Miguel Omar Ojeda-Enriquez v. Warden, LCC, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: September 29, 2025
• Docket: 2:18-cv-01207
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 MIGUEL OMAR OJEDA-ENRIQUEZ, Case No. 2:18-cv-01207-RFB-NJK

8 Petitioner, ORDER

9 v.

10 WARDEN, LCC, et al.,

11 Respondents.

12 In Miguel Omar Ojeda-Enriquez’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition, he challenges 13 his convictions for the sexual assault of a child, arguing that his sentence violated his constitutional 14 rights and that his plea counsel was ineffective. See ECF No. 45. Respondents move to dismiss 15 one ground in the Petition as unexhausted/procedurally barred. See ECF No. 50. Because the Court 16 defers consideration of whether the claim is procedurally defaulted to the merits adjudication, the 17 motion to dismiss is denied. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 In November 2012, in the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, Nevada, 20 Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault on a child under the age of fourteen. See 21 ECF No. 46-29. The state district court sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 35 years to life 22 in prison. See ECF No. 46-31. Judgment of conviction was entered on January 24, 2013. See ECF 23 No. 46-32. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions in July 2013, and the 24 Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of his state post-conviction habeas corpus petition in 25 December 2017. See ECF Nos. 57-2; 48-13. 26 Petitioner commenced this federal habeas petition in July 2018. See ECF No. 8. The Court 27 granted his motion for appointment of counsel and Petitioner ultimately filed the Second Amended 28 Petition through the Federal Public Defender in December 2024. The petition raises the following 1 grounds:

2 Ground 1: The plea and conviction are invalid because Petitioner’s sentence 3 violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

4 Ground 2: Trial counsel was ineffective for allowing Petitioner to enter into a plea agreement that was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 5

6 Ground 3: Counsel was ineffective for failing to present substantial mitigation evidence at sentencing. 7 ECF No. 45 at 9-22. 8 Respondents now move to dismiss ground 3 of the Petition as unexhausted/procedurally 9 barred. See ECF No. 50. 10 II. DISCUSSION 11 A. Ground 3 Is Unexhausted, and the Court Defers a Determination on Procedural 12 Default to the Merits Review 13 Petitioner acknowledges that he has not fairly presented ground 3—the claim that counsel 14 ineffectively failed to present substantial mitigation evidence at sentencing—to the Nevada state 15 courts.1 See ECF No. 55 at 2. He agrees that the claim is technically exhausted and procedurally 16 barred because the Nevada courts would not consider the claim on the merits if he tried to return 17 to state court. He insists instead that he can overcome the procedural default of ground 3 under 18 Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 19 A state prisoner who fails to comply with state-law procedural requirements in presenting 20 his claims in state court is barred by the adequate and independent state ground doctrine from 21 obtaining a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731– 22 32 (1991). Where a procedural default constitutes an adequate and independent state ground for 23 denial of habeas corpus, the default may be excused only if “a constitutional violation has probably 24 resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,” or if the prisoner demonstrates cause 25 for the default and prejudice resulting from it. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). 26 Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may serve as adequate cause. See 27 1A claim is not exhausted unless the petitioner has presented to the state court the same operative facts and 28 legal theory upon which his federal habeas claim is based. Bland v. Calif. Dept. of Corr., 20 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994). 1 Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012). “Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance 2 of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will 3 not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, 4 in the initial review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was 5 ineffective.” Id. at 17; see also Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 423 (2013) (regarding the showing 6 necessary to overcome a procedural default under Martinez). 7 Here, Petitioner argues that he can demonstrate cause and prejudice to overcome the 8 procedural bars because his state post-conviction counsel was ineffective, and the claim is 9 substantial. Respondents dispute that his postconviction counsel performed deficiently and that he 10 was prejudiced under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Respondents also dispute 11 that the claim is substantial under Martinez. 12 Because the question of procedural default is intertwined with the underlying merits of the 13 claim, full merits briefing may assist the Court with its determination, and best serves judicial 14 efficiency. Therefore, the Court defers a decision on whether ground 3 is procedurally defaulted 15 from federal review to the merits adjudication.

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 I. CONCLUSION 2 Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 50) is 3 | DENIED. The Court defers a determination on whether ground 3 is procedurally barred to the 4| merits review. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents have 60 days from the date this order is 6 | entered within which to file an answer to the Second Amended Petition. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner has 45 days following service of 8 | Respondents’ answer in which to file a reply. 9 10 DATED: September 28, 2025.

13 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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