Mike Morath in His Official Capacity as the Commissioner of Education v. Kingsville ISD

Court of Appeals of Texas

Mike Morath in His Official Capacity as the Commissioner of Education v. Kingsville ISD

DecidedDecember 13, 2024

Docket15-24-00007-CV

StatusPublished

This text of Mike Morath in His Official Capacity as the Commissioner of Education v. Kingsville ISD (Mike Morath in His Official Capacity as the Commissioner of Education v. Kingsville ISD) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Mike Morath in His Official Capacity as the Commissioner of Education v. Kingsville ISD, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

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Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-24-00007-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/13/2024 5:58 PM No. 15-24-00007-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK ____________________________________________________ FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/13/2024 5:58:29 PM OF TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE ____________________________________________________ Clerk

Michael Morath, in his Official Capacity as Texas Commissioner of Education Appellant v.

Kingsville Independent School District, et al. Plaintiff-Appellee School Districts

and Pflugerville Independent School District, et al. Intervenor-Appellee School Districts ____________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 419th District Court of Travis County ____________________________________________________

Appellee School Districts’ Joint Brief Regarding Jurisdiction ____________________________________________________

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

The Appellee School Districts respectfully submit this supplemental brief

requested by the Court on the issue of whether Section 39.151 of the

Education Code deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.

Appellees recognize that jurisdictional issues may be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. LLC v. Chaparral Energy,

LLC, 546 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tex. 2018). But it is telling that the Commissioner,

who has been ably represented by experienced legal counsel throughout this

case, has never argued that Section 39.151 deprives the courts of jurisdiction

in this case. There are at least six reasons why such an argument lacks merit

and cannot be adopted by this Court.

First, the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine does not apply

to ultra vires claims. Lazarides v. Farris, 367 S.W.3d 788, 798 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see also City of Houston v. Williams, 99

S.W.3d 709, 717 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (explaining

the related principle that exhaustion of administrative remedies is also not

required when an agency attempts to exercise authority beyond its statutorily

conferred powers); Jackson v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 S.W.2d 396,

401 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no writ) (same).; Jones v. Dallas

Indep. Sch. Dist., 872 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied)

(same). That makes sense because properly understood, ultra vires claims

are not exceptions to immunity; “rather, when a governmental officer is sued

for allegedly ultra vires acts, governmental immunity does not apply from

the outset.” Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d

154, 158 n.1 (Tex. 2016). Here, Appellees have alleged ultra vires claims. The

2 Legislature could have written a single statute that said, “The Commissioner

may assign A-F Ratings whenever and however he would like to do so.” The

Legislature did not create that scenario for unfettered bureaucratic

discretion in the A-F ratings process. (In other words, the Legislature did not

declare Calvinball “rules” for such an important process.) Instead, the

Legislature adopted a detailed A-F ratings process that requires the

Commissioner to implement the accountability system by adopting rules in

a manner that provides a transparent, effective, and fair system. See Tex.

Educ. Code §§ 39.001–39.408.

Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when the

case is “controlled by pure questions of law.” Clint Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez,

487 S.W.3d 538, 545–46 (Tex. 2016). If there were fact questions in this case

regarding the temporary injunction or plea to the jurisdiction, the Court

would be required to defer to the trial court’s resolution of any conflicting

evidence, see Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002),

and “indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in” favor of

the school districts. See Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133

S.W.3d 217, 229 (Tex. 2004). But in this case, the Commissioner has not

disputed any of the evidence. The issues in this case present pure questions

of law that can be decided based on the undisputed evidence in the record.

3 Third, even if the exhaustion doctrine did apply, the text of the statute

forecloses any exhaustion of administrative remedies argument. Section

39.151 provides no avenue to challenge the Commissioner’s actions in this

case. Section 39.151(a) states that the Commissioner “by rule shall provide

a process for a school district or open-enrollment charter school to challenge

an agency decision made under this chapter relating to an academic or

financial accountability rating that affects the district or school, including a

determination of consecutive school years of unacceptable performance

ratings.” Tex. Educ. Code § 39.151(a) (emphasis added). Appellees are

unaware of any rule the Commissioner adopted for the 2022–23 school year

that provided any process for them to challenge the Commissioner’s actions

described in the pleadings in this case. The Commissioner has not identified

any such rule.

Fourth, even if the exhaustion doctrine applied and the Commissioner

had adopted rules, the rules would not have allowed school districts to

challenge the Commissioner’s ultra vires actions. At the time of the hearing

no accountability rules for the 2022–23 school year had been adopted.

However, the Commissioner had published proposed rules, which were later

adopted, and those rules do not provide an administrative appeal that would

have allowed school districts to challenge the Commissioner’s adoption or

4 implementation of the accountability system. 3 RR 1023 (Intervenors’

Exh. 16). The proposed 2023 Accountability Manual (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7),

which had not been adopted at the time of the underlying hearing,

contemplated an appeals process that would not have allowed school

districts to challenge the Commissioner’s ultra vires actions. Indeed, the

proposed rules state that “a successful accountability appeal is usually

limited to such rare cases as a data or calculation error attributable to the

testing contractor(s), a regional education service center (ESC), or the Texas

Education Agency (TEA). 3 RR 252 (P7, 000244). The proposed manual

further states that “[t]he basis for appeals should be a data or calculation

error attributable to TEA, an ESC, or the testing contractor(s).” 3 RR 253 (P7,

000245).1

Fifth, even if the exhaustion doctrine applied and the Commissioner had

adopted rules that would have allowed school districts to raise the issues in

this lawsuit in that administrative appeal, exhaustion would not be required

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