Mikhelson v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.

2025 Ohio 2524

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 17, 2025
• Docket: 114458
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Mikhelson v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2025-Ohio-2524.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IGOR MIKHELSON, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 114458 v. :

DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPT. OF JOB AND : FAMILY SERVICES, ET AL., : Defendants-Appellees.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 17, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-24-996928

Appearances:

Igor Mikhelson, pro se.

David Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Laurence R. Snyder, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Director, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

Claimant-appellant, Igor Mikhelson, appeals from a judgment of the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas affirming the decision of the

Unemployment Compensation Review Commission (“Commission”), finding that Mikhelson fraudulently misrepresented his earnings with the intent of obtaining

unemployment compensation to which he was not entitled. Mikhelson raises seven

assignments of error for our review:

1. The trial court did not apply the correct definition of fraud to the case.

2. The trial court did not recognize that the appellant was not able to resolve potential fraud issues in the beginning of the problem due to a malfunctioning unemployment system, and system reporting errors.

3. The trial court did not recognize that, after the telephone hearing, the Appellant’s weeks of fraud were reduced from 22 to 20.

4. The trial court did not recognize that the Appellant over reported his earnings in addition to underreporting which were ignored.

5. The trial court failed to ensure proper legal procedures for an in person hearing to address the significant language barrier that caused comprehension issues.

6. The trial court did not consider all the reasons why the applicant failed to report wages correctly.

7. The trial court failed to recognize the errors, delays, and miscalculations made by ODJFS.

After review, we conclude that the Commission’s finding that

Mikhelson fraudulently reported his wages for 22 weeks was not unlawful,

unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. We further conclude

that although the Commission removed two of the original 22 weeks, it added two

additional weeks from April 2021 and, therefore, the Commission and the trial court

did not err when they determined that Mikhelson underreported his wages for 22

weeks. We also find no error in the format of the hearing. Finally, there is no

indication in the record that the Commission failed to recognize errors made by ODJFS. Accordingly, we remand the matter to ODJFS for it to recalculate

Mikhelson’s overpayment and penalty based on the Commission’s decision

modifying ODJFS’s redetermination.

I. Procedural History and Factual Background

Mikhelson lost his job at Shulte Hospitality Group in March 2020,

because of Covid-19. He applied for unemployment compensation in April 2020.

At the time of his application, he was still employed part time at M&Y Care, L.L.C.

(“M&Y Care”). ODJFS approved Mikhelson’s application for unemployment

compensation from April 2020 to April 2021.

In March 2023, Mikhelson received a determination letter from

ODJFS, stating that he had fraudulently misrepresented his earnings from M&Y

Care when filing his weekly claims for unemployment compensation from August 8,

2020, through March 27, 2021, and that he had been overpaid benefits to which he

was not entitled. ODJFS informed Mikhelson that he owed a total of $9,191.25 in

backpay and mandatory penalties. Mikhelson appealed the determination.

ODFJS issued a redetermination in January 2024, affirming its original

determination issued in March 2023. Mikhelson again appealed. The matter was

transferred to the Commission, which held a hearing in late February 2024. Three

witnesses appeared at the hearing: Todd Keller, Director of Human Resources at

M&Y Care; Eugenia Alexander, Fraud Investigator at ODJFS; and Mikhelson. At the telephonic hearing, Keller testified to Mikhelson’s hourly rate

and to the number of hours that Mikhelson worked each week for the weeks ending

on August 8, 2020, through April 10, 2021.

During Mikhelson’s testimony, he explained that he reported his net

pay for the weeks at issue rather than his gross pay. The hearing officer asked

Mikhelson why he reported his net pay for each week when the form “says report

your gross earnings.” Mikhelson replied that he “just didn’t look” at it.

The Commission issued a decision in late February 2024, modifying

ODJFS’s redetermination. It found that Mikhelson overreported his earnings for

the weeks ending August 8, 2020, and August 15, 2020, and, therefore, Mikhelson

did not commit fraud for those two weeks. However, the Commission found that

Mikhelson fraudulently misrepresented and underreported his earnings to ODJFS

between $24 and $70 each week for 22 weeks, specifically, for the weeks ending

August 22, 2020, through September 26, 2020; the weeks ending November 28,

2020, through February 20, 2021; and the weeks ending March 27, 2021, through

April 10, 2021. The Commission noted that Mikhelson “denied any fraudulent

intent and testified that the error occurred because he accidentally reported his net

earnings instead of his gross earnings.” But the Commission explained that when

Mikhelson “was asked why he would repeatedly do this, when every week the new

claim form clearly asks for gross wages, [he] could not provide a reasonable

response.” The Commission remanded the matter to ODJFS to recalculate

Mikhelson’s overpayment and penalty based on its decision. The Commission

denied Mikhelson’s request for further review, and Mikhelson appealed the matter

to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.

The common pleas court affirmed the Commission’s decision, finding

that it was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the

evidence. It is from this judgment that Mikhelson now appeals.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

R.C. 4141.282(H) governs our standard of review and states that “[i]f

the court finds that the decision of the commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or

against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the

decision, or remand the matter to the commission. Otherwise, the court shall affirm

the decision of the commission.” See also Geretz v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family

Servs., 2007-Ohio-2941, ¶ 10, quoting Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Admin., Ohio

Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 697 (1995) (“‘[A] reviewing court may

reverse the board’s determination only if it is unlawful, unreasonable, or against the

manifest weight of the evidence.’”). This standard of review applies to “all reviewing

courts, from the first level of review in the common pleas court, through the final

appeal” in the Ohio Supreme Court. Tzangas at 696.

When reviewing a decision from the Commission, we must refrain

from making factual findings or weighing the credibility of witnesses and must instead determine whether the evidence in the certified record supports the

Commission’s decision. Id., citing Irvine v. State Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 19

Ohio St.3d 15, 18 (1985). If such evidence is found, the reviewing court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. Wilson v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of

Rev., 14 Ohio App.3d 309, 310 (8th Dist. 1984). “‘[T]he fact that reasonable minds

might reach different conclusions is not a basis for the reversal of the

[Commission’s] decision.’” Tzangas at 697, quoting Irvine at 18.

Thus, we must review the Commission’s decision to determine

whether it was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the

evidence. When determining whether a decision is against the manifest weight of

the evidence, “‘[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines

whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [decision] must be

reversed . . . .’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v.

Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).

We note that in this case, Mikhelson frames each of his assigned errors

as challenging the trial court’s judgment, i.e., the common pleas court’s judgment.

But according to R.C. 4141.282(H), this court must focus on the decision of the

Commission rather than the judgment of the common pleas court. Ricks v. Dir.,

Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Serv., 2013-Ohio-3253, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing Hertelendy v. Great Lakes Architectural Serv. Sys., 2012-Ohio-4157, ¶ 16 (8th

Dist.). Thus, we will reframe Mikhelson’s arguments as necessary.

B. Fraud

In his first, second, fourth, and sixth assignments of error, Mikhelson

argues that the Commission’s decision was unlawful, unreasonable, and against the

manifest weight of the evidence because ODJFS did not establish that he acted with

fraudulent intent.

1. Fraudulent Intent

Mikhelson argues in his first assignment of error that the evidence

proved he was “confused in filing his application for benefits.” He further asserts

that his mistake was because of “the language barrier and his limited understanding

of how to complete the forms correctly.”

In support of his argument, Mikhelson cites R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(d) and

Diliberto v. Admr., O.B.E.S., 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2859 (8th Dist. Jul. 20, 1989).

In Diliberto, this court relied on R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(d), explaining that it “deals with

fraud and unemployment compensation benefits.” Id. at *4. We stated that this

provision provides that a claimant commits fraud when “‘[h]e has knowingly made

a false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report any material fact

with the object of obtaining benefits to which he is not entitled.’” Id., quoting former

R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(d). We concluded in Diliberto that there was no evidence of

“specific intent on the part of the appellant to obtain unemployment benefits.” Id.

at *5. However, the General Assembly repealed R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(d) in

2005 Am.Sub.S.B. 81, effective September 2005. Because Diliberto relied on this

subsection, the case is no longer good law.

Mikhelson further claims that ODJFS did not establish the elements

of common law fraud, specifically fraudulent intent. In Johnson v. Ohio Bur. of

Emp. Servs., 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2177 (8th Dist. May 14, 1998), this court

rejected the claimant-appellant’s argument that “the common law standard of

scienter (i.e., specific subjective intent to defraud)” applied. Id. at *9. We explained

that fraud that arises under R.C. 4141.35 is “‘a special statutory proceeding,’” and

therefore, the common law definition of fraud did not apply. Id. at *9, quoting Ridel

v. Bd. of Review, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 14014 (7th Dist. May 9, 1980). Although

this court relied on R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(d) in Johnson, which has been repealed, we

also relied on R.C. 4141.35(A), which is still in effect.

R.C. 4141.35(A) provides that “[i]f the director of job and family

services finds that any fraudulent misrepresentation has been made by an applicant

for or a recipient of benefits with the object of obtaining benefits to which the

applicant or recipient was not entitled,” then the director “shall,” among other

things, (1) reject or cancel such person’s entire weekly claim for benefits that was

fraudulently claimed, (2) “declare that, for each application for benefit rights and for

each weekly claim canceled, such person shall be ineligible for two otherwise valid

weekly claims for benefits, claimed within six years subsequent to the discovery of

such misrepresentation,” (3) “require that the total amount of benefits rejected or canceled . . . be repaid to the director before such person may become eligible for

further benefits,” and (4) assess a mandatory penalty equal to 25 percent of the total

amount of benefits that were fraudulently received. R.C. 4141.35(A)(1)-(4).

We explained in Johnson that fraud under R.C. 4141.35(A) “‘simply

refers to the making of a statement that is false, where the party making the

statement does or should know that it is false.’” Id. at *10, quoting Ridel. Courts

may infer a claimant’s “‘intent to commit fraud . . . from intrinsic or extrinsic

evidence, as well as from the surrounding circumstances.’” Id. at *11, quoting

Christie v. Admr., 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3875, *8-9 (11th Dist. Sept. 6, 1996). And

whether “a party engaged in a fraudulent act is a factual determination” that may

not be disturbed “if there is some credible proof upon which the [Commission’s]

decision was based.’” Id., quoting id.

In this case, Mikhelson testified that he reported his net wages rather

than his gross wages because he “just didn’t look” at it. He did not state that he did

not understand the weekly form because of language barriers or otherwise. He did

not tell the hearing officer that he could not read the form because of language

barriers or otherwise. He simply stated that he did not look at it.

The Commission rejected Mikhelson’s assertion that “the error

occurred because he accidentally reported his net earnings instead of his gross

earnings,” finding that Mikhelson’s response that he “just didn’t look at it” was

unreasonable. After review, we conclude that there is evidence in the certified

record supporting the Commission’s decision. Therefore, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the Commission. Tzangas, 73 Ohio St.3d at 696, citing Irvine,

19 Ohio St.3d at 19.

2. Malfunctioning Unemployment System

In his second assignment of error, Mikhelson argues that the

Commission failed to recognize that he was not able to resolve potential fraud issues

“in the beginning of the problem due to a malfunctioning unemployment system,

and system reporting errors.” We disagree. The majority of Mikhelson’s testimony

regarding the “malfunctioning unemployment system” was in response to the

hearing officer’s questions with respect to the timeliness of Mikhelson’s original

appeal. The Commission accepted Mikhelson’s claims that he filed his appeal

untimely because of technical issues. (The Commission found that Mikhelson filed

the appeal timely despite filing it over three months late.)

3. Mistake Regarding Number of Weeks

In his fourth and sixth assignments of error, Mikhelson claims that

the Commission failed to consider “all the reasons why [he] failed to report wages

correctly” and did not consider that he overreported his earnings in two of the 22

weeks at issue and, thus, he only committed fraud for 20 weeks and not 22 weeks.

He further claims that because he overreported his income and because M&Y Care

also made mistakes when reporting his wages, these facts prove that he “did not

intentionally take money from the government.” Again, we disagree.

The Commission modified ODJFS’s determination and

redetermination after considering Keller’s testimony regarding the wages Mikhelson earned during the reporting weeks versus what Mikhelson reported he

earned. Ultimately, the Commission found that Mikhelson overreported his

earnings for two of the reporting weeks at issue (in August 2020) and therefore

removed two of the original 22 weeks. But then the Commission found that

Mikhelson underreported his earnings for two additional weeks that ODJFS did not

originally include (in April 2021), which resulted in 22 weeks total. Thus, the

Commission considered all the evidence that was presented at the hearing as well as

Mikhelson’s arguments.

4. Conclusion

Mikhelson fraudulently reported his wages for 22 weeks was not unlawful,

unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, Mikhelson’s

first, second, fourth, and sixth assignments of error are without merit and are

overruled.

C. Remaining Arguments

In his third assignment of error, Mikhelson claims that the common

pleas court made an incorrect factual statement when it concluded that the

Commission found that he underreported his earnings for 22 weeks instead of 20

weeks. Again, upon appeal to this court, we review the Commission’s decision and

not the common pleas court’s judgment. But we will briefly address this argument.

Mikhelson seems to be claiming that the common pleas court did not consider the

fact that the Commission removed two of the weeks as fraud because it found that Mikhelson overreported his earnings for two weeks in August 2020. We disagree.

As we previously stated, although the Commission removed two of the original 22

weeks, it added two additional weeks from April 2021. Thus, the trial court was

correct when it stated that the Commission found that Mikhelson underreported his

wages for 22 weeks. Mikhelson’s third assignment of error is therefore overruled.

In his fifth assignment of error, Mikhelson argues that the

Commission did not consider the fact that there was a “significant language barrier

that caused comprehension issues.” He asserts that he “has limited English

proficiency” and therefore, the hearing officer should have held an in-person

hearing. We disagree. The Review Commission notified Mikhelson that his hearing

before the Commission would be telephonic. The notice further informed him that

if he wished to have an in-person hearing, he had to request one within ten days of

receiving the notice. The record reflects that he did not do so.

Mikhelson further argues that the hearing officer should have

provided bilingual services to him. The transcript reveals, however, that Mikhelson

did not raise the issue of language comprehension to the hearing officer at the

hearing. Moreover, nowhere in the transcript does it appear as if Mikhelson could

not speak English properly or could not understand it. Mikhelson answered each of

the hearing officer’s questions appropriately.

Mikhelson’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

In his seventh assignment of error, Mikhelson’s entire argument

states: Another argument is that when looking at all these checks, the Appellate figured out the core of the issue, but the court did not try to go through these checks again to understand what was happening. The court ignored the fact that M & Y Care LLC. the one who issued the checks, provided incorrect amounts, and the court did not mention this in its reasoning.

Again, we review the Commission’s decision and not the trial court’s

judgment. Although Mikhelson claims that M & Y Care provided incorrect amounts,

Mikhelson testified at the hearing and did not dispute the accuracy of the wages

reported. We therefore find no merit to his argument.

We have also reviewed the Commission’s decision and conclude that

it was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Mikhelson’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed. Case remanded to ODJFS to recalculate

Mikhelson’s overpayment and penalty based on the Commission’s decision

modifying ODJFS’s edetermination.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________ MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, J., and MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR