Miko Kerr v. Camille Boden

Ninth Circuit

Miko Kerr v. Camille Boden

668 F. App'x 211

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 5, 2016

Docket14-55901

StatusUnpublished

This text of 668 F. App'x 211 (Miko Kerr v. Camille Boden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Miko Kerr v. Camille Boden, 668 F. App'x 211 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Miko Kerr appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kerr’s action because Kerr failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (though pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (a party’s conclusory allegations need not be accepted as true); see also Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015) (requirements of a § 1983 claim); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir, 1992) (requirements of a § 1985(3) claim)

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,

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MEMORANDUM **

Miko Kerr appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kerr’s action because Kerr failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (though pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (a party’s conclusory allegations need not be accepted as true); see also Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015) (requirements of a § 1983 claim); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir, 1992) (requirements of a § 1985(3) claim)

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,

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668 F. App'x 211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miko-kerr-v-camille-boden-ca9-2016.

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