NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MINGIEDI FAMILIA MIGUEL; D.P.M.; No. 24-6451 M.P.M.; A.M.P.; ARLETH MAVINGA Agency Nos. PEDRO MIGUEL, A246-768-480 A246-768-476 Petitioners, A246-768-496 A246-768-497 v. A246-768-498 TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted April 22, 2026 Seattle, Washington
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Mingiedi Familia Miguel (“Petitioner”) and his family
(collectively, “Petitioners”) seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
We deny the petition.
Where, as here, “the BIA ‘adopts and affirms’ the IJ’s decision and provides
its own analysis,” “[w]e review both the IJ and the BIA decisions.” Chmukh v.
Garland, 124 F.4th 670, 674 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Alcaraz-Enriquez v. Garland,
19 F.4th 1224, 1229 n.2 (9th Cir. 2021)). When reviewing the agency’s persecution
determination, we “review the entirety of the agency’s conclusions—both the
underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to those findings—for
substantial evidence.” Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845, 851 (2026). Under
the substantial-evidence standard, “findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. at 850
(quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)).
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum based on past
persecution. To establish eligibility for asylum, Petitioners must “demonstrate a
likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’”
Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). “Proving past persecution requires the petitioner to show, among
1 Miguel is the lead petitioner. His wife Arleth Mavinga Pedro Miguel and their three children A.M.P., D.P.M., and M.P.M. are seeking relief through him.
2 24-6451 other elements, that ‘his treatment rises to the level of persecution.’” Id. at 1060
(quoting Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir. 2021)).
The record supports the BIA’s and IJ’s conclusion that the harms Petitioner
experienced do not constitute past persecution.
First, while Petitioner testified to developing high blood pressure, stomach
ulcers, and weight loss after escaping a police shooting at a political demonstration
he helped organize, Petitioner did not allege that he or his family were “subject to
‘significant physical violence,’” or “suffered serious injuries that required medical
treatment.” See id. at 1061 (citation omitted).
Second, the repeated death threats that the police communicated through
Petitioner’s employee were indirect, unfulfilled, and did not cause significant
suffering. See Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2021)
(“Mere threats, without more, do not necessarily compel a finding of past
persecution.”); Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Although death threats against an individual may be sufficient to constitute
persecution, most threats do not rise to the level of persecution.” (citations omitted));
Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]hreats may be
compelling evidence of past persecution, particularly when they are specific and
menacing and are accompanied by evidence of violent confrontations, near-
confrontations and vandalism.”). The police threatened Petitioner only in Cafunfo,
3 24-6451 which is a 10-hour drive away from where he was living in Luanda. These threats
lack the level of confrontation and harm that we have previously recognized as
compelling a finding of past persecution. See, e.g., Corpeno-Romero v. Garland,
120 F.4th 570, 578–79 (9th Cir. 2024); Ruano v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 1155, 1160–61
(9th Cir. 2002); Mashiri, 383 F.3d at 1119–20.
Third, Petitioner’s arguments that the BIA failed to conduct a cumulative-
effect review and that the economic harm he experienced from the police’s
destruction of his business should have been included in the cumulative-effect
analysis are unavailing. The record shows that the BIA did consider the cumulative
effect of the incidents, including whether the destruction of Petitioner’s business
threatened his life or freedom.
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum based on a
well-founded fear of future persecution. “Absent evidence of past persecution,” the
petitioner “must establish a well-founded fear of future persecution by showing both
a subjective fear of future persecution, as well as an objectively ‘reasonable
possibility’ of persecution upon return to the country in question.” Duran-Rodriguez
v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019). “To demonstrate a fear of future
persecution on account of a political opinion, an asylum applicant must show (1)
that he holds a political opinion; (2) that his political opinion is known to his
4 24-6451 persecutors; and (3) that the persecution will be on account of his political opinion.”
Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007).
Even assuming Petitioner has a subjective fear of future persecution, the
record does not demonstrate that there is an objectively reasonable possibility of
future persecution upon his return to Angola.
First, Petitioner argues that the BIA erred in its future persecution analysis by
not considering that he was hiding in Luanda during the COVID-19 pandemic and
suppressing his political opinion. However, the BIA’s conclusion that the
government was uninterested in seeking Petitioner out is supported by the evidence
that Petitioner stayed in his home in Luanda for two years while Petitioner’s wife
went out and worked, even though Petitioner’s area of residence was on his
identification documents and neighbors knew where he lived.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MINGIEDI FAMILIA MIGUEL; D.P.M.; No. 24-6451 M.P.M.; A.M.P.; ARLETH MAVINGA Agency Nos. PEDRO MIGUEL, A246-768-480 A246-768-476 Petitioners, A246-768-496 A246-768-497 v. A246-768-498 TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted April 22, 2026 Seattle, Washington
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Mingiedi Familia Miguel (“Petitioner”) and his family
(collectively, “Petitioners”) seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
We deny the petition.
Where, as here, “the BIA ‘adopts and affirms’ the IJ’s decision and provides
its own analysis,” “[w]e review both the IJ and the BIA decisions.” Chmukh v.
Garland, 124 F.4th 670, 674 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Alcaraz-Enriquez v. Garland,
19 F.4th 1224, 1229 n.2 (9th Cir. 2021)). When reviewing the agency’s persecution
determination, we “review the entirety of the agency’s conclusions—both the
underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to those findings—for
substantial evidence.” Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845, 851 (2026). Under
the substantial-evidence standard, “findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. at 850
(quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)).
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum based on past
persecution. To establish eligibility for asylum, Petitioners must “demonstrate a
likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’”
Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). “Proving past persecution requires the petitioner to show, among
1 Miguel is the lead petitioner. His wife Arleth Mavinga Pedro Miguel and their three children A.M.P., D.P.M., and M.P.M. are seeking relief through him.
2 24-6451 other elements, that ‘his treatment rises to the level of persecution.’” Id. at 1060
(quoting Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir. 2021)).
The record supports the BIA’s and IJ’s conclusion that the harms Petitioner
experienced do not constitute past persecution.
First, while Petitioner testified to developing high blood pressure, stomach
ulcers, and weight loss after escaping a police shooting at a political demonstration
he helped organize, Petitioner did not allege that he or his family were “subject to
‘significant physical violence,’” or “suffered serious injuries that required medical
treatment.” See id. at 1061 (citation omitted).
Second, the repeated death threats that the police communicated through
Petitioner’s employee were indirect, unfulfilled, and did not cause significant
suffering. See Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2021)
(“Mere threats, without more, do not necessarily compel a finding of past
persecution.”); Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Although death threats against an individual may be sufficient to constitute
persecution, most threats do not rise to the level of persecution.” (citations omitted));
Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]hreats may be
compelling evidence of past persecution, particularly when they are specific and
menacing and are accompanied by evidence of violent confrontations, near-
confrontations and vandalism.”). The police threatened Petitioner only in Cafunfo,
3 24-6451 which is a 10-hour drive away from where he was living in Luanda. These threats
lack the level of confrontation and harm that we have previously recognized as
compelling a finding of past persecution. See, e.g., Corpeno-Romero v. Garland,
120 F.4th 570, 578–79 (9th Cir. 2024); Ruano v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 1155, 1160–61
(9th Cir. 2002); Mashiri, 383 F.3d at 1119–20.
Third, Petitioner’s arguments that the BIA failed to conduct a cumulative-
effect review and that the economic harm he experienced from the police’s
destruction of his business should have been included in the cumulative-effect
analysis are unavailing. The record shows that the BIA did consider the cumulative
effect of the incidents, including whether the destruction of Petitioner’s business
threatened his life or freedom.
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum based on a
well-founded fear of future persecution. “Absent evidence of past persecution,” the
petitioner “must establish a well-founded fear of future persecution by showing both
a subjective fear of future persecution, as well as an objectively ‘reasonable
possibility’ of persecution upon return to the country in question.” Duran-Rodriguez
v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019). “To demonstrate a fear of future
persecution on account of a political opinion, an asylum applicant must show (1)
that he holds a political opinion; (2) that his political opinion is known to his
4 24-6451 persecutors; and (3) that the persecution will be on account of his political opinion.”
Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007).
Even assuming Petitioner has a subjective fear of future persecution, the
record does not demonstrate that there is an objectively reasonable possibility of
future persecution upon his return to Angola.
First, Petitioner argues that the BIA erred in its future persecution analysis by
not considering that he was hiding in Luanda during the COVID-19 pandemic and
suppressing his political opinion. However, the BIA’s conclusion that the
government was uninterested in seeking Petitioner out is supported by the evidence
that Petitioner stayed in his home in Luanda for two years while Petitioner’s wife
went out and worked, even though Petitioner’s area of residence was on his
identification documents and neighbors knew where he lived. Though Petitioner hid
during the COVID-19 pandemic, that does not change the fact the police were aware
of Petitioner’s political affiliation and his general location but appeared to make no
efforts to seek him out in Luanda during that two-year period. Petitioner’s argument
that the BIA impermissibly speculated that Petitioner would be able to resume
political activity within Luanda is also unpersuasive, because we afford substantial
deference to the agency’s factual finding regarding Petitioner’s future ability. See
Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 586, 590 (BIA 2015) (“[A]n Immigration Judge’s
5 24-6451 predictive findings of what may or may not occur in the future are findings of
fact[.]”); Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 552 n.4 (9th Cir. 2023).
Second, Petitioner briefly argues that the BIA erred by failing to apply the
presumption that where the persecutor is the government, internal relocation would
not be reasonable. Petitioner did not raise this argument before the BIA, so we need
not consider it. See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“[B]efore a petitioner can raise an argument on appeal, the petitioner must first raise
the issue before the BIA or IJ.”). This argument nevertheless fails on the merits
because the BIA did not suggest that Petitioner should relocate, but rather
determined that it would be safe for him to remain in Luanda and therefore he did
not establish a meritorious asylum claim.
3. Petitioner’s arguments for withholding of removal and CAT protection are
predicated on his asylum claim. Petitioner did not establish a sufficient showing for
asylum and therefore does not demonstrate the level of harm required for
withholding of removal and CAT protection. See Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073,
1085–86 (9th Cir. 2021); Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1146–48 (9th Cir.
2021).
We affirm the BIA’s denial of Petitioners’ asylum, withholding of removal,
and CAT protection applications.
6 24-6451 PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.2
2 The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 13) is denied.
7 24-6451