Mikhail, Rafik v. FedEx Supply Chain, Inc.

Opinion

FILED Aug 25, 2026 12:15 PM(CT) TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Rafik Mikhail Docket No. 2024-50-1447

v. State File No. 16062-2020

FedEx Supply Chain, Inc., et al.

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims Thomas L. Wyatt, Judge

Affirmed and Certified as Final

In this compensation appeal, the employee questions the trial court’s order finding his injuries resulted from an “Act of God” and are therefore not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law. The employee was sheltering in place at work during a tornado when a wall fell on him, causing injuries. The employer apparently provided certain benefits before denying the claim, and, after unsuccessful mediation, the employer filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by a statement of undisputed material facts, to which the employee responded. Following a hearing, the court issued an order finding that the employer had negated an essential element of the employee’s claim and that the burden of production had shifted to the employee to establish disputed issues of material fact such that summary judgment would be inappropriate. The court found that the employee did not meet this burden, granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The employee has appealed. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s order and certify it as final.

Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Rafik Mikhail, employee-appellant, pro se

Jamie Elizabeth Glass, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, FedEx Supply Chain, Inc.

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Factual and Procedural Background

The facts underlying the occurrence of the subject injuries are not in dispute. On March 3, 2020, Rafik Mikhail (“Employee”) was working for FedEx Supply Chain, Inc. (“Employer”), in Mt. Juliet, Tennessee, when a large and destructive tornado touched down. While Employee was sheltering in place at Employer’s facility, a wall fell on him, resulting in various injuries. On March 6, 2025, over five years later, Employee filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits, indicating he needed “additional treatment and medications” and asserting that he had not received medical treatment from Employer. On June 24, a dispute certification notice was issued, identifying compensability, medical benefits, and temporary and permanent disability benefits as disputed issues. As an affirmative defense, Employer contended that a tornado is an “Act of God” and that Employee’s injuries are not compensable.

Although Employer had apparently paid certain workers’ compensation benefits after the incident, it subsequently denied the claim in July 2025. Employer indicated that permanent partial disability benefits that had been paid since June 23, 2023, would no longer be paid moving forward.1 Employee then filed a request for a scheduling hearing. On October 28, the parties agreed that the court should not schedule the case for trial until after it had ruled on a dispositive motion Employer intended to file. As a result, the trial court set deadlines applicable to Employer’s filing of a motion for summary judgment. After those deadlines expired, Employer filed its dispositive motion, in which it argued that this case was a “straightforward application of Tennessee’s [‘Act of God’] doctrine” and pointed to Employee’s acknowledgment that he was sheltering in place at work when a tornado struck the building and caused a wall to collapse, resulting in his injuries. Employer asserted that injuries caused by natural forces not within Employer’s control are not compensable unless the employment exposed the worker to a hazard greater than that experienced by the general public and that Employee would not be able to establish that fact in this case. Employer contended that, to survive summary judgment, Employee must present evidence that the employment subjected him to a peculiar or increased risk of injury from an “Act of God” than that encountered by others in the community.

In response, Employee attempted to offer into evidence a newspaper article and map comparing the path of the 2020 tornado to the similar paths of tornadoes in the 1990s. Employee apparently sought to show that Employer was put on notice of an increased risk to its employees from tornadoes. However, the court excluded those documents based on objections by Employer. Following a compensation hearing, the trial court concluded that, based on Employee’s agreement with its undisputed facts, Employer had “negated an essential element of [Employee’s] claim by showing he was injured by the impact of [the]

1 The Notice of Denial, Employee’s medical records, and evidence of Employer’s payments of benefits are not included in the record on appeal. This information was gleaned from Employer’s original and amended motions for summary judgment filed on February 20, 2026, and March 12, 2026, respectively.

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tornado,” which the court agreed was an “Act of God.” As a result, the court found that the burden shifted to Employee to present sufficient evidence of a genuine issue of material fact such that summary judgment would be inappropriate. The court determined that Employee did not meet his burden, granted Employer’s motion, and dismissed Employee’s case. Employee has appealed.

Standard of Review

The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law that we review de novo with no presumption that the trial court’s conclusions are correct. See Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015). As such, we must “make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Id. Moreover, a trial court has broad discretion to control the pace of litigation and set hearings to address pre-trial motions. Valladares v. Transco Prods., Inc., Nos. 2015-01-0117 & -0118, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 31, at *26 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 27, 2016) (“a trial court has the necessary discretion to control the pace of litigation through the use of case supervision and docket management”); see also Smith v. Smith, No. E2017-01295- COA-R3-CV, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 59, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019) (“trial courts have broad discretion to control their dockets”).

Analysis

In his notice of appeal, Employee contends that his injuries are compensable under Tennessee’s workers’ compensation laws.2 However, he did not file a brief on appeal and, thus, has offered no factual or legal arguments explaining how he believes the trial court erred in granting Employer’s motion and dismissing the case.

As stated by the Tennessee Supreme Court, “[i]t is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her.” Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). When an appellant fails to offer substantive arguments on appeal, an appellate court’s ability to conduct meaningful appellate review is significantly hampered. Holmes v. Ellis Watkins d/b/a Watkins Lawn Care, No. 2017-08-0504, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 7, at *3-4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 13, 2018). Moreover, “where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal

2 On May 20, 2026, Employee’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as attorney of record. We issued an order on May 21 remanding the case to the trial court to “rule on counsel’s motion,” after which jurisdiction would automatically vest in this Board upon the “filing of a notice of appearance or the expiration of the time allowed for [Employee] to obtain new counsel.” On May 26, the court granted Employee’s attorney’s motion to withdraw and gave Employee until July 10, 2026, to obtain new counsel. On July 8, Employee filed a motion for an extension of time to retain counsel, which the trial court denied in an order entered on July 17.

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argument, the issue is waived.” Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 615. In sum, it is not our role to search the record for possible errors or to formulate a party’s legal arguments where that party has provided no meaningful argument or authority to support its position. Cosey v. Jarden Corp., No. 2017-01-0053, 2019 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 3, at *8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 15, 2019). As our appellate courts have explained, were we to search the record for possible errors and raise issues and arguments for Employee, we would be acting as her counsel, which the law prohibits. See, e.g., Webb v. Sherrell, No. E2013-02724-COA-R3-CV, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015).

When a properly-supported motion for summary judgment has been filed, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of one or more genuine issues of material fact at the summary judgment stage that would support the need for a trial. Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265. In considering an order granting summary judgment, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993). Moreover, we review the trial court’s decision with no presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s conclusions. See Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 250. In considering whether an employee has come forward with sufficient evidence of a disputed issue of material fact, we consider whether the alleged fact in dispute “must be decided in order to resolve the substantive claim or defense at which the motion is directed.” Id. at 215. A genuine issue of material fact exists if “a reasonable [factfinder] could legitimately resolve that fact in favor of one side or the other.” Id.

Here, Employer’s motion for summary judgment was supported by a statement of undisputed facts that Employee acknowledged were true. Those facts included that Employee sustained injuries when a wall collapsed during a tornado. Thus, the court concluded that Employer negated an essential element of Employee’s claim by establishing that his injuries arose primarily out of an “Act of God” (i.e., a tornado) rather than his employment. Once the court determined that Employer had negated an essential element of Employee’s claim, Employee bore the burden of establishing that there were genuine factual disputes related to whether the employment placed him at an increased risk of injury. See Hill v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 512 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tenn. 1974). The trial court found Employee did not meet this burden of production. Based on our de novo review of the record as a whole, we agree. Thus, we conclude Employer negated an essential element of Employee’s claim, and Employee did not come forward with evidence sufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and dismissing Employee’s claim, and we certify it as final. Costs on appeal have been waived.