Miguel Quinteros v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 18-73514
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 11 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIGUEL ANGEL QUINTEROS, AKA No. 18-73514 Miguel Quintero, AKA Miguel A. Quintero, Agency No. A205-719-012 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 9, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, M. SMITH, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Miguel Angel Quinteros, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of

a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an Immigration

Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for withholding of removal and relief under

the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1252. We deny the petition.

Where, as here, “the BIA expressed agreement with the reasoning of the IJ,

this court reviews both the IJ and the BIA’s decisions.” Kumar v. Holder, 728

F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). The court reviews the agency’s “legal conclusions

de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence.” Bringas-Rodriguez v.

Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted). Under

the substantial evidence standard, we will reverse the agency “only on a finding

that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”

Diaz-Torres v. Barr, 963 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Reyes v. Lynch,

842 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016)).

1. The agency properly denied Quinteros withholding of removal based

on his membership in the proposed particular social group of “men age 25 to 30

returning from the United States who had been targeted for forced recruitment by

gangs.” Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Quinteros did not

present sufficient evidence that Salvadoran society perceives this group as socially

distinct. See Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2020)

(explaining that one of the “requirements for a cognizable group” is “social

distinction”).

The agency also properly denied Quinteros withholding of removal based on

his membership in “family Quinteros.” Substantial evidence supports the agency’s

2 determination that the threats and subsequent murder of Quinteros’ father by his

neighbor, several decades ago, do not establish that Quinteros suffered past

persecution. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2010)

(While “harm to a petitioner’s close family members or associates may be relevant

to assessing whether the petitioner suffered past persecution, we have not found

that harm to others may substitute for harm to an applicant.”). Substantial

evidence also supports the agency’s finding that Quinteros failed to show his fear

of future persecution on this basis was objectively reasonable because he did not

establish that it would not be reasonable for him to relocate in El Salvador. See 8

C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2).

2. Quinteros’ CAT claim fails because the record does not compel the

conclusion that it is “more likely than not” that he would be tortured if removed to

El Salvador by or with the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government. See Lopez

v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17).

3. Quinteros also contends that (1) under Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396

(9th Cir. 2019), he is entitled to a de novo hearing on his cancellation of removal

application; and (2) his membership in a certified class action permits him to file

an asylum application. We cannot consider these arguments. As Respondent

argues, Quinteros did not raise these issues before the BIA and thus failed to

exhaust administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Suate-Orellana v.

3 Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding that although the

administrative exhaustion requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is not

jurisdictional, it is a mandatory claim-processing rule that a court must enforce if a

party raises the issue).

PETITION DENIED.