Mikel Young v. United Parcel Service, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. Texas
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03558
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION MIKEL YOUNG, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:25-cv-3558-B-BN § UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, ET AL., § § Defendants. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Mikel Young filed a pro se complaint alleging retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Dkt. No. 3. And Senior United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred Young’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. Young moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Dkt. No. 5. And the undersigned entered an order and notice of deficiency (“NOD”) explaining that the verified financial information in Young’s IFP motion prevented a finding that requiring Young to pay the $405 filing fee would cause undue financial hardship, particularly given the inconsistencies in the information provided, and requiring that Young pay the filing fee by February 23, 2026. See Dkt. No. 6. And the Court warned Young that, “failure to timely follow the directions in this order subjects this lawsuit to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” Id. at 4. Although it has now been more than a month since the court-imposed deadline to pay the filing fee, Young has not paid the fee or filed anything further in this action. Considering this record, the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should deny the IFP motion and dismiss

this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Discussion The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “was designed to ensure that litigants would not be deprived of meaningful access to the federal judicial system due to their financial circumstances.” Bucklew v. St. Clair, No. 3:18-cv-2117-N-BH, 2019 WL 2250886, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2019) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)), rec. accepted, 2019 WL 2249718 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2019). But, to gain access,

“[a] litigant seeking IFP status must submit an affidavit identifying all assets he possesses, as well as a statement that he is unable to pay the necessary fees of bringing a federal civil action.” Smith-Garcia v. Harrison Cnty., 776 F. App’x 226, 227 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)). The Court must then examine the financial condition of the applicant in order to determine whether the payment of fees would “cause undue financial hardship.”

Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988). “This entails a review of other demands on individual [applicants’] financial resources, including whether the expenses are discretionary or mandatory.” Id. And, while “[t]he term ‘undue financial hardship’ is not defined and, therefore, is a flexible concept[,] ... a pragmatic rule of thumb contemplates that undue financial hardship results when prepayment of fees or costs would result in the applicant’s inability to pay for the ‘necessities of life.’” Walker v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, No. 1:08-CV-417, 2008 WL 4873733, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2008) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)); see also Williams v. Louisiana, Civ. A. No. 14-00154-BAJ-EWD, 2017 WL

3124332, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 14, 2017) (noting that the applicable standard “requires a showing of more than an inconvenience to the applicant” (citations omitted)). “[W]hether the litigant is ‘unable to pay’ the costs [associated with initiating a lawsuit also] ... depend[s] in part on [the] litigant’s actual ability to get funds from a spouse, a parent, an adult sibling, or other next friend.” Williams v. Spencer, 455 F. Supp. 205, 209 (D. Md. 1978); see Fridman v. City of New York, 195 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“In assessing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a

court may consider the resources that the applicant has or can get from those who ordinarily provide the applicant with the necessities of life, such as from a spouse, parent, adult sibling or other next friend.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Pisano v. Astrue, No. 11-30269-KPN, 2012 WL 79188, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 2012) (collecting cases). And a financial affidavit that is either “incomplete” or “internally inconsistent”

is insufficient to find that a movant qualifies for leave to proceed IFP. Muhammad v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., Civ. A. No. 09-3431, 2009 WL 3150041, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2009) (citing Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[W]here the in forma pauperis affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility, the court should first docket the case and then proceed to the question ... of whether the asserted claim is frivolous or malicious.”); collecting cases). These legal standards were set out in the NOD sent to Young. See Dkt. No. 6. And as also set out in the NOD, see id. at 3, Young’s IFP motion and financial affidavit inconsistently state that he is currently being paid $3,600 per month by Penske

Logistics either since November 23 or since November 2023, that he expects to receive $3,000 next month in employment, and that his average monthly income for the past 12 months was $2,800. See Dkt. No. 5 at 1, 2. This information also contradicts his assertion in the complaint that he has “not worked one day since UPS learned about the complaint with EEOC.” Dkt. No. 3 at 4. Young reports no dependents, and assuming that to be true, the applicable poverty guideline for an individual in Texas for 2026 is $15,960. See Annual Update

of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 91 Fed. Reg. 1797, 1798 (Jan. 15, 2026). So even taking the lowest of the employment income amounts provided, Young’s reported annual income of $33,600 is more than twice the federal poverty guideline. See Logan v. Logan, No. 4:23-cv-1252-P, 2023 WL 9052109, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2023) (“The Court has discretion to make [IFP] decision guided by an array of considerations and (most importantly) informed by the federal poverty guidelines.” (citing Prows v.

Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988))). Considering the IFP motion as filed, the undersigned cannot recommend that the IFP motion be granted consistent with the legal standards set out above. The record here further support dismissal under Rule 41(b), which “authorizes the district court to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or comply with [a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court order.” Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); accord Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure to comply with a court order); Rosin

v. Thaler, 450 F. App’x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute); see also Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 798, 800-01 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that the text of Rule 41(b) does not extend to a failure to comply with a court’s local rule insofar as that violation does not also qualify as a failure to prosecute (discussing Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1992))). This authority “flows from the court’s inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins.

Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)); see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua sponte whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 631)); Campbell, 988 F.3d at 800 (“It is well

established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal not only on motion of the defendant, but also on the court’s own motion.” (citing Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing, in turn, Link, 370 U.S. at 631))). And the Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding pro se, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Wright v. LBA Hospitality, 754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in turn, Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981))).

A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. See Long v. Simmons, 77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996). Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.’” Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also Long, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser sanctions would be futile); cf. Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that “lesser sanctions” may “‘include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings’” (quoting Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))). “When a dismissal is without prejudice but ‘the applicable statute of limitations probably bars future litigation,’” that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is reviewed as – “a dismissal with prejudice.” Griggs, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441); see, e.g., Wright, 754 F. App’x at 300 (affirming dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially effectively with prejudice – where “[t]he district court had warned Wright of the consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second chance at obtaining service’” but she “disregarded that clear and reasonable order”). By not complying with the NOD – in addition to leaving the impression that Young no longer wishes to pursue these claims – Young has prevented this action

from proceeding and has thus failed to prosecute this lawsuit. A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is therefore warranted under these circumstances. Because the undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile, as the Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until such time as Young decides to obey the Court’s order or contact the Court, the Court should exercise its inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and sua

sponte dismiss this action without prejudice under Rule 41(b). Insofar as this dismissal may prejudice Young, these findings, conclusions, and recommendation afford notice, and the opportunity to file objections (further explained below) affords an opportunity to respond, to explain why this case should not be dismissed for the reasons set out above. Cf. Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on

its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)). Recommendation The Court should deny Plaintiff Mikel Young leave to proceed in forma pauperis and, because he has already been ordered to pay the filing fee but failed to do so, dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. □□□□ P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: March 26, 2026

DAVIDL.HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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