 2003), this Court articulated a ten-part test for
reckless disregard that includes, as a factor, the existence of a police policy that prohibits
pursuit under the circumstances. However, the ten-part test is used for evaluating whether
an officer acted in reckless disregard in connection with a police pursuit. City of Jackson
v. Spann, 4 So. 3d 1029, 1033 n.7 (Miss. 2009). This case does not involve a police pursuit.
Moreover, the evidence lends no support to Rayner’s contention that Deputy McCarty
violated the Rankin County Sheriff’s Department’s law enforcement policies. Deputy
McCarty testified that he and another officer were responding to the disturbance call. Rankin
County’s policy states that responding to some calls may require several deputies, and that
the situations requiring a response from multiple deputies are not limited to the eight listed
situations. The Court finds this argument to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶24. The Court finds no genuine issue of material fact and affirms the judgment of the
Rankin County Circuit Court that Rankin County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The evidence of how the collision occurred was not in genuine dispute. Deputy McCarty
stopped at the intersection and, with his blue lights and sirens activated, slowly proceeded
across in a stop-and-start fashion. His safety measures were sufficient to prompt other
drivers near the intersection to yield the right-of-way, including the driver traveling in the
14 lane ahead of Rayner. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rayner, nothing
about Deputy McCarty’s conduct demonstrated a conscious indifference to consequences
equating to almost a willingness that harm should result. Deputy McCarty’s safety measures
showed that he exercised care in crossing the intersection, and his conduct did not rise to the
level of reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of persons not engaged in criminal
activity under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(c). We affirm the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Rankin County granting summary judgment to Rankin County.
¶25. AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.