Miguel Gonzalez v. Sabrina Henry

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: January 15, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-0593
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed January 15, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0593 Lower Tribunal No. 21-8594-FC-04 ________________

Miguel Gonzalez, Appellant,

vs.

Sabrina Henry, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ivonne Cuesta, Judge.

Miguel Gonzalez, in proper person.

No appearance, for appellee.

Before EMAS, LOBREE and GOODEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 61.13(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2024) (“Unless otherwise

provided in this section or agreed to by the parties, there is a rebuttable

presumption that equal time-sharing of a minor child is in the best interests

of the minor child.”) (emphasis added); Daniels v. Caparello, 249 So. 3d 760

(Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (holding that mother could not challenge the terms of

the timesharing schedule on appeal because she expressly agreed to those

terms in the parties’ mediated settlement). See also Bryan v. Wheels, 295

So. 3d 889, 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“Modification proceedings are ‘entirely

different’ than initial custody decisions, . . . and courts have considerably less

discretion in considering them ‘because they disrupt children’s lives.’ Parties

seeking to modify a parenting plan must show ‘a substantial, material, and

unanticipated change in circumstances and . . . that the modification is in the

best interests of the child.”) (internal citations omitted); Garcia v. Guiles, 254

So. 3d 637, 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“‘Demonstrating to the court that there

has been a sufficient substantial change in circumstances places an

extraordinary burden on the party seeking to modify the underlying

judgment.’”) (citation omitted).